CORE 183c: The Middle East

Colgate University's general education program includes a "Core Cultures" component designed to introduce students to the interdisciplinary study of a region of the non-Western world and its relationships with the West. As you might expect, I'm teaching one on the Middle East. Here's my syllabus for that.

CORE 183C: The Middle East
108 Alumni Hall, 1:20 MW
Dr. Brian Ulrich

Office: 309 Alumni Hall, Ex. 7556 (Office Hours: 10 – 11 a.m. MWF or by appointment)

Required Texts:
Understanding the Contemporary Middle East, 3rd Edition, ed. Jillian Schwedler and Deborah J. Gerner
A History of the Arab Peoples, 1st Edition, Albert Hourani
The Edward Said Reader, ed. Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin
Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits, Laila Lalami
In Search of Islamic Feminism, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea
The Ornament of the World, Maria Rosa Menocal

Reserve Texts with Required Readings:

Electronic reserves found on Blackboard

This course will introduce students to important aspects of the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the deep connections between the Middle East and what we think of today as “the West” both throughout history and in the modern world. Whereas most courses are designed to clarify topics, it is hoped that students will emerge from this one confused about many of the complex issues we will address, but that this confusion is grounded in increased knowledge of the region and a textured understanding of life away from the crisis-inspired headlines that draw many to study it.

Exam dates and due dates for major papers will not change for any reason, and students who have unavoidable conflicts must see me for alternate arrangements as soon as they become known. Small assignments will usually be announced one or two class periods in advance, and will receive reduced credit if handed in late. Occasional quizzes may check student comprehension of readings and other course material and cannot be made up. Attendance in class is mandatory, and missing more than two class periods will result in a reduced participation grade. Participation, however, is more than just attendance, and will reflect your asking and answering of questions and participation in discussions. The instructor may change readings during the course of the semester.

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated and handled according to Colgate procedures. Any text in taken from another source in an assignment must be noted with quotation marks and the original source indicated. On some assignments, all information, regardless of whether exact words are used, must be cited via footnotes. Furthermore, due to the importance of participation and handing in assignments in a timely manner, misrepresentation of the reasons for an absence or late assignment will be considered a case of academic dishonesty.

Grading:

Major Papers (2): 10% Each
Small Assignments and Quizzes: 20%
Participation: 20%
Mid-Term Exam: 20%
Final Exam: 20%

If you feel you may need an accommodation based on the impact of a disability, you should contact me privately to discuss your specific needs. If you have not already done so, please contact Lynn Waldman at the Office of Academic Support and Disability Services in the Center for Learning, Teaching, and Research. Ms. Waldman is responsible for determining reasonable and appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities on a case-by-case basis, and more generally, for ensuring that members of the community with disabilities have access to Colgate’s programs and services. She also assists students in identifying and managing the factors that may interfere with learning and in developing strategies to enhance learning. Her services are available free of charge to all students.

Schedule of Readings and Major Assignments

September 1 – Intro
September 3 – Gerner and Schwedler, Chapter 2 “A Geographic Preface”; Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, People and Politics, 4th ed, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), pp. 137-57.

September 8 – Hourani, Chapters 1, 2, 3; Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 91-101.
September 10 – Jamal J. Elias, Islam, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), pp. 74-81, On-line readings on Sufism and Shi’ism

September 15 – Hourani, Chapters 4, 9; Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “The Tasks and Traditions of Interpretation,” The Cambridge Companion to the Qur’an, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 181-209.
September 17 – Hourani, Chapters 5, 10; S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, Vol. II: The Community, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971), pp. 273-99

September 22 – Hourani, Chapters 13-16
September 24 – Hourani, Chapters 18-20

September 29 – Hourani, Chapters 21-24
October 1 – Hourani, Chapters 25-26

October 6 – Gerner and Schwedler, Chapter 4, “Middle Eastern Politics”
October 8 – Said, “Orientalism”

October 13 – Examination
October 15 – Said, “Islam as News”

October 20 – FALL BREAK
October 22 – Lalami, whole book

October 27 – Menocal, pp. 101-188
October 29 – Menocal, pp. 189-252

November 3 – Schwedler and Gerner, Chapter 10, “Kinship, Class and Ethnicity” (Major paper due on either Said or Lalami)
November 5 – Fernea, “Uzbekistan”

November 10 – Fernea, “Morocco”
November 12 – Fernea, “Kuwait,” “Saudi Arabia”

November 17 – Fernea, “Egypt”
November 19 – Fernea, “Iraq”

November 24 – Iran Documentary

THANKSGIVING

December 1 – Gerner and Schwedler, Chapter 7, “The Economies of the Middle East,” and Chapter 9, “Population Growth, Urbanization, and the Challenges of Unemployment”
December 3 – Gerner and Schwedler, Chapter 8, “The Political Economy of Middle Eastern Oil” (Major paper due on women in the Middle East)

December 8 – Gerner and Schwedler, Chapter 6, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Selections from Israeli blogs
December 10 – Said, “Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims”

December 18, 9 a.m. – Final Examination

Lectures

Brad DeLong takes a look at the origins of the academic lecture and whether it makes sense today. While I try not to lecture more than I have to for several of the reasons he implies, I do think lectures give instructors a great deal of flexibility to choose the exact content they wish, even if no book exists that's configured the way they want.

HIST 259: Introduction to the Modern Middle East

For those who might be interested, this is my Modern Middle East syllabus for the semester:

HIST 259: Introduction to the Modern Middle East
111 Alumni Hall, 11:20 MWF
Dr. Brian Ulrich

Office: 309 Alumni Hall, Ex. 7556 (Office Hours: 10 – 11 a.m. MWF or by appointment)

Required Texts:

The Modern Middle East: A History, 2nd Edition, James L. Gelvin
The Modern Middle East, 2nd Edition, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury and Mary C. Wilson
Confronting Iran, Ali M. Ansari

Reserve Texts with Required Readings:

A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, M. Sukru Hanioglu
Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, Akram Fouad Khater
Electronic reserves found on Blackboard

This course will deal with the major changes and trends in the Middle East for the past 200 years, with particular influence on those which are most significant for current issues in the region. At the same time, it will introduce students to aspects of how historians work with primary and secondary sources to approach historical problems, as well as how historical events can become the subject of different interpretations, and how these different interpretations can become part of what drives conflicts today.

Among the readings, Gelvin and Hanioglu will convey important background information in a general way, while Ansari and the anthologies of articles and primary sources will be used more as discussion pieces and in skill building exercises. Electronic reserves fall into both categories. Exam dates will not change for any reason, and students who have unavoidable conflicts must see me for alternate arrangements as soon as they become known. Small assignments will usually be announced one or two class periods in advance, and will receive reduced credit if handed in late. Occasional quizzes will check student comprehension of readings and other course material and cannot be made up. Attendance in class is mandatory, and missing more than three class periods will result in a reduced participation grade. Participation, however, is more than just attendance, and will reflect your asking and answering of questions and participation in discussions. The instructor may change readings during the course of the semester.

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated and handled according to Colgate procedures. Any text an assignment taken from another source must be noted with quotation marks and the original source indicated. On some assignments, all information, regardless of whether exact words are used, must be cited via footnotes. Furthermore, due to the importance of participation and handing in assignments in a timely manner, misrepresentation of the reasons for an absence or late assignment will be considered a case of academic dishonesty.

Grading:

Small Assignments and Quizzes: 30%
Participation: 20%
Mid-Term Exam: 20%
Final Exam: 30%

If you feel you may need an accommodation based on the impact of a disability, you should contact me privately to discuss your specific needs. If you have not already done so, please contact Lynn Waldman at the Office of Academic Support and Disability Services in the Center for Learning, Teaching, and Research. Ms. Waldman is responsible for determining reasonable and appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities on a case-by-case basis, and more generally, for ensuring that members of the community with disabilities have access to Colgate’s programs and services. She also assists students in identifying and managing the factors that may interfere with learning and in developing strategies to enhance learning. Her services are available free of charge to all students.

Schedule of Readings and Major Assignments

September 1 – Intro
September 3 – Gelvin, pp. 1-34
September 5 – Gelvin, pp. 35-59

September 8 – Hanioglu, pp. 6-41
September 10 – Gelvin, pp. 73-87
September 12 – Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”

September 15 – Gelvin, pp. 148-54; Hanioglu, pp. 72-108
September 17 – Tucker, “Decline of the Family Economy,”
September 19 – Quataert, “Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing 1800-1914”

September 22 – Gelvin, pp. 88-99; Khater, pp. 38-65
September 24 – Diana K. Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007), pp. 26-44, 96-102.
September 26 – Gelvin, pp. 110-10,158-61

September 29 – Gelvin, pp. 123-31, 161-2
October 1 – Gelvin, pp. 132- 38
October 3 – Lambton, “Social Change in Persia”

October 6 – Gelvin, pp. 139-46, 163-7
October 8 – Ansari, pp. 1-18.
October 10 – Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922, (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), pp. 138-164; Khater, pp. 184-92.

October 13 – Gelvin, pp. 112-22
October 15 – Examination
October 17 – Gelvin, pp. 171-96; Khater, pp. 128-30, 145-51.

October 20 – FALL BREAK
October 22 – Gelvin, pp. 197-205; Dawn, “From Ottomanism to Arabism”
October 24 – Beinin and Lockman, “1919: Labor Upsurge and National Revolution”

October 27 – Khoury, “Syrian Urban Politics in Transition”
October 29 – Gelvin, pp. 206-14, Khater, pp. 114-28, 131-6 (Zionism)
October 31 – Michelle Campos, “Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict,” Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel-Palestine, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 41-65.

November 3 – Avi Shlaim, “The debate about 1948,” The Israel/Palestine Question: A Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Ilan Pappe, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 139-60.
November 5 – Gelvin, pp. 223-46
November 7 – Gelvin, pp. 247-67

November 10 – Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 88-105.
November 12 – Ansari, pp. 19-53
November 14 – James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 165-82.

November 17 – Humphreys, “The Strange Career of Pan-Arabism”
November 19 – Gelvin, pp. 290-99; Selections from Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones
November 21 – Gelvin, pp. 278-89

November 24 – Read Ansari while professor is at a conference

THANKSGIVING

December 1 – Ansari (complete book)
December 3 – Gelvin, pp. 268-77 (Arab-Israeli Conflict)
December 5 – Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 250-76.

December 8 – Society and Culture Presentations
December 10 – Society and Culture Presentations
December 12 – Society and Culture Presentations

December 19, Noon – Final Exam Period

August Lull

This week I'm busy with Colgate orientation activities and last-minute preparations for the semester. When I do follow news, it's the Democratic National Convention, about which I have little to say. What all that means is that I probably won't post anything until next month. Have a great rest of the week and weekend!

Schwerbel in Georgia

Steve Schwerbel from Letters in Bottles is blogging from Georgia.

Child Brides in Yemen

Child marriage isn't just a Saudi Arabian problem; it's also coming under the spotlight in Yemen:

"Two months ago, at the start of the school vacation, 12-year-old Reem was forced to marry her 30-year-old cousin.

"'While my hair was styled for the ceremony, I thought of ways to set fire to my wedding dress,' she says. 'When I protested, my dad gagged me and tied me up. After the wedding, I tried to kill myself twice.'

"Reem is the latest child bride to run from her husband's arms into the media spotlight. But she is not the youngest girl to escape from domestic violence and sexual abuse in recent months. This spring, 9-year-old Arwa and 10-year-old Nujood became the first 'tiny voices' to alert the world to Yemen's widespread practice of child marriage.

"The girls' stories have instigated a campaign against the practice, which is believed to be a consequence of widespread poverty as parents unable to provide for their children give, and in some cases sell, them into matrimony...

"Child brides are prevalent in Yemen because the minimum marriage age of 15 was revoked a decade ago to allow parents to decide when their daughters should marry. The ruling abides by an interpretation of the Koran that claims there is no prescribed age for marriage.

"Deep-rooted traditions also play a role. 'Early marriages are universal in Yemen because of the cultural premium placed on shaping a young bride to meet the husband's needs,' explains Naseem ur-Rehman, the chief of communications for the United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Yemen."

Sadly, this surprises me less. For all the press official conservatism in Saudi Arabia gets, Yemen is really the sticks of the Arab world.

Syria Today

At Joshua Landis's site, Ehsani2 and IDAF both have observations about changes afoot in daily life and infrastructure in Syria.

Fujairah Fort

It's been ages since I last posted a picture, so here's one of Fujairah Fort in the United Arab Emirates. Fujairah, on the east coast border the Gulf of Oman, was the last of the Gulf emirates created, and unlike the others, was entirely a creature of British diplomatic activity. Under the British treaty system in the Gulf, what became British petroleum could only deal with shaykhs bound to Britain in a trucial relationship, while those shaykhs could in turn only give oil concessions to the British. As investigated by Christopher Davidson, in the early 1950's, the American company ARAMCO determined that Fujairah wasn't under the control of any of the shaykhs, and so started planning to prospect for oil in the region. Britain promptly found one Muhammad b. Hamad ash-Sharqi to rule it as an autonomous emirate and signed a treaty with him, thus locking out the Americans.

Socially Kosher

Danna Harman writes about a new trend in Jerusalem:

"In Israel, the majority of restaurants, hotels, and banquet halls have "kosher certificates" from the chief rabbinate. Many Jews will not eat at places without one. But now, a different sort of kosher credential, one that has nothing to do with the Jewish dietary laws, is popping up across the city.

"The kosher social seal is awarded to eateries that pledge to treat those preparing and serving the food in an ethical way. This means paying overtime, providing health insurance, and ensuring the equal treatment of minorities – the list goes on.

"What does this have to do with Judaism?

"'Everything,' says Asaf Banner, the young religious Jerusalemite who directs Bemaaglei Tzedek, a nonprofit organization that started the social seal project three years ago. 'The Torah is a system of life.'

"'It has something to say not only about mixing milk and meat – but on every subject,' he says. 'Religion is more than a list of laws someone wrote down thousands of years ago. It is a guide to bettering our community.'"

Sounds good to me!

McCain on Georgia

Josh Marshall has an e-mailer who sums up McCain's response to the Georgia crisis:

"McCain's first reaction to the Georgia crises was to urge action that would commit the United States to war with Russia (by having Georgia immediately admitted to NATO). Obama needs to point out that, in this test for whether McCain is ready to be commander in chief, McCain grossly overreacted. Indeed, several days later, after McCain had time to cool down, he retracted his statements, saying that military intervention should not be considered. McCain fundamentally does not understand the purpose of NATO. Obama needs be repeating this series of events like a broken record. McCain overracted, and then changed his mind 3 days later. A President has no such luxury. McCain is no match for the calm and calculated actions of a player like Putin."

Normally, I don't think campaign trail foreign policy statements should be taken at face value. In 1992, Bill Clinton advocated bombing then-Yugoslavia over the war in Bosnia, while 2000-era George Bush was famously interested in a "more humble foreign policy." However, in this case I'm concerned that McCain has a long public service record suggesting that he usually responds this way.

Russia and Georgia

Kevin Drum has a post which captures some key elements of the post-war sitation in Georgia, with Russian troops clearly intending to assert a presence in Georgia, but South Ossetians firmly in their corner. Juan Cole has a short FOXNews clip also indicating the latter. The media coverage and political rhetoric are trying to make this a battle of good and evil, but while Russia is using this as a means of asserting itself in the Caucasus, Georgia's nationalist government under its naive president was also the aggressor. Ultimately, it goes back to a Soviet decision to cut Ossetia in two hoping to better control it.

Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Barbara Surk has written for the AP an article about some machninations between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two largest constituents of the United Arab Emirates. Her interpretation, however, seems oddly Iran-focused. As she states, Iran and Dubai have important economic ties. The reasons for this can be easily discerned by looking at a map.

Abu Dhabi, however, isn't worried about morality in Dubai because of American pressure because of American pressure over those ties. Abu Dhabi represents the central government of the UAE, whereas Dubai's rulers are intent on retaining as much internal control as they can. That dynamic is the most important to both parties. The U.S. doesn't have any real leverage over the UAE, anyway.

Turkmenistan's Wind

Turkmenistan is working on developing alternative energy sources, starting with wind:

"Despite the fact that the country’s future prosperity is apparently assured by such bounty, the country is taking tentative steps toward exploring the potential of alternative energy sources. In a development that may have a more substantive impact on the lives of Turkmen dwelling in isolated communities than Westerners shilling for exploration rights, specialists of the Giun ('sun' in Turkmen, 'Solntse' in Russian) Scientific and Production Association under direction of Berdimukhamedov’s Higher Council for Science and Technology have constructed a prototype wind turbine capable of generating five kilowatts (Internet-gazeta, www.turkmenistan.ru, August 14).

"The windmill was tested at Birkova near Ashgabat and its performance certified by Giun researchers and officials from Turkmenistan’s Department of Energy and Industry. The windmill is destined for the isolated island of Gyzylsu ('Red Water' in Turkmen), two hours by boat and 11 miles southeast of Turkmenistan’s largest Caspian port, Turkmenbashi (Gosudarstennoe informatsionnoe agentstvo Turkmenistana [TDH], August 13). When installed, the windmill will provide power for the island’s school, kindergarten, and a day nursery for 100 children. The windmill will also provide electric power to a solar seawater desalination system in the village, its pumps, reservoir-distillate accumulator, and ultraviolet water disinfection unit, which was designed specially for the facility...

"As Giun researchers note, Turkmenistan’s climatic conditions provide an ideal setting for both solar and wind power research, as approximately 86% of the country is covered by desert. Even though Turkmenistan is self-sufficient in electrical power generation, producing about 14 billion kwh annually, a number of localities such as the Caspian islands preclude stringing centralized electric power lines but where power shortages could be addressed by local renewable energy facilities."

Kuwait Sanctions Firms

In more fallout from the recent labor riots, Kuwait is sanctioning some of the offending firms:

"Kuwait has placed restrictions on five companies accused of abusing foreign workers, most of them cleaners from Asian countries, the countyr's labour minister said on Thursday.

"The companies will be prevented from receiving government contracts and their business licenses could be revoked, Bader Al Duwailah was quoted as saying in the Al-Watan daily.

"The measures were the toughest yet since thousands of labourers from Bangladesh demonstrated last month to demand pay increases and better living conditions. Some of the protests turned violent and hundreds of labourers who took part in them were deported."

Saudi Arabia and the Olympics

Mona Eltahawy calls for the IOC to enforce the ban on discrimination by national Olympic committees by banning Saudi Arabia for gender discrimination:

"The presence of all these Muslim women at the Olympics is a clear message to the world -- and the conservative clerics -- that there is nothing in Islam that stops them from competing in the sports they love.

"Saudi women are fighting back. A few days before the start of the Beijing Olympics, Saudi women’s rights activist Wajeha al-Huwaider posted a video on YouTube protesting the ban on women’s sports in her country. Others are directly challenging the ban by playing underground soccer, basketball and learning horse riding -- risking state anger but determined to be recognized.

"Religious authorities banned an all-women’s marathon and soccer match, but the Jeddah United women’s basketball team makes public appearances as part of their fight against the ban.

"They have a natural ally in Moroccan Olympic gold medalist Nawal El Moutawakel, who this week became the first Muslim woman elected to the International Olympic Committee’s executive board. In 1984, El Moutawakel became the first women from a Muslim majority country to win a gold medal. She must tell Saudi Arabia that it’s time to have sisters on the team.

"And time for that Board to insist Saudi Arabia abides by the IOC charter, which bans discrimination of any kind."

Ahmadinejad's Aides

Two top Iranian officials are in trouble today. One is newly confirmed Interior Minister Ali Kordan, who it turns out forged his diploma from Oxford. The other, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, who heads up the country's tourism ministry, is under assault in Parliament for saying Iranians are friends with the Israeli people, even though the distinction between Iran's opposition to Israel's existence as a nation-state and its lack of hostility to the people who live there is pretty standard fare.

When Kordan was confirmed a couple of weeks ago, Farideh Farhi couldn't explain how it happened, though a key seemed to be Ahmadinejad's claim that Supreme Leader Ali Khamane'i supported him, a claim that appears questionable. Kordan is also close to Parliament speaker Ali Larijani and may be a compromise candidate between Ahmadinejad's faction and mainline conservatives. The Interior Ministry supervises national elections, but in 2005 was accused of political bias under President Khatami so that institutions under conservative control could manage them instead. Something similar may be afoot here, as the mainline conservatives remain afraid of Ahmadinejad's interest in leftist economic reforms and consider him a foreign policy loose cannon. If this is the case, then the assault on both Kordan and Rahim Mashaie makes sense as part of a more general campaign to embarrass and weaken him.

South Ossetia Coverage

What's with some of the media coverage and rhetoric surrounding the conflict over South Ossetia? You'd think Russia just decided to attack Georgia for no apparent reason. It was Georgia that, even against Bush administration advice, decided to launch a full-scale assault on a province that claims independence and has Russian peacekeepers stationed there to protect it. I think that, from the Russian perspective, even the advance on Gori isn't that different from NATO bombing throughout Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War. Great power politics is involved, of course, but then it always is.

The Timeless Enmity Canard: Iraq Edition

In a guest post an Informed Comment, Sumbul Ali-Karamali lashes into the application to Iraq of what I call the Timeless Enmity Canard:

"A lazy way to dismiss conflicts as hopeless is to characterize (usually erroneously) the disputing parties as having been 'at each other’s throats for centuries.' It happened in Bosnia when the Christian Serbs started expunging Bosnian Muslims from the area; it happened in Rwanda when the fighting between Hutus and Tutsis erupted; and it’s happening now with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict. It’s also happening in Iraq. It is nearly impossible to listen to news about Iraq without hearing of 'sectarian violence' and receiving the impression that the U.S. (the invader, remember?) is simply there as the intermediary between the Sunni and Shi’a, who have – of course – always been at each other’s throats...

"I find this constant conditioning, and in this particular case, the constant portrayal of Sunni and Shi’a Islam as adversarial, extremely damaging. It’s self-fulfilling, dehumanizing, and inaccurate."

I might quibble with some of the history, mainly in that I am far less willing than she is to see proto-Sunnism in the Islam of the Umayyad dynasty. That, however, only strengthens her case, in that it suggests that while later Sunnis would claim the period of the "rightly guided caliphs" as their golden age, when you get into the Ummayad caliphate which actually carried out the Karbala massacre, Sunni Islam has nothing to do with it. Husayn, the primary Karbala martyr for Shi'ites, is revered by Sunnis as the Prophet's grandson, Ali is one of the four rightly guided caliphs, and the Umayyads are remembered as tyrants who perverted the caliphate into a kingdom. Sunni Islam developed in reaction to the concept of dynastic religious leadership as claimed by the Umayyads and Abbasids, ultimately arguing that only the religious scholars could interpret doctrine and that the caliphs were mere political leaders.

An analysis of Sunni-Shi'ite tensions in Iraq would have to take into account the fact Sunni Islam was the dominant ideology of the Ottoman Empire, and this did lead to persecution of Shi'ites, who were seen as a potential fifth column for Shi'ite Iran. This, of course, is an accusation still leveled at Arab Shi'ites in both Iraq and Bahrain. The Ottoman legacy also affects the present in that it left Sunnis as the dominant military and administrative class and, in a political culture in which proximity to power translates into further political and economic advantage Sunnis were favored, not for religious reasons, but because they were close to Saddam. While Saddam persecuted Shi'ite religious leaders as possible rivals to his authority and suppressed Ashura commemorations because of their anti-dictator implications, he actually tried to draw Shi'ites into his regime's patronage network by trying to create a bunch of new tribal leaders called the "Shaykhs of the '90's."

It was the United States occupation regime that decided to political divide the country into Sunni and Shi'ite blocs, Iran that favored the sectarian religious parties that have come to dominate Shi'ite politics, and Saddam's regime that suppressed all internal leadership it could, leaving only religious leaders whose political views he found non-threatening. Meanwhile, it's worth pointing out that the bloodshed of the sectarian cleansing that happened in Baghdad was primarily because neighborhoods were integrated during the 20th century. In other words, despite the history above, the current cycle of violence is only a few years old and a result of conditions in post-Saddam Iraq rather than something the Ba'athist regime suppressed.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

South Ossetia Links

Over at American Footprints, Nadezhda is offering lots of maps and links related to the ongoing crisis in South Ossetia.

South Ossetia

Georgia has launched a full-scale offensive to gain control of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, while Russia's response remains unclear. A couple of years ago I was actually in South Ossetia, though only for about an hour, when my ignorance of the Georgian alphabet caused me to get on a marshrutka (minivan, sherut) to Tskhinvali instead of Tbilisi.

Child Marriage in Saudi Arabia

Gulf News reports on efforts to end child marriage in Saudi Arabia. Most often these are marriages of young girls to older men, though the article leads with a wedding between an 11-year-old and 10-year-old. I was surprised to see that the country has no minimum marriage age at all. If memory serves, traditional Islamic law sets it at nine for girls and 14 for boys, though even in a conservative country such as Iran, there are a number of bureaucratic regulations which effectively stifle marriages until late adolescence, and most people simply wait until they're older anyway.

Kuwaiti Minimum Wage

Kuwait has approved a minimum monthly wage, but only for firms with state contracts:

"Kuwait set a minimum monthly wage of 40 dinars (about Dh555) on Monday for some companies with state contracts after Asian workers demanding better pay rioted in the Gulf Arab state.

"The country now requires firms with cleaning and security contracts with state institutions to pay a net monthly minimum salary of 40 dinars for cleaners and 70 dinars (about Dh972) for civilian security staff, the cabinet said in a statement after a weekly meeting."

Ansari on Ahmadinejad

My major project for the day has been reading Ali Ansari's Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation, published in December 2007 as part of the International Institute for Strategic Studies's Adelphi Paper series. The book does not seriously reshape the views I have taken in my commentary on Iran, but does bring together a number of threads and places them solidly within the framework of Iran's post-revolution history.

Ansari portrays Ahmadinejad's rise against the legacies of his two immediate predecessors, both of whom his supporters regard as having corrupted the 1979 revolution. Of these, his opposition to the reformist legacy of Muhammad Khatami is well known, and it is for that reason the conservative faction supported him against Mehdi Karrubi and Mustafa Mo'in in the 2005 elections, if only after their other choices, Ali Larijani and Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf, faltered. Less well known, however, is his reaction against the mercantilist policies of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who in the name of free markets helped make Iran into what Ansari has previously characterized as a kleptocracy, rather than a strict theocracy. While vote rigging helped put Ahmadinejad into the final round of 2005 voting, Rafsanjani's status as the incarnation of a corrupt and out-of-touch establishment is what prompted most Iranians to take a chance on Tehran's relatively unknown former mayor.

As the book's subtitle implies, Ahmadinejad has sought to use an atmosphere of foreign policy crisis to try and consolidate his position domestically, a strategy which worked through 2005 and 2006, but has gradually fallen apart as his economic mismanagement has not only alienated most of the Iranian public, but threatened the commercial interests that helped put him in power. As portrayed by Ansari, however, Ahmadinejad right now is a deluded egomaniac who, together with his core supporters both within and outside his administration, actually believes much of his rhetoric, holds odd millenarian religious beliefs, and has furthermore not abandoned the goal of making Iran economically self-sufficient, or otherwise acknowledged any errors in policy, either directly or by implication. For example, he sees the U.S. as in a reversible divinely ordained decline, and interprets out problems in Iraq in that light. At the same time, the regime has become increasingly repressive internally, as it is aware that it's popularity has waned significantly.

Here is Ansari's conclusion, which admittedly doesn't seem to follow squarely from the bulk of the text:

"When Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, there were some who argued that the reformist experiment had been an exercise in wishful thinking that had not reflected the reality of Iran, and that, with Ahmadinejad's election, the real, raw Iran had finally come to the foreground. This view is now a rarity, and crucially, the president's stock within his own faction is falling. Despite the extraordinary advantage afforded to him by high oil prices, Ahmadinejad has failed to achieve the defining goal of his presidency, to which all other principlist strategies had been subordinated: the establishment of the domestic hegemony of hardline conservatism. The populist had been invited to turn the faction's particular agenda into a national one - to restore the revolution to the true path. But Iran's revolutionary president has proved to be an anachronism, unwilling to recognize the changes that have transformed Iranian society. And it is these social transformations , which long predate Ahmadinejad's rise, that will ultimately determine the direction the country will take in the future.

"As his problems mount, Ahmadinejad will increasingly rely on the assets he and his supporters place the most faith in: his charisma and the cult of personality. Ahmadinejad still speaks the language of the poor and dispossessed, and his promises of utopia around the corner still have their power. Not for him a dialogue of civilizations, or talk of economic growth, but a complete solution to a total problem. Ahmadinejad can be interpreted as a consequence of the continuing crisis in Iran's mercantile capitalist system. He was a short-term solution to a long-term problem, but he may well prove more damaging to the very foundations of the Islamic Republic than his backers could ever have imagined.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The "Proof" Canard

I've criticized interpretations of archaeological finds as proving or disproving this or that biblical narrative before, and today Ha'aretz brings us another annoying example of the tendency:

"Israeli archaeologists have unearthed a seal impression belonging to a minister of the biblical King Zedekiah, which dates back 2,600 years, during an archeological dig in Jerusalem's ancient City of David. The finding helps corroborate the story pertaining to the biblical minister's demand to have the prophet Jeremiah killed.

"The seal impression, or bulla, with the name Gedalyahu ben Pashur, who served as minister to King Zedekiah (597-586 BCE) according to the Book of Jeremiah, was found completely intact just meters away from a separate seal impression of another of Zedekia's ministers, Yehukual ben Shelemyahu, which was unearthed three years ago.

"Both ministers are mentioned in the Book of Jeremiah (Jeremiah 38 1-4) along with two other ministers when they came to King Zedekiah demanding the death of the prophet Jeremiah for preaching to the besieged city to surrender."

Look, that is the kind of biblical story that I find perfectly believable, but these seals have nothing to do with it any more than historical proof that Nero was once Rome's emperor prove that he fiddled while Rome burned. The blame here probably goes to the headline writer, though, as opposed to the reporter, as it's the headline that reads, "Archaeologists unearth proof of plot to kill Prophet Jeremiah."

Deportations from Kuwait

I may have spoken too hastily in chalking the recent strike in Kuwait up to a victory for the workers, as many are now being deported:

"Over the past few days more than 1000 Bangladeshis have been deported from Kuwait, officials at Dhaka airport told reporters, with hundreds more facing a similar fate.

"Nearly 170 Bangladesh workers returned home from Kuwait on Friday, complaining they had been beaten and expelled after taking part in a rare labour protest in the Gulf state...

"Some Bangladeshis returning on Friday said they had been beaten and kept in appalling conditions after being accused of taking part in the protests.

"'The army beat us mercilessly while breaking up the protest and also in detention camps,' said Mohammad Ilyas, 28, who started work in Kuwait three years ago after selling everything he owned and borrowing from relatives to afford the agent fees."

Deportations could be justified as a reaction to the violent aspects of the protest. I can't say anything for sure, though, without knowing more of the mentality on the ground.