ISIS Recruitment in Tajikistan

Here is a bit from Jamestown Foundation on how ISIS is gaining recruits in Tajikistan:

Earlier this month, it was widely reported that the Islamic State had appointed a Tajikistani national to be Amir of Raqqa—the “capital” of the territory under the group’s control (BBC Tajik, September 2). Little is known about the alleged “Tajik Amir.” However, many fear that if the appointment is true, it would be a major propaganda coup in the effort to recruit more Tajikistanis to fight.

Some observers blame the uptick in recruiting on anti-Shia propaganda funded by the Gulf States. Satellite stations such as “Wesal TV” have Persian-language services designed to reach Sunni populations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Iran. In one video, a popular host, Shaykh Abdul Rahim Mollazadeh, can be seen accusing Iran of propagating Shia thought in Tajikistan, which he denounces as “intellectual cancer and lies” (YouTube, April 19). While Tajikistan’s population is predominantly Sunni, the sectarian identity has become increasingly salient in recent years as evidenced by a high-profile incident of Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, an influential cleric and political figure, who was accused of secretly being a Shia (see EDM, January 12, 2012). 

Imams as Part-Timers

In recent years, Tajikistan has taken a number of steps to diminish the role of Islam in society and bring religion under state control.  In the latest, the government wants religious leaders to get secular jobs:

The northern Sughd Province is expected to serve as the testing ground for a new effort to expand madrasah curriculums well beyond religious education.

The goal is to produce multi-skilled mullahs, ones who will not only depend on their followers or state funding to make a living...

"The main point is that mullahs should get regular jobs," Sharifov told journalists last week.

"Around 500 young people graduate from Sughd madrasahs every year. Most of them hope to become mullahs and mosque imams, and they expect people take care of them [financially.] The government can't accept this. Everyone has to have a profession, a job as a source of living," Sharifov said...

With the exception of the capital, Dushanbe, madrasahs throughout the country were shut down last year. The reason provided by the state committee for religious affairs was that the religious schools lacked proper teaching programs and specialists.

In other words, the Tajik government no longer sees religious leader as a real profession.

Tajik Islamists Support Woman

Tajikistan's Islamic Renaissance Party is supporting a woman in its upcoming presidential elections:

A secularist woman with a politically independent streak seems an odd choice for an Islamist party to support in Tajikistan's upcoming presidential race.

But for the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), Oinihol Bobonazarova offers an opportunity for victory in what is widely seen as an unwinnable election on November 6.

Bobonazarova, a human rights lawyer and activist, was tapped early this month to represent the United Reformist Forces, a merger that brings together the IRPT, the Social Democratic Party, and several nongovernmental groups and influential political players in the opposition.

The IRPT later confirmed its backing for Bobonazarova during a party congress, surprising observers who had watched the party groom its own potential candidates for years.

Bobonazarova is not really an IRPT nominee, but rather the candidate of a united opposition front of which it is a member.  She also has no chance of winning, and "victory" in the above excerpt means primarily a victory in messaging as Tajikistan's main Islamist group burnishes its moderate and democratic credentials.  Still, that burnishing could be a tough sell given the opposition to this endorsement from many conservative rank-and-file members.

Azerbaijan in the 'Stans

Robert Cutler takes a look at the geopolitical context of Azerbaijan's new investments in Tajikistan and Kyrgyztsan:

"An agreement was signed between the companies Azeraluminum and Tajik Aluminum Co (TALCO) during a state visit to Baku by Tajikistan's President Emomalii Rahmon last week for Azeraluminum to construct an oil refinery in his country...

"Earlier this year, SOCAR agreed to construct a US$250 million oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan with a capacity of 2 million tonnes per year, equivalent to about 40,000 barrels per day. This would reduce and possibly even eliminate Kyrgyzstan's dependence on Russia, on which it relies for imports of about 1.4 million tonnes per year, representing three-quarters of its oil and oil products consumption...

"Having thus reached already westwards, now Azerbaijan and SOCAR are extending their activities and influence eastwards beyond the Caspian Sea basin proper, to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in southern and southeastern Central Asia. The projects themselves are quantitatively minor, as such things go, but the countries involved are also relatively small; and since they are near the collision points not only of geological tectonic plates (producing the Himalaya mountains) but also geopolitical tectonic plates, the moves by Azerbaijan have a much larger potential geo-economic significance.

"That is especially so because, combined with initiatives from China, the given countries may be in the process of extricating themselves from a Russian sphere of influence inherited from the Soviet, indeed pre-Soviet, era. Over the past decade and half, China has become an extremely important player in the economy of Kyrgyzstan, through which it also penetrates the market for (re-exported) consumer goods in Uzbekistan."

Khorog Clashes

IWPR reports on clashes between government forces and a regional strongman in southeastern Tajikistan:

"Forty-two people died when Tajik government forces clashed with supporters of a renegade military commander in the remote southeastern province of Badakhshan, police agencies said...

"This outbreak of violence – highly unusual for this sparsely-populated, high-altitude region of Tajikistan – began on July when the provincial head of the national security service, Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, was killed in an attack outside Khorog.

"The authorities identified one Tolib Ayombekov as a possible suspect. Like the murdered man, Ayombekov was a member of the regular security forces, in his case as commander of a border guards unit at Ishkashim, close to the Afghan frontier...

"Ayombekov is a former rebel leader turned security forces member. Like many opposition commanders who fought the government during the 1992-97 civil war, he was given his command in the border guards force as part of the peace and reintegration agreement that ended the conflict."

According to the article, local strongmen such as Ayombekov have had more autonomy in Badakhshan because of its remoteness and small population.  The most interesting aspect of this is why Nazarov was killed, and whether he might have been interfering in a significant Ayombekov smuggling operation.

Rahmon's 2013 Preparations

In Tajikistan, President Emomali Rahmon's crackdown on non-governmental Islam continues:

"Muhiddin Kabiri, the Islamic Revival Party (IRPT) leader, led a group of politicians who raised concerns about the new legislation, noting that under the current law the Muslim Brotherhood is among the 14 banned Islamic groups. 'Tomorrow, for example, suppose that the leadership of our country were to meet with the presidents of Egypt or Tunisia, or that an ambassador or minister were to visit. How could an official of the Tajik government meet with a representative of this organization when it, according to Tajikistan’s Supreme Court, is designated as a terrorist organization?' (Ozodi.org, June 20). Given the rampant corruption in the security apparatus, it is also feared that the power to seize assets of the accused would add further financial incentive (to the already considerable political incentive) for the government to seek prosecutions.

Additionally, the parliament recently passed amendments to the 'Code of Administrative Offenses' that would fine citizens 2,000 to 4,000 Somoni ($420-840) for 'violation of the rules of getting religious education abroad' and would also fine Tajikistan’s religious organizations 1,200 to 1,600 Somoni ($250-335) 'for maintaining international relations with foreign religious organizations without notifying related national structures' (Asia Plus, June 6). Opposition parties were quick to criticize the amendments, citing the vague language and sweeping mandate of the legislation. They also complained of a dearth of religious education opportunities in the country and the over-regulation of existing state approved madrassas."

As explained by Mark Vinson in the linked article, the most likely reason is Rahmon's fear of Islamic or Islamist groups as a source of opposition ahead of the 2013 elections. Rahmon is particularly concerned in the wake of Iran's 2009 protests and, of course, the 2011 Arab Spring. Something similar undoubtedly lies behind his moves against the Turajonzoda family, which could serve as a high-profile rallying point for hypothetical protestors.

Rahmon and Turajonzoda's Mosque

Tajikistan's President Imomali Rahmon is targeting a key symbol of the Islamist opposition:

"The May 28 ruling to close the Muhammadiya Mosque – run by the family of Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, a popular theologian and charismatic leader during the country's civil war in the mid-1990s – marks the latest confrontation between the authorities and the powerful family...

"After 2005, when Rahmon demoted him from the cabinet to the senate, Turajonzoda became a critic of the president, and was sacked in 2010. Since then, he has made headlines for making disparaging comments about the president. In addition, he has reportedly mended fences with the IRPT, apparently fueling government fears of a resurgent Islamic opposition...

"Certainly, the Turajonzoda family is a powerful force. Their mosque in Vahdat regularly draws 15,000 men for Friday prayers. The sermons given at the mosque are sold on compact disks around the country."

The article explains both that there has been a series of moves against the Turajonzoda family going back several years, as well as attempts to limit Muslim religious life in the country and bring it under strict government control.  The official reason for closing this mosque is an accusation that it hosted Shi'ite rituals.  The fact the government of a president named "Imam Ali" finds that objectionable is rather peculiar, though the state's official religion is Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school.  Perhaps the regime doesn't want competition for this megamosque now under construction?

Danghara for Dushanbe?

In Tajikistan, there are rumors that President Emamoli Rahmon may move the capital to his native region:

"Danghara, a small town of 20,000 situated in Tajikistan’s southern lowlands, may not strike most observers as a likely spot to place a national capital. But locals are pointing to the resumption of work on a grand new international airport nearby to speculate that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon – a native of the area – intends to relocate his country’s seat of power to his modest hometown...

"The airport scheme is not the only reason Danghara’s residents are talking up their town as a possible successor capital. They point to other unusual capital projects that Tajikistan’s government has brought to the area, including a complete renovation of the town’s roads and extensive building construction. They also note that over the last 10 years, the government has steadily relocated families from the countryside to Danghara...

"But at least one government official close to Rahmon on the national stage has indicated his support for a change of capitals. Suhrob Shapirov, the former head of the Center for Strategic Research and a deputy in the Tajik parliament, told RFE/RL that he would support the move of the capital from Dushanbe to Danghara...

"And that does not take into account the local jealousies likely to be aroused by such a dramatic act of presidential nepotism. One resident of Khatlon Province who identified himself as Djamshed complained that 'even now, people are saying that the president is doing more for his hometown than others.'"

To me, the only truly suggestive thing in this is the airport. Why would you build your largest national airport around 75 miles from your capital and largest city? Danghara is in Khatlon Province, which is the most populous of Tajikistan's four main administrative divisions. Even if Dushanbe remains capital, it seems like Khatlon is where the business hub will be.

No Children in Mosques

Tajikistan is banning children from mosques:

"The new legislation has generated controversy by explicitly barring children under the age of 18 from 'participating in the activities of religious organizations,' which include mosques and other places of worship. Local analysts believe that the ban is aimed at preventing Tajik children from becoming radicalized. Presenting the bill in the parliament, Tajik Education Minister Abdujabbor Rahmonov, said: 'The draft law allows children that study in religious schools to attend mosques and join religious associations. However, children studying in secular schools are prohibited from doing so before they reach the age of 18.' He also said that children will still be allowed to participate in funerals and attend mosques during official religious holidays (www.avesta.tj, June 15)...

"Tajik legal experts and religious communities have condemned the ban on children’s visits to mosques as unconstitutional and anti-Islamic. Prominent Tajik lawyer and head of the country’s Social Democratic Party (SDPT) Rahmatillo Zoirov suggested that the parental responsibility bill includes some provisions which had already been stipulated in the constitution and the Family Code. At the same time, according to Zoirov, some provisions in the bill violate Tajikistan’s constitution and international human rights obligations (www.news.tj, June 20)...

"The ban on children attending places of worship has also drawn criticism from the country’s non-Islamic religious groups, including Russian Orthodox Christians and the Jewish community (www.rferl.org, February 17; www.forum18.org/Archive.php, May 25)."

Violence in Tajikstan

A wave of recent violence in Tajikistan has risen to the level of an attack on a military convoy:

"Details of the assault on the convoy, which occurred around midday on Sunday, have emerged slowly. Faridun Makhmadaliyev, a spokesman for the Tajik Defense Ministry, said by telephone on Monday that a column of military vehicles carrying about 80 soldiers was passing through the mountainous Rasht Valley, about 150 miles east of the capital, Dushanbe, when it was ambushed by gunmen in the heights above.

"The column sustained heavy fire from machine guns and grenade launchers, he said. At least 23 servicemen were killed and several others were critically wounded, he said. Other reports said that as many as 40 soldiers may have been killed...

"The assault came just weeks after a car packed with explosives rammed a police headquarters in northern Tajikistan, killing at least one person and wounding more than two dozen, in what apparently was a suicide attack. A few days later, a bomb exploded at a nightclub in Dushanbe, injuring seven people."

This rash of violence follows a militant prison break:

"Tajikistan faces a deteriorating security situation following the escape of 25 high-profile prisoners from a detention center in Dushanbe run by the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on August 23. The convicts escaped less than one week after they had been sentenced to lengthy terms in prison on charges related to terrorism and drug trafficking. Some of the escapees reportedly have ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), designated by the US State Department as a terrorist group, and rebel militants in Russia’s North Caucasus republics (www.asiaplus.tj, www.khovar.tj, August 23)...

"On September 8, a previously unknown Islamic group, Jamaat Ansarullah in Tajikistan, claimed responsibility for the bombing in Khujand. The group’s statement on an Islamist website frequently used by rebels in Chechnya said the attack was carried out 'in response to the killing and humiliation of our brothers and ordinary Muslims, which took place behind the walls of this building accursed by Allah' (www.kavkazcenter.com). Although many experts, including the deputy head of Tajikistan’s Islamic Revival Party, Umarali Hisaynov, doubt whether Jamaat Ansarullah exists, the statement reflects a growing frustration with the Tajik government’s increasingly harsh policies towards non-conventional Islamic movements. In the first eight months of this year alone, Tajik security agencies jailed more than 100 members of banned Islamic organizations (www.asiaplus.tj, September 11)."

Central Asian leaders, including Tajikistan's President Emamoli Rahmon, have used the threat of Islamic militancy to track down on dissent, but this violence is real.

The New IRP

Tajikistan's Islamic Renaissance Party makes for an interesting comparison with Islamist political parties in the Arab world:

"The IRP, the only officially registered Islamic party in Central Asia, has in the past depended heavily on support in the country's conservative east -- particularly Rasht Valley, the wartime stronghold of the Islamic opposition fighters. Today, the party boasts an increasing number of followers in other regions, including Kulob and Sughd, traditionally dominated by the pro-presidential party.

"The IRP broadened its support base in a number of ways. First, it sought to shed its image, cultivated since its founding in 1990, as a rural party followed by mullahs and religious conservatives. By replenishing its aging ranks, the party has made itself more appealing to intellectuals, businessmen, and students. Most of the IRP's candidates in the upcoming elections are in their 30s and 40s, and they include lawyers, teachers, entrepreneurs, and at least one professional sportsman...

"Unlike the publicity-shy Nuri, who wore a dark beard and donned a long cloak at official meetings, the clean-shaven Kabiri comes across as media-savvy, outspoken, and dynamic...

"Kabiri has sought support outside the party's traditional base -- making it his goal to appeal to young and educated Tajiks, including women."

One commonality I see is the desire to broaden appeal in exactly the ways mentioned. The political context is different, however, in that the government has made no attempt at co-option. In fact, it seems more interested in the Turkish model, as are its Central Asian neighbors.

SMS Divorce

RFE-RL reports on how labor migration affects Tajikistan's divorce rate:

"With jobs at home in dismally short supply, a significant percentage of Tajikistan's male population depends on seasonal work abroad to earn money that can be sent home in the form of remittances. But as this migrant culture takes root, long-distant marriages are increasingly ending in 'SMS divorce,' contributing to a spike in the country's divorce rate and leaving countless Tajik women without recourse...

"It is estimated that nearly a million Tajiks -- accounting for one out of every seven citizens and consisting mostly of men aged 18 to 60 -- depend on seasonal jobs in Russia or elsewhere abroad to make a living. The migratory nature of the work leads to prolonged periods away from home, a scenario that women's rights activists say negatively affects the institution of marriage in Tajikistan."

I suspect that the men in migrant communities often take up with women in the country where they work, leaving women in the labor sending country effectively out of luck in traditional societies.

Tablighi Jama'at in Tajikistan

I'm used to reading about Central Asian crackdowns on Hizb ut-Tahrir, but now Tajikistan is going after Tablighi Jama'at. Here's the case:

"An official from the interior ministry who asked not to be named told IWPR that Tablighi Jamaat did represent a real danger, although he did not offer evidence that members were involved in subversive activity within Tajikistan, apart from distributing Islamist pamphlets.

"'They’re extremists,' he said. 'Tablighi Jamaat wants to create an Islamic state. The movement is banned by the justice ministry, and the ban is there because they’re dangerous. They’ve studied illegally in Pakistan, and since they were there illegally, it’s more than likely they received training in terrorist camps.'

"On the group’s general aims, he said, 'They have dangerous plans. There’s intelligence information implicating Tablighi Jamaat members in acts of terrorism in India and Pakistan. In addition, supporters of the movement who have been detained in Dushanbe have been found to be in possession of propaganda leaflets and religious literature.'

The focus here is clearly on the group's ideology, despite some vague references to some members possibly being involved in terrorist activity in other countries and a credible assertion that it serves as a gateway to more militant organizations and networks. This also fits Tajikistan's pattern of trying to bring non-governmental religious organizations under control.

What does make the TJ case somewhat interesting is the idea, mentioned later in the article, that its loose organizational structure leads to recruitment of radical militants who try to take control of local branches. Most of what I know about this group comes from Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori's Muslim Politics, where it was an example of transnationalism and an example of the ways in which transnational groups often become localized. The people allegedly radicalizing the group in Tajikistan are coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan, though, which seems to put a new spin on the "localization" theme.

Gulen Schools Watched

I've occasionally raised the Gulen Movement as an example of an Islamic activist group that hasn't had its due impact in the scholarly literature because it does not operate in the Arab world, nor is Arabic one of its more important languages. Much of its influence comes from its extensive network of schools around the world, especially in Turkic countries. Central Asian governments, however, are starting to look at them with suspicion:

"In Turkmenistan, education authorities have ordered Turkish lyceums to scrap the history of religion from curriculums.

"In the only Persian-speaking country in the region, Tajikstan, the government, as well as academics, are wary of the possible spread of pan-Turkic ideas. They fear that these schools promote Turkish influence and the Turkish language in their country.

"However, it is Uzbekistan that has taken the toughest stance toward Turkish schools. In 1999, Tashkent closed all Turkish lyceums after its relationship with Ankara turned sour.

"This year, the authoritarian Uzbek government headed by President Islam Karimov took things a step further by arresting at least eight journalists who were graduates of Turkish schools. The journalists were found guilty of setting up an illegal religious group and of involvement in an extremist organization...

"Uzbek officials have expressed suspicions that Turkish-school graduates in government offices and other key institutions use their positions to weaken the secular government. They charge that graduates of Turkish schools promote an aggressive form of Islam and even a role for Islam in political life."

The charges in the last quoted paragraph are ridiculous. These governments are worried about religious organizations they can't control, and will toss out the standard charges to justify their crackdown.

UPDATE: IWPR is also reporting on this.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Holiday Globalization

Am American Christmas tradition hits Tajikistan:

"Tajiks added a new element to the traditional Nouruz celebrations this year -- a slightly modified version of Santa Claus.

"'Nouruz Santa's' long white beard and sack bear a striking resemblance to Santa Claus, but his robe and walking stick are more colorful and wrapped with flowers."

Tajik Laicism

Two bits of news reported recently by RFE-RL suggest that the major goals of Tajikistan's religious policy is and perhaps has been for some time to consolidate the state's control over religion. One is a draft bill giving priority to Hanafi Sunni Islam and banning the proselytizing of other religions. That law would also increase regulation of religious schools even as the government introduces a standardized Hanafism into its curriculum, without consulting religious leaders who may be sympathetic to the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party.

Tajikistan is not a Turkic nation, but its moves may be related to increasing Turkish influence in Central Asia as a model of Islamic modernity. Turkey is famous for its public secularism, but at the same time the government controls religious knowledge in the country, imposing Sunni teachings on the Alevi minority. I suspect the origins of this lie in efforts to break the power of the ulama and homogenize a Turkish nation. Similar issues are at play in Tajikistan, which is in the midst of a post-Soviet nation-building project, has a strong Islamist movement, and includes a substantial religious minority, in this case Isma'ili. It may also stem from an official nationalism seen when President Emamoli Rahmon dropped the "ov" from his name and urged Tajiks to return to their cultural roots in the post-Soviet era.

Hijabs in Tajikistan

Tajik religious leaders are joining government efforts to ban the hijab:

"In an official meeting with clerics and imams last week, the country’s Council of Islamic Clerics suggested that "foreign-made" hijabs are unsuitable for women in Tajikistan.

"Instead, the clerics have encouraged Tajik women to switch to the national costume, which consists of a dress reaching below the knee, worn with trousers. The color and length of the national costume vary depending on women’s individual tastes. A head scarf is considered optional...

"Cleric Qobiljon Boev, the head of the fatwa department at the council, says the clerics believe the imported hijabs 'do not meet Islamic standards.' He said the hijabs 'seem to be too tight.'"

Tajik Islam

RFE-RL reports on the growth of Islamic practice among young people in Tajikistan. This probably forms part of the rising interest in perceived national heritages after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Tajik authorities' fear of Islamic activism, however, continues to cause problems:

"The parents of 7-year-old Maryam are sending her to a school run by the Iranian Embassy in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe.

"She attends the Iranian school because, like many other Tajik girls who wear Islamic head scarves, Maryam wasn't allowed to enter her Tajik school when it opened last week.

"'I went to school on September 1, but [the teachers] didn't let me in,' she says. 'They told me to remove my head scarf. I didn't go to school anymore.'

"Tajikistan's Education Ministry outlawed the hejab in schools and universities last year and also demands that its students wear special uniforms. It's all part of the Tajik authorities' wider efforts to restrict the growing influence of Islam in society."

The USSR looked at all religion as backward, and in the case of Islam that was built upon centuries of Russian hostility, so it's not surprising that those with a Soviet education, both in the country's leadership and others in the older generation whom the article mentions, look askance upon these trends. Trying to suppress them, however, is likely to do more harm than good. After all, the people most skilled at smuggling Islamic materials past authorities are the very radicals the state would like to suppress.

Opposing Rahmon

Popular discontent with Tajikistan's government may be growing:

"But several protests have been held recently in the capital, Dushanbe, as well as in cities like Kulob, Panjakent, and Khorog. In one case, the appointment of a local official prompted a rally.

"'People are not afraid of the government's retaliation anymore,' says 22-year-old Safar, from the eastern Badakhshan region. 'What else can happen to us? With a university diploma in my pocket, I have to work like a slave in Russia, because I don't have any -- literally any -- job opportunities in Tajikistan. The situation can't possibly get any worse than this.'

"The attitudes of many Tajiks appear to have shifted recently, with skyrocketing food prices and energy shortages that left people freezing to death in their homes during the coldest winter in living memory."

Since Tajikistan relies on hydro-electricity for much of its energy supply, the recent drought has hurt more than just agriculture in the country.

Badakhshan

I wasn't sure what to make of the recent unrest in Tajikistan, but fortunately IWPR has solid coverage. There may be a link to drug smuggling out of Afghanistan.