Former Ba'athists in ISIS

Today people are talking about Liz Sly's Washington Post article on the role of former Iraqi Ba'athists within ISIS:

Even with the influx of thousands of foreign fighters, almost all of the leaders of the Islamic State are former Iraqi officers, including the members of its shadowy military and security committees, and the majority of its emirs and princes, according to Iraqis, Syrians and analysts who study the group.

They have brought to the organization the military expertise and some of the agendas of the former Baathists, as well as the smuggling networks developed to avoid sanctions in the 1990s and which now facilitate the Islamic State’s illicit oil trading...

The public profile of the foreign jihadists frequently obscures the Islamic State’s roots in the bloody recent history of Iraq, its brutal excesses as much a symptom as a cause of the country’s woes...

Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliph, the former officers became more than relevant. They were instrumental in the group’s rebirth from the defeats inflicted on insurgents by the U.S. military, which is now back in Iraq bombing many of the same men it had already fought twice before. 

The entire article is worth reading, and highlights elements of continuity between Iraq before and after Saddam Hussein which are too often overshadowed by the dramatic changes at the top. (I previously discussed some of these here.)  Although Ba'athist ideology was secular, the actual Ba'ath parties were more institutions by which entrenched regimes maintained power, and so Iraq's freely adopted a form of internally aggressive salafism during the 1990's.  From there, it was an easy shift into the salafi-laced anti-American insurgency and ultimately ISIS today.  I suspect this is some of what is covered in Amatzia Baram's recent book Saddam Husayn and Islam, which I have not read.

This does not mean that ISIS is simply the reconstituted Ba'ath or Sunni insurgency from ten years ago.  The organization has at times and in places distanced itself quite strongly from elements of Ba'athism and Saddam Hussein's regime.  Nonetheless, it is recruiting from the disaffected Sunni heartland of Iraq which was the Ba'athists' social base, and which has lots of former military and intelligence men whose training allows them to take over key positions in the organization.

Suleyman Shah's Tomb

Turkey controls a tiny exclave about 20 miles south of its border, an exclave around the tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of Osman, consider the first Ottoman ruler.  Ishaan Tharoor writes about how it matters today:

So potent was the symbolism of this Ottoman ancestor's tomb that the new Turkish republic concluded an agreement in 1921 with France, then Syria's colonial ruler, guaranteeing Ankara's ownership over the site. Since at least the 1970s, when the tomb was relocated following the damming of the Euphrates, a Turkish guard has been posted there to protect it.

The arrangement over the tomb, in most circumstances, would be a curious footnote of history. But it now may be at the heart of a battle in one of the more intense fronts of the brutal, three-year-long Syrian civil war. The site is not far from the border city of Kobane, where the extremist fighters of the Islamic State have been advancing on Syrian Kurdish militias. The battles of the past few weeks prompted the single most dramatic refugee exodus of the whole war: a conspicuous moment, given that the conflict has displaced roughly a quarter of all Syrians.

As Syrian Kurdish militias struggle to resist the Islamic State, it's believed that the tomb has been encircled by Islamic State forces and that the Turkish soldiers guarding it have been taken hostage. Details are a bit murky. 

Kurds accuse Turkey of tacitly supporting ISIS in the region, which the Turks vociferously deny.

ISIS Recruitment in Tajikistan

Here is a bit from Jamestown Foundation on how ISIS is gaining recruits in Tajikistan:

Earlier this month, it was widely reported that the Islamic State had appointed a Tajikistani national to be Amir of Raqqa—the “capital” of the territory under the group’s control (BBC Tajik, September 2). Little is known about the alleged “Tajik Amir.” However, many fear that if the appointment is true, it would be a major propaganda coup in the effort to recruit more Tajikistanis to fight.

Some observers blame the uptick in recruiting on anti-Shia propaganda funded by the Gulf States. Satellite stations such as “Wesal TV” have Persian-language services designed to reach Sunni populations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Iran. In one video, a popular host, Shaykh Abdul Rahim Mollazadeh, can be seen accusing Iran of propagating Shia thought in Tajikistan, which he denounces as “intellectual cancer and lies” (YouTube, April 19). While Tajikistan’s population is predominantly Sunni, the sectarian identity has become increasingly salient in recent years as evidenced by a high-profile incident of Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, an influential cleric and political figure, who was accused of secretly being a Shia (see EDM, January 12, 2012). 

Conflict Begetting Conflict: ISIS This 9/11

I don't post about 9/11 every year, because I usually don't feel I have anything new or important to say.  This year seems to call for it, in part because of the sharp rise to prominence of al-Qaeda's former Iraq affiliate, which now claims to be the (implied one true) Islamic State, and tries to urge all Muslims to migrate to it.

I can't, however, shake my hatred of the situation, not only of the rise of ISIS, but the way conflict fuels more conflict, and necessary evils often thrive, even if they are still evil.  Al-Qaeda itself did not rise from a vacuum, but rather made organizationally incarnate an ideology developed in Afghanistan during the 1980's war, when those influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's program of Islamic identity-based activism hooked up with those influenced by the puritanical law-centered Islam brought by volunteer fighters from Saudi Arabia.  It was then fueled by perceptions of the sanctions placed on Iraq in the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War, perceptions engineered by Saddam Hussein manipulating the situation so that lots of innocent Iraqi suffering could be advertised.

Al-Qaeda entered Iraq with the Anglo-American invasion of 2003, and ISIS, a moniker I prefer to  "Islamic State" in solidarity with those who deny their claims, having been beaten in Iraq, gained new life from the civil war in Syria.  There, another evil dictator, Bashar al-Assad, enabled it, letting transnational salafi jihadists out of prison and avoiding taking them on directly so he could claim that al-Qaeda affiliates and fellow travelers were his major enemies.  Although President Obama has pledged to find Syrians to work with who are in neither the al-Qaeda nor the Assad camp, I am dubious that any are strong enough, and such a policy will certainly prolong a civil war that has already claimed 200,000 lives.

In other words, thirteen years after 9/11, evil is on the march.  Civilizational hatreds run wild across social media.  I suspect that if contained, ISIS in Iraq at least will collapse under its own weight.  Much human suffering would happen in the meantime, with northern Iraq's religious demography probably never being the same.  It is an open question whether this will be the crisis which makes Iraqi democracy by causing the downfall of budding strongman Nouri al-Maliki and the rise of a prime minister seemingly more committed to being a leader of all Iraqis.  Perhaps, however, there is a sort of hope in the unity with which most reject ISIS:

IS has achieved something scarcely conceivable in the Middle East by uniting the bitterest of foes in a common purpose. Such diverse actors as Europeans and Kurds, the embattled Syrian regime along with many of the rebels opposing it, Turkey, a slew of Arab states, as well as Israel and the Iraqi government itself have all clamoured for American intervention. Even Iran, though unenthusiastic about the Americans’ return to a theatre that it has worked hard to squeeze them out of, has accepted a tacit, temporary alliance with the Great Satan.

Kirkuk Future Postponed

I don't remember if I said it on this blog or not, but back in June, I speculated that the biggest long-term consequence of ISIS seizing Mosul would be the Kurds seizing Kirkuk and probably pushing for statehood.  Enough has happened since then that the view is clearly wrong.  Even in Kirkuk, ISIS remains the priority:

Talk of the city's future stopped in light of events, until Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, on June 30 called for a referendum on the annexation of Kirkuk, sparking angry reactions in the Iraqi capital. Ultimately, however, Barzani's statement was also put on the back burner, after IS sparked a larger confrontation with the peshmerga on the Nineveh plains and threatened Erbil, prompting US and international military intervention.

After that, the convulsive rhetoric between Baghdad and Erbil changed. The different tone coincided with the appointment of Haider al-Abadi as prime minister-designate, and military cooperation between the peshmerga and Iraqi forces. This cooperation resulted in advances on a number of fronts, and in particular, led to taking control of the town of Amerli, south of Kirkuk, and then moving to open the Kirkuk-Baghdad highway...

Although the Turkmen prefer for Kirkuk to be an autonomous region, they too have view the picture from a different angle today with IS in the picture. According to Hussein, "The best solution is for Kirkuk to be an autonomous region. Given that Kurds comprise a majority, they would have an upper hand in the administration, alongside the Arabs and Turkmen, for at least around 10 years. Later on, the issue of its fate could be raised again. Yet currently the situation of Kirkuk is very sensitive, so we can't discuss the issue. The enemy is just 15 kilometers from the city center, and any mistake or misunderstanding would mean no Kirkuk or its fate to discuss."

None of the Kirkuk Arab politicians who spoke to Al-Monitor touched on the issue of the city's fate, the magnitude of the current crises superseding specifying a position on Article 140. Mohammed Khalil al-Jubouri, head of the Arab group in the Kirkuk Provincial Council, issued a statement Aug. 29 calling for the formation of a special force that would include the city's minorities to expel IS from Kirkuk's eastern and southern regions. "The Arab tribes of Hawija and al-Dibs confirmed their opposition to the organization [led by Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi. They formed forces to fight it, and must be aided and supported militarily and logistically," he said.

ISIS Financing

Interesting point from The Economist about the financing of the would-be Islamic State:

IS's mission is to create its own caliphate, but until now many of its sources of revenue have depended on its host states. In Iraq, the money that IS extorted from contractors, businesses and institutions ultimately derived from the expenditure of the central government in Baghdad. In both countries, IS’s “subjects” include thousands of employees of the respective central governments, who are still drawing their salaries from the government and carrying out their functions.

IS also depends on established infrastructure. Most of the electricity generated in Syria comes from power stations in regime-controlled areas and is transmitted through a national grid, which includes IS-held zones. These plants run on natural gas produced from fields under regime control. One exception has been an associated gas plant known as Conoco (after the American company that built it in the early 2000s) not far from Deir ez-Zor. Until recently it was operated under the protection of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's official branch in Syria, which was kicked out of Deir ez-Zor in July, and the gas was pumped to the Jandar power station, south of Homs. It is not clear whether this arrangement has continued since IS seized control.

In July IS overran the Al Shaer natural gas plant between Homs and Palmyra. On this occasion the regime had no interest in ceding control of a vital energy asset to IS, and within two weeks it was back in Mr Assad’s army’s control, albeit badly damaged. The prospect of the Mosul dam and hydroelectric plant remaining under IS control prompted a similarly robust response from the Iraqi government and its Kurdish and Western backers, who on August 18th to have recaptured it.

In other words, Syria and Iraq both have large public sectors, with lots of government employees and significant government contracts, and these, along with infrastructure, have continued to direct wealth into ISIS-controlled territory.  The blog post suggests that this is a spigot governments can turn off, forcing ISIS to spend money on their territory rather than simply extracting it.

Anti-Arab Sentiment in Kurdistan

Cathrin Schaer reports on rising anti-Arab sentiment in Iraqi Kurdistan:

These are just a sample of the kinds of comments that Iraqi Kurdish social media users have been posting online. Others added even more vitriol, reporting that relatives serving in the Iraqi military, who were fighting the Islamic State group, said they were shot at by ordinary Arabs in contested areas. They also said that the ordinary Arabs in contested areas were providing the extremists with intelligence.

The online anger against Arabs that started as random messages on social media has also evolved into online campaigning in some cases, with one group starting a Facebook page “for the expulsion of Arabs from Iraqi Kurdistan”. A group of Facebook campaigners also began to organise a demonstration against Arabs in Iraqi Kurdistan, even though Iraqi Kurdish authorities forbade it.

Two weekends ago, the UK-based website Middle East Eye reported on an impromptu demonstration held in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil. The mostly young men involved apparently set up checkpoints on the street to police anyone driving by, that they suspected was Arab. The protestors also tried to vandalise property they thought belonged to Arabs. Iraqi Kurdish security forces broke the protest up.

From the article as a whole, it sounds like a lot of this relates to ISIS's coasting on Sunni Arab grievances against the Maliki government in Baghdad. Many Sunni Arabs either work directly with ISIS, seeing it as the lesser evil, or are openly hostile to the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi army operating in their region even if they are neutral on or hostile to the ISIS against which that army is campaigning.  Where Kurds and Shi'ites see ISIS as the primary issue, an evil against which all must unite, the nuances of Sunni Arab views and experiences easily become lost.

ISIS and "Friends"

Way back when ISIS seized Mosul, I emphasized how it was dependent on alliances with other Sunni militants and that the fraying of such alliances could be the key to its downfall.  Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel has more analysis along those lines:

Most of the Sunni groups have insisted that they are in control of key areas and facilities and have pushed back ISIS where necessary. For example, the Islamic Army of Iraq prevented ISIS from entering Dulu’iya after they took control of it due to ideological differences between the movements (al-Arabiya [Dubai], June 11). Al-Maliki has tried to manipulate Sunni tribal anxiety by encouraging Arab tribal leaders in northern areas to fight ISIS (BasNews [Erbil], July 8). There have been skirmishes between these tribes and ISIS militants but for any real impact on the ground Sunnis must turn against ISIS in much greater numbers.

What is clear, however, is the increasing tension between former the Ba’ath party, JRTN factions and ISIS. These groups have already been involved in deadly clashes in the Kirkuk area with reports of JRTN assassination campaigns against ISIS leaders in the Diyala region (al-Sumaria [Baghdad], June 22; Shafaq News [Erbil] July 9). There are other reports of generalized clashes between tribal forces and ISIS in Mosul, Salahuddin and in other areas (al-Mustakbal [Baghdad], July 12; al-Estiqama [Baghdad], July 11). 

With so many groups and varying end games, the danger of Sunni infighting can only grow. Furthermore, the more Sunni groups in the field, the more difficult it becomes to establish a negotiating partner. Sunni tribes have to find a solution to ISIS, but are more likely to deal with that problem when al-Maliki is removed from power and a Sunni region is endorsed under an agreement. Either way, Sunni tribes have learned their lesson from the disappointments of the first Awakening initiative and Sunni support to expel ISIS or offer Baghdad any respite will not come cheap this time around. 

This comes at the end of a careful overview of the major armed forces in the anti-Maliki coalition.

Some Medieval Travelers on Jonah and Mosul

Today ISIS destroyed the Mosque of Jonah in Mosul, which some articles suggest contained his tomb.  Here is what the tenth century Muslim traveler al-Maqdisi (sometimes al-Muqaddasi) reported about the prophet and Mosul (in Basil Collins' translation):

In the countryside near Mosul are the Mosque of Jonah, and other places associated with his name.  Close to ancient Nineveh is a place known as Hill of Repentance atop which is a mosque, and residences for the devout.  It was built by Jamila, daughter of Nasir al-Dawla, and she settled a considerable bequest on it.  It is said that seven visits to it equal a Pilgrimage to Mecca; it is visited on Thursday nights.  It is the place whither the people of Jonah went when they were convinced of impending chastisement.  Half a farsakh from this place is the Spring of Jonah.  Outside the town of Balad is a spring out of which it is claimed Jonas emerged: healing of leprosy is its waters.  Here is a mosque in his name, and also the place of the gourd plant.

I don't know the geography in question, but I think the destroyed mosque is a much-renovated version of the one endowed by Jamila, a princess of the 10th century Hamdanid dynasty whose territory roughly parallels that ruled by ISIS now, with Aleppo and a chunk of southeastern Turkey as important additions.  In the Qur'an, a gourd grew to cover Jonah (Arabic "Yunus") after the whale spit him out.  Here is Ibn Jubayr in the 1100s (Roland Broadhurst translation):

Among the benefits God has especially conferred on this town is that about a mile to the east of it, across the Tigris, is the Hill of Penitence.  It is the hill on which stood Jonah with his people and prayed with them until God relieved them of their distress.  Near to this hill, also about a mile away, is the blessed spring named after him.  It is said that en enjoined his people to purify themselves in it and to take thought of repentance, and that then they ascended the hill praying.  On the hill is a large edifice which acts as an asylum for the needy with many chambers, rooms, and ablution and drinking chambers, all approached by one door.  In the middle of this door is a pavilion over which hangs a curtain, and below this is bolted a blessed door, wholly inlaid.  It is related that this is the place where Jonah stood and that the mihrab of this pavilion was the chamber in which he worshipped.  Around the pavilion are candles, thick as the trunks of palm-trees.  Men go out to this asylum every Friday night and there devote themselves to God's worship.

Mosul's Christian Exodus

The latest news from Caliph Ibrahim's Land of Horrors is that the last remnant of Mosul's Christian community has fled.  The group which I prefer to still call ISIS had summoned them to a meeting Thursday to discuss the community's status.  When Christians did not appear, the group issued the declaration they were probably going to issue anyway, requiring Christians to convert to Islam, pay a special tax, or depart.  The option of departure means giving up their possessions, but that is the one Christians have apparently chosen en masse:

A YouTube video shows ISIS taking sledgehammers to the tomb of Jonah, something that was also confirmed by Mr. Hikmat. The militants also removed the cross from St. Ephrem’s Cathedral, the seat of the Syriac Orthodox archdiocese in Mosul, and put up the black ISIS flag in its place. They also destroyed a statue of the Virgin Mary, according to Ghazwan Ilyas, the head of the Chaldean Culture Society in Mosul, who spoke by telephone on Thursday from Mosul but seemed to have left on Friday...

For the Christians displaced from Mosul, sudden departure has meant a series of treks — first to nearby Christian villages like Bartella and Hamdaniya, already badly overcrowded, then to Kurdistan, a semiautonomous region of Iraq where there is more tolerance for Christians.

As the Christians leave Mosul, ISIS has painted the Arabic letter that means “Nasrani,” from Nazrene, a word often used to refer to Christians, on their homes. Next to the letter, in black, are the words: “Property of the Islamic State of Iraq.”

The militants have also told Muslims who rent property from Christians that they no longer need to pay rent, said a businessman who rents from a Christian. The landlord now lives in Lebanon.

Jonah is a prophet in Islam.  The militants are probably destroying his tomb out of concerns veneration of the prophet distracts from worship due only to God, the same reason many Muslim sites have been destroyed in Saudi Arabia.

Mosul's Christian community, which via the city's absorption of neighboring Nineveh may even date from apostolic times, will probably never come back.

ISIS's Electricity Binge and Water

In Syria, the ISIS has sharply increased electricity generation from a critical dam, causing water shortages elsewhere:

Under the watch of the  Islamic State group - formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - levels in Lake Assad have dropped so low that pumps used to funnel water east and west are either entirely out of commission or functioning at significantly reduced levels. The shortages compel residents in Aleppo and Al Raqqa to draw water from unreliable sources, which can pose serious health risks.

The primary reason behind the drop appears to be a dramatic spike in electricity generation at the Euphrates Dam in al-Tabqa, which has been forced to work at alarmingly high rates...

"Ten years ago the government told engineers to forget this dam for energy [generation] … that it is only a strategic reserve of water," Waleed said. "Normally we should not use more than one or two of the turbines for more than four or five hours per day. But for the last month and a half they have been using eight at full [capacity]..."

At the beginning of May, electricity supply in rebel-confrolled al-Raqqa suddenly spiked, reaching up to 16 hours per day - unheard of in Syria's conflict-ridden northern provinces.

It sounds like ISIS tried to endear themselves to the inhabitants of Raqqa by providing more electricity, but in a way that was unsustainable and that continues to cause significant water shortages elsewhere, most notably in Aleppo.

ISIS Alienates Allies

About a week ago I commented that ISIS's success in Iraq depended on a confluence of interests with entirely Iraqi Sunni Arab militias, and that the former al-Qaeda affiliate could easily wear out its welcome.  That might be happening sooner than I expected:

The first signs of a split emerged on Saturday, with reports of fighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Naqshbandi Army, formed by officers from the former dictator Saddam Hussein’s military, that left 17 people dead.

The fighting in Hawija, in Kirkuk province, on Friday was sparked by the refusal of Naqshbandi fighters to give up their weapons and pledge allegiance to ISIL, a security official said.

However, witnesses said the two sides clashed over who would take control of fuel tankers in the area...

ISIL’s strict enforcement of its religious convictions, such as the destruction of tombs and other cultural symbols in Mosul, has raised misgiving among other members.

This friction may be compounded by public frustration over power outages and fuel shortages in captured territory...

Elsewhere, too, ISIL’s tough measures have begun alienating those who initially did not oppose their military campaign.

The tribal areas of Kirkuk province, where ISIL has a strong presence, are starting to resent the group’s behaviour, said Mohammed Mohammed, who runs the Arab affairs division of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan office in Kirkuk city.

ISIL has killed youths from the tribes for unspecified reasons and demanded that residents repent for their sins, angering leaders of the two main tribal confederations in the area, said Mr Mohammed, whose office is in regular contact with residents there.

ISIS Recruits in Riyadh

Bloomberg reports on ISIS recruitment flyers that turned up in Riyadh last month:

The evidence showed up last month in Riyadh, where drivers woke up to find leaflets stuffed into the handles of their car doors and in their windshields. They were promoting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which has grabbed the world’s attention by seizing parts of northern Iraq. The militant group is also using social media, such as Twitter and YouTube, to recruit young Saudi men.

Already at war with the governments of Iraq and Syria, ISIL also poses a potential threat to the Al Saud family’s rule over the world’s biggest oil exporter. Saudi authorities gained the upper hand in their battle with Al Qaeda, which targeted the kingdom a decade ago, yet analysts said the latest generation of militants may be harder to crush...

In the leaflets, the group warned against Muslims with “fake beards,” or those who pretend to be followers of Islam but are really its enemy, according to copies posted on Twitter by residents of the capital...

ISIL’s printed literature also accused Western nations of using the war on “terror” to assault the Muslim world, a message that may ring true with some Saudis, who are suspicious of the US role in the Middle East.

ISIS and Maliki's Legitimacy Gap

I've seen some headlines in mainstream news sources talking about the "Fall of Iraq."  This is a terrible misreading of what is happening with ISIS's expansion in the country's north and west.  Consider this reporting:

That many Sunnis would prefer to take their chances under a militant group so violent it was thrown out of Al Qaeda sharply illustrates how difficult it will be for the Iraqi government to reassert control. Any aggressive effort by Baghdad to retake the city could reinforce the Iraqi Army’s reputation as an occupying force, rather than a guarantor of security...

And most said the militants in Mosul had not terrorized the population and were keeping a low profile, with a small number of men in black masks staffing checkpoints...

Each security sweep that rounds up innocent Sunni men in the name of fighting terrorism has deepened resentment in the Sunni population toward the government, especially the Shiite-dominated army...

The events over the last several days in Mosul — which is majority Sunni, although it has a sizable population of Kurds and some Shiites, too — highlight what critics have said for years: that Sunnis see the army not as a national force but as the protector of the Shiite population. A Western diplomat, in a recent interview, said that in places such as Mosul and Anbar Province, the security forces are regarded as “a foreign force in their own country.”

But residents of Mosul say that so far the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has handled the local population with a light touch. Some residents, hardened by their hatred of the army, spoke of the insurgents almost as if they were a liberating army. The militants, residents said, greet people at checkpoints and ask citizens if they are carrying a weapon, and if the answer is no, they let them on their way.

Many spoke of being able to move around the city more freely for the first time in years, after the militants unblocked roads that the army had shut down for security reasons and took down the blast walls that had become a permanent feature of nearly every major Iraqi city over the last decade...

One of the Mosul residents who escaped to Erbil was Atheel Nujaifi, the governor of Nineveh Province, where Mosul is. In an interview on Thursday, he said that one of the reasons Mosul was quiet on Thursday — and the citizens felt comfortable returning — was the presence of other groups, like tribal militias and a group led by former Baathist officers, in addition to the Islamists.

So what's happening there is that during his years as prime minister, Maliki has monopolized political and economic power in the hands of Shi'ite allies from the country's south, including violating understandings with Sunni leaders who helped end the anti-government insurgency late in the Bush administration in conjunction with the U.S. "surge."  Sunnis have revolted against this, and the national army has essentially been occupying Sunni areas on behalf of a hostile national government.  When ISIS arrived, the national army simply melted away, and Mosulis felt liberated to go about their lives.  ISIS itself does not fully occupy the city, but co-exists alongside local militias, much as it does in Anbar.

This shows the limits of ISIS's expansion.  Once it hits largely Shi'ite Baghdad, it will come crashing to a halt, and t will make no headway in Shi'ite and Kurdish areas of the country.  What's more, within the Sunni areas, it must tread carefully to avoid wearing out its welcome.

ISIS in Fallujah

Raed el-Hamed has interesting information on ISIS's political position in Fallujah:

Following a successful entry into Fallujah in January 2014, which ISIS wanted as a stepping stone for attacks against Baghdad, the group formed an implicit agreement with tribal insurgents and the local military council, which includes armed former opposition factions and some former army officers. According to this agreement, ISIS can be present in Fallujah proper but may not launch revenge attacks against public property, former officials, party leaders, or former Awakening members, while also refraining from labeling any others as infidels (takfir), raising its flag, or forcing others to swear allegiance. The agreement also dictates that ISIS is to act in full coordination with the military council and the tribal insurgents in everything related to military action or civil administration, and cannot unilaterally claim credit for any attack on government troops.

ISIS prospers in Iraq only because it has convinced Sunni Arabs that it can be an effective partner against the Maliki government.  This suggests to me its allies could easily turn on it if it becomes too aggressive in trying to dominate the territory it occupies.  That said, I don't think pushing for shari'a law will matter to religiously conservative tribes.  ISIS needs to let them control economic resources.

ISIS in Mosul

With two million people, Mosul is Iraq's second largest city.  Its capture by the former al-Qaeda affiliate ISIS is thus a major coup:

The capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) — an offshoot of Al Qaeda — and its allies followed four days of fighting in the northern city and attacks in other towns.

Residents said ISIL black flags and banners were flying on captured government buildings...

In a speech on Tuesday, Iraq’s Shiite prime minister Nouri Al Maliki urged the international community to support his country in its fight against “terrorism” and asked parliament to declare a state of emergency.

State television said the speaker of parliament had scheduled an emergency session for Thursday to vote on the motion, which requires a two-thirds majority...

On Monday, governor Atheel Nujaifi made a televised plea to the people of Mosul to stand their ground and fight. Hours later, Mr Nujaifi himself narrowly escaped the provincial headquarters in Mosul after militants besieged it.

Mr Nujaifi’s brother Osama, who is parliament speaker, called on the leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to deploy the region’s peshmerga forces to Mosul and wrest it back from “terrorists”.

The KRG’s prime minister Nechirvan Barzani said his region had tried to coordinate with Iraqi federal authorities to protect Mosul, but Baghdad’s stance had made it impossible.

First, for those who are confused about the group's name, it includes in addition to the Iraq the word "al-Sham."  This refers historically to a sort of greater region of Syria much the same as the somewhat dated English term "Levant."  At the same time, even though Syria's official name in Arabic is "Suriya," you will hear people use "Sham" to refer to the country.  Hence, depending on your translation, you get either ISIS or ISIL.

ISIS/L was formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, and since 2010 has been led by a man named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, about whom little is known for sure.  It became involved in Syria's civil war, and birthed an offshoot, Jabhat al-Nusra, also an al-Qaeda affiliate.  However, sometime in 2013, it had a falling out with al-Qaeda Central and JN; the former has disowned it, and the latter is part of a coalition of Syria rebel groups that are now fighting ISIS as well as the regime. 

ISIS still, however, controls a swathe of territory along the Euphrates River in eastern Syria and western Iraq.  Adding Mosul along the upper Tigris is a significant addition to its burgeoning state. Indeed, given its growth and battlefield successes, it is fair to ask whether it is now more important than al-Qaeda Central under Osama bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  In addition to the wide swathe of central Middle Eastern territory it controls, it has cells in at least Turkey and Lebanon.

The fall of Mosul also has ramifications for Iraqi politics, especially during the coalition-building period after the recent parliamentary elections.  As noted above, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has called for a nationwide state of emergency, one which would give the already autocratic leader broad new powers.  The article also notes the possibility that Kurdish forces could play a role in attempts to retake Mosul, a possibility which is caught up in relations between the Kurds and al-Maliki's government.

Insurgents in Mosul

The always valuable Joel Wing analyses the rise of the new Iraqi insurgency in the northern city of Mosul and its surrounding state of Ninewa:

Ninewa is once again an urban bastion of the insurgency. Several different groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunni, Naqshibandi and perhaps others have rebuilt their networks throughout the province, and are carrying out a steady campaign to wear down the government, security forces, and people. Militants earn a huge amount of money through their extortion rings in Mosul to carry out these operations. They are also able to bring in fighters and supplies from Syria through Ninewa. Their tactics appear to be working, as there are more and more stories of militants being able to act uninhibited in the province. The Americans and Iraqis were never quite able to shake the hold of the insurgency over Mosul. Now it is back and terrorizing the area. The governorate is a perfect location because many in the populace and political class are opposed to Baghdad. That offers more opportunities for at least passive support of the militants, especially for groups like the Naqshibandi that play upon nationalist themes. In turn, the bases in Ninewa can be used to launch further attacks into the central part of the country. The province is therefore an important battleground between the government and militants, which the former is losing.

Read the whole thing for details. Part of the analysis details how government forces alienated the population in the context of the anti-Maliki protest movement that's been going on for some time now.

Syrian al-Qaeda and the Kurds

Continuing the theme that the al-Qaeda-like groups in Syria are now battling against their fellow anti-Assad forces, a Kurdish rebel official named Redur Khalil explains the battle his militias are waging against Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS:

Since Jul. 16 our forces have been constantly engaging in clashes with Al Qaeda-linked groups like Jabhat al Nusra and, especially, the ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – all across our territory.

These terrorist groups have not only killed and abducted Kurdish people and displaced civilians from their villages but also looted their properties, homes and places of work. After heavy clashes in areas like Afrin, 340 km north of Damascus, and Serekaniye, 506 km north of Damascus, we have pushed them down to Til Kocer, 840 km northeast of Damascus on the Syria-Iraq border.

Khalil claims that these groups are supported in their efforts by Turkey, which would prefer not to have a strong Kurdish autonomous area in Syria to go with the one in Iraq.  If those allegations are true, then it is short-sighted on the Erdogan government's part, since a Syria dominated by salafi militants poses the risk of long-term instability on the border from which the Kurds are likely to benefit anyway.  My best guess is that there is simply a confluence of both the Turkish army putting pressure on the armed Kurdish groups and the al-Qaeda types waging steady battles, but not actual support from one to the other.

A Battle in Azaz

A town called Azaz in northern Syria has been the site of clashes between fighters associated with al-Qaeda and other anti-regime forces:

The latest clashes were sparked, rebels say, because ISIS, which sees Syria as a battleground for a Sunni holy war and views other Muslim sects as heretics and Westerners as miscreants, kicked up a fuss about a German doctor working in a local hospital who had apparently filmed the treatment of one of their fighters. Fighting broke out between ISIS and Northern Storm, the local rebel brigade which was guarding the hospital. Northern Storm was ejected from the town, and called in other local groups to help.

Aleppo's most prominent rebel group, the moderate Liwa al-Tawheed, appears to have brokered a ceasefire in Azaz. But similar clashes are breaking out in other areas of the north and east, too, though moderate rebel groups still dominate western and southern Syria. In another murky episode on the same day, ISIS battled rebels in the eastern city of Deir Ezzor, near the Iraqi border, reportedly taking scores hostage. On September 13th ISIS declared war on two other groups in Aleppo, in an operation named “Expunging Filth”. Last month, after a series of assassinations, it pushed out Ahfad al-Rasoul, one of the largest moderate groups fighting Mr Assad, from Raqqa, a central city that fell to rebels in March. 

I wonder how closely this fits the pattern of the Anbar Awakening, in which al-Qaeda-style fighters ultimately wore out their welcome with those whose cause they claimed as their own.  In that Iraqi case, the tribal shaykhs began cooperating with the United States and in practice the Iraqi government to ensure at least some local control over their areas of the country.  In Syria, it may be that the ISIS, including its foreign elements, is also pushing things by trying to create its own power structure, and thus threatening local authority networks that have sprung up or asserted themselves with the collapse of institutions associated with the Assad regime.