Almohad Tribalism

My current book project is focused on the incorporation of the genealogically organized societies which Middle Eastern Studies still calls "tribes" into the state structures of agrarian empires, specifically that of the early caliphate. My argument is that this process of incorporation depended as much of tribal ways of doing things as on state powers to coerce and entice. In his recent book on the Almohads in 12th century North Africa, Allen Fromherz came to a similar conclusion:

"The rapid formation of the Almohad hierarchy was made easier by the fact that there were pre-existing mechanisms and traditions for forming larger alliances within the tribes themselves. Alliances were based on power. Depending on the strength of the sheikh or tribal chief, some tribes were stronger than others. Not all tribes were purely isolationist in nature. Intermarriage and a confluence of tribal identities probably produced a vague sense of Masmuda identity even before the rise of Ibn Tumart. Ibn Tumart used a combination of military action, co-option of tribal traditions and tribal leaders, and persuasive indoctrination to transform this vague sense of unity into a solid government and army."

Incidentally, Fromherz is the author of a biography of Ibn Khaldun that just came out in paperback.

Khamene'i on Iran's Presidency

Earlier this month, Iran's leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i suggested the country might switch to a parliamentary system:

"The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, told an academic gathering last week that “changing Iran into a parliamentary system” in which voters no longer elected a president would not be a problem. His words were widely seen as the latest blow in a battle that began in April when Mr. Ahmadinejad crossed a line by openly feuding with Ayatollah Khamenei — who has the final word in affairs of state — over cabinet appointments...

"Ayatollah Khamenei’s veiled attack on the presidency has drawn sharply polarized responses. Ali Larijani, the speaker of Parliament and a rival to Mr. Ahmadinejad, endorsed the comments and called for a parliamentary system. A former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has at times sparred with the supreme leader, warned on Tuesday that eliminating the presidency would “be contrary to the Constitution and would weaken the people’s power of choice,” according to the centrist newspaper Aftab News. Other partisans have gone further, with one pro-Ahmadinejad daily newspaper, Iran, seeming to mock the supreme leader’s comments. (That article was soon taken off the paper’s Web site.)"

On one level, these comments serve to illustrate the point that in Iran's system of Islamic government, the Leader, Khamene'i's office, is more fundamental than the presidency. Since I can't picture the elimination of Ahmadinejad's office over the next couple of years, however, I also see it as a proposal aimed at preventing a repeat of the 2009 presidential elections.

In Iran, candidates for office are vetted by the Council of Guardians. This body represents one of the cornerstones of clerical power, and routinely disqualifies reformist and other undesirable candidates for parliament. However, some candidates are simply too obviously qualified to keep out, such as 1980's prime minister Mir Hussein Musavi in those 2009 elections. If they run for a presidency, they create a battle over a high office that can serve as a rallying point for opposition. If they are limited to contesting parliamentary seats, however, they can be kept as the face of a minority faction, perhaps even proving useful to present the regime as democratic in tolerating debate and opposition.

Turkmen Wedding Plans

Early this past summer, I speculated that Turkmenistan might be moving decisively to a more open society, though in Turkmenistan that isn't saying much. Since then, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has made moves eerily reminiscent of life under his predecessor, such as writing a new national guidebook. The most recent is his requirements for newlyweds:

"Register marriage: check. Plant trees with the president in special wedding center park: check. Visit earthquake memorial: check. Visit Monument to the Constitution: check. Visit Monument to Independence: check. Visit...

"And the list goes on, part of new lengthy requirements laid out for newlyweds by the Turkmen ruler in remarks anticipating the October 28 grand opening of the 'Palace of Happiness' hotel complex.

"The detailed list of instructions has couples visiting a total of four memorials the day of their registration, far more than the one obligatory visit customary for newlyweds in the region...

"The new requirements are clearly meant to coincide with events celebrating the nation's 20th anniversary of independence on October 27 as well. The tree-planting ritual 'could start a new tradition to build family life and strengthen family values,' Berdymukhammedov was quoted as saying in an October 21 Turkmen State News Agency report."

The Turkmen were better off under the Soviets than in their first twenty years of independence.

Tunisia's Results

In elections where voter turnout was over 80%, the Islamist al-Nahda (Renaissance) party will have a huge parliamentary plurality:

"Tunisia’s moderate Islamist political party emerged Monday as the acknowledged leader in elections for a constitutional assembly and began talks to form a unity government with a coalition of liberals in a rare alliance that party leaders hailed as an inclusive model for countries emerging from the tumult of the Arab Spring.

"By Monday afternoon, Tunisian liberal parties said they were entering discussions to form a government led by their Islamist rival, Ennahda, after it swept to a plurality of about 40 percent in preliminary vote tallies. The acceptance of the results by rivals signaled the beginning of a partnership seldom seen in the Arab world, where Islamists’ few opportunities for victories at the voting booth have sometimes led to harsh crackdown or civil war."

On that second paragraph, it's worth pointing out that in the Arab world, it has been the non-Islamist governments refusing to accept Islamist electoral victories which has led to conflict. Focusing on this Tunisian case, however, al-Nahda had the highest profile, was the best organized, and was able to position itself as the viable party furthest from the corruption and oppression of the Ben Ali regime. Its leader, Rashid Ghannoushi, has spoken of Turkey's AKP as a template and said he believes in what he calls the Anglo-American model of a religious-neutral public sphere to that of France of Kemalist Turkey, which are more hostile to religion outside the realms of belief and ritual. Parties are, of course, more than leaders, and al-Nahda seems to have drawn in some salafis and others who want a more formally Islamic order than Ghannoushi has called for. It's a good sign, however, that al-Nahda is reaching out to liberal parties rather than smaller Islamist groups, not so much for what it might say about the party's ideology, but for what it portends about the process of creating a new democratic order in which all Tunisians can have faith.

Tripoli's Power Vacuum

Writing in The National, Bradley Hope paints a picture of Tripoli that isn't pretty:

"The deposed leader is dead and its temporary leaders have declared the country 'liberated.' Yet the capital, in particular, has become a patchwork of armed fiefdoms, as wannabe power brokers backed by hometown militias made up of former clerks, students and engineers battle with each other and with natives of Tripoli for the spoils of war, a slice of the country's wealth and a share of political power - all of it, in their way of looking, up for grabs.

"Kidnappings and disappearances are the new currency in the swelling conflict, with outright shootings a tactic of last resort. The creeping mayhem is fuelled by an infusion of weapons that has turned Tripoli into a virtual armoury."

Much like Iraq in 2003, Libya appears to have no nation-wide institutions capable of keeping a semblance of public order. Revolutions breed chaos, and even in Tunisia and Egypt there has been a steady undercurrent of private vigilante violence. The most challenging task for the National Transitional Council in Libya is not to decide on the nature of Libya's state, but simply to construct a state where Qadhafi's personalized organs of control have evaporated.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Trouble with Libya

These statements from a leading TNC member have gotten a lot of attention today:

"When Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, the chairman of the Transitional National Council, pronounced the end of the uprising, the crowd reacted with shouts of 'God is great.' This was not long after people sang the bouncy national anthem of pre-Qaddafi days, which was revived to help celebrate the downfall of the dictator, who was killed on Thursday after he tried to flee Surt.

"Two strands — a new piety and all-purpose, freewheeling happiness — dominated the ceremony. Mr. Abdel-Jalil, stooping humbly to shake hands in the crowd and embracing the elderly relative of a fallen rebel, made clear that personality would have nothing to do with the new order.

“'We are an Islamic country,' he said as the sun descended. 'We take the Islamic religion as the core of our new government. The constitution will be based on our Islamic religion.'

"Among other things, he promised that Islamic banks would be established in the new Libya. He also talked of lifting restrictions on the number of women Libyan men can marry, The Associated Press reported.

"The comments reflected not only the chairman’s personal religious conservatism and the country’s, but also the rising influence of Islamists among the former rebels. The Islamists, who include some influential militia commanders, have warned that they will not permit their secular counterparts in a new government to sideline them."

What concerns me isn't the fact that Abd al-Jalil is proclaiming an Islamic state. Arab countries all claim their laws and institutions are derived from Islam. What concerns me is that this is simply being proclaimed rather than discussed in a political process, and that armed militias are likely to remain such an important force in the country.

I do not regret the fall of Qadhafi, but the road ahead remains difficult, far more difficult than in Tunisia or Egypt. Libya is divided and without strong institutions that can manage the transition. If under Qadhafi the west was favored, the TNC is drawn mainly from the east, and the patronage connections are sure to bring about an uncomfortable reallocation of national resources in that direction. Right now there is celebration and giddy proclamations about the future, but for Libya's sake, national reconciliation needs to be around the corner.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Tunisia Votes

Issandr el-Amrani on Election Day in Tunisia:

"I have a confession to make: I used to hate Tunisia. I spent some time reporting there in the last decade and had an awful experience, including a fistfight with police informants who were following me at one point. Many others have had similar experiences. But most of all I disliked Tunisia because so many Tunisians I met seemed perpetually on the verge of a nervous breakdown, which I thought was because they were partly complicit in their ordeal under Ben Ali.

"Of course I met admirable Tunisians: I remember how, at a conference of human rights activists in Casablanca, a Tunisian woman broke down in tears as she told me of the daily humiliations the police subjected her to when she visited her husband in prison. But I thought far too many of her compatriots were silent, and this beautiful country seemed, compared to boisterous Egypt where I lived, dead in the soul. This was no doubt unfair — I was, in part, blaming the victims. I have never had to endure what they were subjected to.

"The Tunisia I have visited is another country, and not just because Ben Ali is gone. It feels like a different country. Yes, the Tunisians still have their national character: they are a serious-minded, persnickety, stubborn people (the opposite of Egyptians). But they now have a sense of humor, a levity, that I had rarely encountered before. Gone is their old dourness; they have a joie-de-vivre that I had never seen before. It is extremely moving to see when you knew the old Tunisians...

"Driving around northern Tunisia today, I saw tremendous enthusiasm. The long lines at polling stations and the preliminary turnout of at least 70% (although this is probably calculated from the eligible voters who registered, so should be taken with a grain of salt) confirms this. I heard, notably in rural areas, of vote-buying or parties that used gifts to woo voters. This is not surprising. My impression, however, is that these elections were generally the real thing. The aftermath — what the constituent assembly will do (which I’ll discuss tomorrow) — is a much bigger question mark, and more important for Tunisia’s transition to democracy.

"I was struck in my small sampling of voters by the act that while Nahda seemed dominant, many voted for other parties with a strong record of opposition to Ben Ali, such as Moncef Marzouki’s CPR, Najib Chebbi’s PDP or Mustafa Ben Jaafar’s al-Takkatul (all left/social democratic and secular). An overall trend is that, with programs often largely similar, people voted for parties, in the words of one young woman, 'that are as distant as possible from Ben Ali.' I think that is why Nahda may do particularly well — not just because of an Islamist/conservative vote, but because of a let’s-give-the-dissidents-a-chance vote. (I’ll write more on Nahda and other parties in the coming few days.)"

It's impressionistic, of course, but score it for the dignity of human beings free to choose their own destiny.

Tunisians Start Voting

The death of Moammar Qadhafi should not crown out awareness of the fact that today is the day Tunisians start voting:

"Dozens of Tunisians who live in Egypt flocked to the Tunisian Embassy in Cairo on Thursday to cast their votes in the election for a constituent assembly that will be responsible for drafting a new constitution.

"The voters expressed joy, and some noted that it was the first time in their lives to share in an electoral process. One of the women was so moved by the event that she cried while casting her vote...

"The constituent assembly election is Tunisia’s first free election held in 23 years, and follows the ouster of Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali late last year."

Voting in Tunisia takes place Sunday. The Islamist Nahda party is expected to win the largest share of votes, but probably not a majority of the parliement. Admittedly writing from Pennsylvania, I don't see that as a problem, especially if the Nahda is as close in philosophy to Turkey's AKP as some argue. It certainly shouldn't be confused with the salafi vigilantes active on Tunisia's streets. What matters most, however, is simply the fact that Tunisians will vote, and thereby take up a share in deciding their own political future. Elections produce winners and losers, and what matters in transitional periods like this is the willingness of all parties to agree on rules for political competition and to respect the results. Erik Churchill lays out what is at stake:

"The success of Sunday's election will be judged first and foremost on whether Tunisia will continue with its peaceful transition to democracy. While most observers expect calm, a slight disruption, especially if centered around the fairness of the polls, could quickly degenerate into large disturbances. Secondly, a strong turnout will show the legitimacy and support of Tunisians for the democratic process. The weakness of the voter registration drive gives cause for concern that Tunisians will not show up on Sunday, potentially delegitimizing the results. Thirdly, Sunday's vote will test whether the government will be able to accept the result of Ennahdha's presumed victory. A result of less than 20 percent could raise calls that the voting was rigged, while an absolute majority by Ennahdha could spark protests from secular groups. This is known as the Algerian scenario, after the Islamist victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the country's 1991 elections, which sparked a backlash from military regime and ultimately resulted in civil war.

"Finally, despite foreign and domestic observers and the demonstrated competence of the electoral commission, many Tunisians have expressed doubts that the elections will be truly free and fair. Despite all evidence to the contrary, it is commonplace to hear arguments that the outcome has been predetermined by the West. If Sunday's elections dispel these rumors, Tunisians will not look at this election as the result of their uprising, but rather, the first step in the process of controlling their destiny as an independent, democratic country."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Qadhafi's Golden Gun

Moammar Qadhafi died today, probably by summary execution at the hands of Libya's successful rebel forces. He died brandishing this golden pistol, which has on it the word "al-jamahiriyya," the term for the unique view of society Qadhafi tried to promote in Libya: a governmentless state governed directly by its citizens. In practice, of course, this was a form of strongman rule in which Qadhafi and his family dominated through control of the army and security forces, as well as the distribution of oil wealth.

Will Qadhafi's death matter in Libya? In practical terms, this is best left to someone with more knowledge of transitional justice and reconciliation than I have. It will be celebrated throughout the Arab world, but even there the demonstration effect for the rest of the region of the regime's fall was probably mostly spent with the fall of Tripoli.

Kuwaiti Strike Warnings

The Kuwaiti government is making threats against public sector workers striking for increased salaries and benefits. First was a plan to replace them with guest workers:

"Kuwait yesterday threatened to recruit foreign help to cope with a wave of strikes that has spread through the public sector and is endangering oil exports.

"Ali Al Rashid, the minister of state for cabinet affairs, told the state news agency, Kuna, that the cabinet has formed a team that will 'take all necessary measures' to 'fill gaps' caused by the strikes.

"Kuwait has been hobbled by dozens of strikes since oil sector workers successfully coerced the government into increasing their salaries and benefits in September. This week, operations at ports and airports were hit as the union for customs workers became the latest civil servants to begin industrial action."

There is also a proposal to criminalize the strikes, which could pose a threat to Kuwait's economy if sustained.

Weird Iran Plot

Both Robert Mackey and Barbara Slavin round up the reasons many experts are skeptical of the Obama administrations assertions that the Iranian government was planning to launch an assassination and terrorist attacks within the United States. For me, the most convincing evidence that Iran's main intelligence organs were not involved is the sheer incompetence of it all:

"If Arbabsiar really had been an Iranian intelligence asset, he would have been informed if there’s one thing the US typically monitors, it is money transfers of more than $10,000 (as a measure against drug money laundering). The only safe way to undertake this transaction would have been cash, and no one in the Quds Brigade is so stupid as not to know this simple reality. Moreover, would the Quds Brigade really depend so heavily on someone with a fraud conviction, who was therefore known to US authorities? Expert terrorism deploys 'newskins' people who can fly under the radar of police and security forces."

The plot was also discussed on an open international phone line, which espionage professionals know would be tapped.

What's less clear is why the Obama administration is so assertive in assigning Iran responsibility. Juan Cole suggests Iranian drug cartels could be the culprint, and attempting to deflect blame to the Iranian government. Another possibility is a false flag operation, in which a third party, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, is trying to create a crisis between Iran and the United States, though that again runs into the sloppiness argument.

I'm most interested in the idea that the plot arose from a faction within the Iranian government seeking to use an international crisis to enhance its own stature. President Mahmood Ahmadinejad, who thrives on controversy, has been on the losing end of a power struggle with Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, the country's paramount leader, and with his military connections could leave the appropriate fingerprints.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Good in People

Matthew Yglesias has an anecdote:

"Last week I was outside my office and I saw a $5 bill on the ground. Famously, economists say you never see a $5 bill on the ground because someone would pick it up. But instead of picking it up, I stood around watching to see if anyone else would. A bunch of people walked by not noticing it. Then one guy saw it, saw me, and asked if it was mine. I said no it wasn’t, I was just curious what would happen. He laughed and made a joke about economists. Then a second guy came by, picked it up, and said I’d dropped five dollars. I said no, actually it was there before me. He looked around, noticed a homeless guy across the street, said 'I think he needs it more than me,' walked over and gave it to him."

Kuwait's Protest Movement

Kuwaitis have a high standard of living, but that isn't stopping the spread of labor activism among both nationals and guest workers:

"Strikes sweeping through the Kuwaiti public sector will increase unless the government comes to grip with the concerns of employees, the head of a major trade union said...

"The recent surge in industrial action was sparked in September when the government gave oil sector employees, who had threatened to down tools, salary increases ranging from 15.5 per cent for senior officials to 66 per cent for Kuwaiti technicians, at an estimated annual cost of 142 million Kuwaiti dinars (Dh1.9 billion).

"When news of the deal spread, so did the strikes. Soon customs officials, port workers, and staff at the ministries of interior, health and social affairs and labour all started mass walkouts in protest against poor salaries and benefits...

"The trade union official said public sector employees have been forced into industrial action by a difficult economic situation. He said Kuwaitis feel they are not being treated equally in their jobs in areas such as promotions, because better educated workers are climbing the ranks ahead of experienced employees...

"Kuwait's hulking public sector employs the vast majority of citizens. In addition to paying some of the highest civil service salaries in the world, the state provides benefits such as free health care and education, land, cheap loans and generous pensions."

Quotes in the article hold that the movement is about rights rather than money, but I wonder if there isn't an element of Kuwaiti citizen entitlement behind some of these complaints. The spread is definitely one a case of one group getting a raise causing others to insist on having one two.

All this is happening as Prime Minister Nasser Muhammad al-Sabah is accused of yet more corruption. Kuwait's premier, who is also the emir's nephew, is always being accused of corruption, but this time the "Arab Spring" context is adding to citizens' assertiveness, while also pushing the government down the road of trying to divert dissent through displays of largesse. I don't expect this labor movement to support the political protests, however, as so far the grievances all seem to be economic, and many of not most Kuwaitis see the Parliament and not the royal family as responsible for keeping economic growth slow.

Another Bahrain Funeral Protest

The death of a teenager at the hands of security forces sparked another protest in Bahrain:

"Large numbers of people filled the streets west of Bahrain’s capital, Manama, on Friday as a funeral march for a 16-year-old boy — who activists said was killed by the police — grew into one of the largest demonstrations in the tiny Gulf nation in recent weeks.

"Toward evening, activists said the police began using tear gas and sound grenades to disperse the crowd as protesters lingered on a central highway after the funeral procession had broken up. Al Jazeera reported on its live blog that at least one person had been severely injured in the face. There were also reports of gunfire, though it was unclear what type of bullets were being used.

"The protest, among the largest in the country since the Sunni monarchy put down an uprising in March with the help of forces from neighboring Saudi Arabia, was touched off by the death on Thursday of the teenager, identified by authorities as Ahmed Jaber."

The Maspero Massacre

Today, Egypt's military government killed at least 19 Coptic demonstrators in Cairo:

"Nineteen people were killed in Cairo Sunday when Christians, some carrying crosses and pictures of Jesus, clashed with military police, medical and security sources said, in the latest sectarian flare-up in a country in political turmoil.

"Christians protesting against an attack on a church threw rocks and petrol bombs and set cars on fire, as thick smoke wafted through the streets in some of the most violent scenes since an uprising ousted ex-President Hosni Mubarak in February.

"Hundreds from both sides fought with sticks on a Cairo bridge. Protests later spread to the central Tahrir Square, the focal point of the February uprising. Witnesses said the army had moved into the area...

"'We were marching peacefully,' Talaat Youssef, 23-year old Christian trader told Reuters at the scene.

"'When we got to the state television building, the army started firing live ammunition,' he said, adding army vehicles ran over protesters, killing five. His account could not be immediately confirmed."

My attention was drawn to this my Twitter feed, where people like al-Jazeera English journalist Nadia Abu al-Magd state unequivocally that security forces responded with lethal force to a peaceful demonstration, despite what is on official state media. Hossam el-Hamalawy, one of the organizers of Egypt's leftist opposition, is blunt, and includes video clips:

"The army and police committed a horrible massacre against peaceful protesters today in Maspero, Cairo. Army vehicles ran over protesters. Live ammunition was used. Extensive rounds of tear gas were fired, and showers of beatings from the military police and the central security forces. At least 19 people have been killed, and more than 150 injured. The toll keeps increasing.

"The Army also stormed Al-Hurra TV station and 25 January TV stations, and took them off air. The Egyptian state run TV is inciting the public against the 'Coptic protesters' and even called on the citizens to take to the streets to 'protect the army'!! SCAF is trying to instigate a sectarian civil war."

Despite the lazy sectarian framing of the Reuters excerpt above, this is not sectarian violence, but violence of the regime against its citizens and an ongoing quest to use the threat of instability to preserve its own power. What's more, it has a lesson for those who argue that current regimes are good for religious minorities: Dictators make fickle friends.

UPDATE: Issandr el-Amrani is worried.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Syrian Death Toll

The UN estimates that almost 3000 have died in Syria's uprising:

"The United Nations has raised its tally of people killed during seven months of unrest in Syria to more than 2,900 - an increase of 200 people since the beginning of September.

"Rupert Colville, a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said on Thursday that the figure was based on 'reliable sources' inside and outside the country.

"He also said that the names of the dead had all been confirmed and likely included some members of the security forces...

"A army officer who has taken refuge in Turkey, Colonel Riad al-Asaad, claims to have established an opposition armed force called the 'Syrian Free Army', but its strength and numbers are unknown."

Building a Fractured Society

Robin Yassin-Kassab takes a look at religious minorities and Syria's uprising:

"Tragically, the propaganda is also taken seriously by members of Syria's minority sects -- not by all of them by any stretch, but perhaps by a majority. It's tragic because perceived minority support for this sadistic regime will inevitably tarnish intersectarian relations in Syria in the future.

"Those Sunni Syrians who are (understandably) enraged by the minorities' siding with the dictatorship should remember first that many Alawis and Christians, as well as many more Druze and Ismailis, have joined the revolution and that many have paid the price. Second, Sunnis should remember that Alawis and Christians have good reason to fear change, if not to believe the propaganda...

"The one thing the regime has done intelligently in the last six months is to play on minorities' fears. I know that prominent Alawis have been receiving threatening phone calls from unknown numbers, ostensibly from "Sunnis" but almost certainly from the mukhabarat. (How would street-level Sunnis get hold of the phone numbers, and why would they want to make such threats when the committees coordinating the protests are stressing the importance of avoiding sectarianism?)..

"The minorities -- and not only the minorities -- also fear the fate of Iraq and Lebanon. When Saddam Hussein fell in Iraq, the Sunni community as a whole was blamed for the crimes of the whiskey-quaffing dictator. The Sunnis then gave shelter to Wahhabi nihilists who bombed Shiite civilians and drove a large chunk of the Christian community into Syria. So will all Alawis be blamed for the Assads? Will they be returned to their pre-1920s status? Will Christians lose Syria, the one place in the Arab world where they have prospered and practiced their faith unmolested?

"The two scenarios that most terrify the minorities (and almost everyone else) are, first, the rise of intolerant Islamism, and, second, sectarian civil war. Unfortunately, both scenarios become more likely with every moment the regime remains in power. The experience of being shot at, besieged, and tortured will inevitably drive some toward more extreme views. In addition, the military units slaughtering the people are overwhelmingly Alawi and commanded by Alawis. The regime's shabiha militias in Hama, Homs, and Latakia are Alawis recruited from the surrounding villages. These are the people torturing Sunni women and children to death, burning shops and cars, beating and humiliating old men. Their actions will have consequences. If the regime falls soon, the consequences will be legal and targeted solely at the guilty. If the regime doesn't fall soon, the consequences may be violent, generalized vigilante 'justice.' Then Iraq and Lebanon will become Syria's models."

A point to take out of this is that religious and ethnic enmities are not natural. They emerge over time based on differential interests and political mobilization and manipulation. In times of turbulence, it's important to recognize this to try and prevent them from hardening, as difficult as that is.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)