Tahrir Violence Again

Yesterday saw new violence in Cairo's Tahrir Square:

"Clashes between Egyptian security forces and more than 5,000 protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square have left more than 1,036 people injured, according to witnesses and medical officials.

"Tahrir Square, the epicentre of protests that toppled Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's former president, was sealed off early on Wednesday as lines of security forces in riot gear strived to regain control from demonstrators.

"Witnesses said the clashes started on Tuesday when police tried to clear a sit-in at the state-TV building, which included families of those killed during the country's revolution earlier this year, known as the 'martyrs', according to the Daily News, an Egyptian news website.

"Witnesses said police attacked the families outside the Balloon Theatre in Agouza, where a planned memorial service for them was taking place."

Ursula Lindsey provides context:

"This violence is the inevitable result of the lack of transparency and of momentum in the judicial proceedings against former regime figures and especially the police (something we talked about on the last Arabist podcast). The families of martyrs' were shut out of the last session of the Habib Al Adly (the former Minister of Interior) trial; they went wild when the trial was postponed again. Everyday I read and hear stories about police officers who are on trial (or should be) going back to work at their old posts; and about families being bribed or threatened ('We'll arrest your other son on drug charges') if they don't drop their cases.

Now both Mubarak and Adli are scheduled to next appear in court on the second day of Ramadan. We all know that means a month-long postponement. And while justice drags out, the Ministry of Interior is in complete denial about the extent of its culture of abuse and the need for total reform. The police literally seem to hope that by sulking at home (and thereby showing people how necessary they are); and by making a lot of vague promises and handing out glossy brochures, they can teach people to appreciate them and rehabilitate their 'image.' But what they really want is their power back; they can't conceive of doing their job in any other way than with total impunity. They view the idea of accountability as undermining their prestige and authority. There is no sense of the moral authority that would come, eventually, from publicly cleaning house."

One of the bigger issues, seen especially in Lindsey's first paragraph above, is that much of the Mubarak regime remains in place. As I've suggested before, the military intervened mainly to save the system by removing its most visible symbol and then retooling it.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

No Children in Mosques

Tajikistan is banning children from mosques:

"The new legislation has generated controversy by explicitly barring children under the age of 18 from 'participating in the activities of religious organizations,' which include mosques and other places of worship. Local analysts believe that the ban is aimed at preventing Tajik children from becoming radicalized. Presenting the bill in the parliament, Tajik Education Minister Abdujabbor Rahmonov, said: 'The draft law allows children that study in religious schools to attend mosques and join religious associations. However, children studying in secular schools are prohibited from doing so before they reach the age of 18.' He also said that children will still be allowed to participate in funerals and attend mosques during official religious holidays (www.avesta.tj, June 15)...

"Tajik legal experts and religious communities have condemned the ban on children’s visits to mosques as unconstitutional and anti-Islamic. Prominent Tajik lawyer and head of the country’s Social Democratic Party (SDPT) Rahmatillo Zoirov suggested that the parental responsibility bill includes some provisions which had already been stipulated in the constitution and the Family Code. At the same time, according to Zoirov, some provisions in the bill violate Tajikistan’s constitution and international human rights obligations (www.news.tj, June 20)...

"The ban on children attending places of worship has also drawn criticism from the country’s non-Islamic religious groups, including Russian Orthodox Christians and the Jewish community (www.rferl.org, February 17; www.forum18.org/Archive.php, May 25)."

al-Ain as World Heritage Site

UNESCo has added the city of al-Ain in the southeastern quarter of the United Arab Emirates to its list of World Heritage Sites:

"The inscription was due to the unique and distinguished cultural sites in Al Ain, with particular reference being made to the geological, archaeological and historical importance of Jebel Hafit, Hili cultural landscape, Bidaa Bint Saud, the Oases areas, and the Falaj system...

"Mohammed Khalaf Al Mazrouei, Advisor for Culture and Heritage in the Court of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and Director General of ADACH, said that the archaeological sites, historical buildings and natural areas, in the city of Al Ain still maintain their cultural values, surroundings and their original urban structure. Since ADACH was established in October 2005, the cultural sites were inventoried, protected and restored, through a strategy based on state-of-the-art methods and internationally approved technological techniques.

"He identified that work is underway to preserve several fortresses and historical places, including the Jahili mosque and fortress, and Bin Hadi House in the Hili Oasis, along with dozens of other archaeological sites and historical buildings.

"Work is also underway to revive the original uses of the buildings and to re-dedicate them to their original purposes (such as the old traditional market in Al-Qattarah). At the same time, they will be used for new purposes, with the objective of integrating these buildings into the vital infrastructure of the city, thus ensuring they are preserved for a long time."

Al-Ain and the nearby mountain of Jabal Hafit do an excellent job of showcasing Arabia desert heritage. It is actually half of an urban area, as the international border went right through Buraimi oasis, and today Buraimi is the name of the Omani side of town, which also has important heritage sites. Another name for the areas, from the early Islamic period, is Tuwwam.

Battle for the Nur Mosque

The Egyptian Gazette reports that Egypt's Salafis are staging a protest for control of Cairo's high-profile Nur Mosque:

"A high-pitched voice at the back of the ornate Al-Nour (The Light) Mosque shouts through a megaphone: 'This is time for us to claim our rights to this mosque. We must get our rights.' A deep-throated roar immediately follows, as the crowd chants: 'Yes, we must get our rights.'

"The congregation of around 3,000 attending the main Islamic event of the week, Friday midday prayers, surges forward in what amounts to a coup against the mosque's established religious order...

"We will all fight for our rights,” they chanted, bringing many of the worshippers to tears – not just young men clad in white religious gowns and headgear, but also many of the snappily dressed men and boys, seemingly an amalgam of different strata of Egyptian society...

"The initial call that transformed an orderly prayer session into a powerful expression of political Islam had come from Sheikh Hafez Salama, a strong opponent of secularism...

"That Al-Nour Mosque should be the main source of the outburst of anti-State sentiment and pro-Salafist control in this city of 16 million people is hardly surprising.

"Every Friday for the past eight weeks, there has been a struggle over who will control the pulpit from where the key religious message of the week is delivered.

"As such, it has been the site of a portentous tug-of-war pitting hardline Salafists, who support an austere form of Islam, against the much more moderate line adopted by religious institutions that for decades have been under firm Government control.

"Sensing that the momentum was with them, the hardline worshippers marched outside the mosque and expressed their determination to take matters inside the mosque into their own hands and impose their full control."

As the excerpts above indicate, Egypt has an official religious establishment managed by the government. The Salafis prospered at unlicensed mosques, often out in open streets, with preachers who often have connections to Saudi Arabia. That they are now moving to take over some of the official mosques is unsurprising.

North African Optimism

Babylon & Beyond passes on some poll results:

"The feeling among pollsters in the gulf Arab countries contrasted sharply with respondents in other parts of the Middle East, especially North Africans, who expressed far more optimism, according to the study.

"Seventy percent of North Africans polled said they felt that they were about to enter 'a new era in the Arab world.'

"Again, optimism was highest in North Africa, the area where the uprisings began, on the question of whether the 'current movement' will make the Arab world a more democratic place. Eighty-five percent of respondents there said they believed that Arab countries would be democratic states in five years."

This confirms a sense I've had that North Africa is really the area where change is likely to be most successful, and that looking back we may remember 2011 as the year of the "North African Spring," counting Egypt in its continental home for this purpose.

Saudi-Khalifa Marriage

Saudi Arabia support for Bahrain's beleaguered Al Khalifa rulers is being consolidated through a political marriage:

"'The first notes that Saudi King Abdullah’s daughter (as per Saudi custom, name not provided) will be marrying Pr. Khalid bin Salman, son of Bahrain’s ruler. If you think this signals, again, that Saudi Arabia is going to stand by the Bahraini government during its political turmoils—and in its defiance of Iran—you’re right. The custom of intermarriage for political purposes is alive and well in the region, as it used to be in the West. And still is, actually, though to a lesser extent.'"

Kuwaiti PM's Confidence Vote

Nasser Muhammad Al Sabah, Prime Minister of Kuwait, has has rather predictably survived a vote of no confidence in parliament. For those interested on the latest in Kuwait's political wrangling, Mona Kareem provides some background here:

"Following all this tension, one may fairly ask what has been accomplished and who is to blame for the continual clashes between the legislature and the executive branch of government. Many Kuwaitis believe the current situation to be a reflection of a struggle inside the ruling family, with parliamentarians linked to family members seeking to further their own economic or political interests. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed is not the first prime minister to be linked to corruption, but depriving him of credit for his achievements might serve the interests of those who want to ensure that he will not be a viable candidate for emir."

Kareem also explores the links between royal and Islamist parliamentary factions.

Egypt's Union Battles

The most under-reported aspect of Egypt's revolution has been the critical role of the labor movement, not only during the events, but in the years leading up to it. Now, an independent labor federation is battling for recognition:

"The battle for union influence is being waged by two groups: the long-established Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) and the upstart Egyptian Federation for Independent Unions (EFIU)...

"Ibrahim el Azhary, the general secretary of ETUF, calls the independent union movement 'the counter-revolution among the workers' and 'a Zionist conspiracy'.

"Kamel Abbas, one of the founders of EFIU, said ETUF is run by 'a group of old men who serve whatever political power is convenient' and are 'enemies of workers' rights in Egypt'.

"ETUF said it will lobby a new parliament for independence from the government, but that it wants to retain control of negotiations with the government and industries on issues such as wages and benefits. EFIU, on the other hand, argues for the complete independence of unions to negotiate on their own or in groups, and the ability to play a larger political role in the country.

"Under Mr Mubarak, the law required all unions to be a part of ETUF and it has been widely accepted that the organisation was a part of the government's apparatus to control dissent and manage the economy...

"The caretaker government, led by the Supreme Council of the Military Forces, has so far come out strongly in favour of the independent unions. Ahmed el Borai, the minister of manpower and immigration, declared the freedom of associations as one of his first acts. The move led the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to immediately remove Egypt's from its blacklist of countries that prevent freedom of association for its workers...

"Where there were only a handful of new trade unions formed before the revolution, they are now sprouting up by the dozen each month."

See also Hesham Sallam

Presidential Election History

Nate Silver today got me wondering when we last had a presidential election cycle with no sitting U.S. Senators as candidates.

Based on wikipedia's articles on U.S. Presidential elections, the answer would appear to be 1900.

Success for AKP, Kurds

Turkey's ruling AKP party won about 50% of the vote and 326 out of 550 parliamentary seats to retain its status as the ruling party since 2002:

"The conservative party of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won a clear victory in parliamentary elections on Sunday with a strong showing that critics worry might be used to further consolidate its power after nearly a decade of rule and to circumscribe civil liberties and its political opposition.

"With 99 percent of the returns counted, Mr. Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party won about 50 percent of the votes, according to the semiofficial Anatolian News Agency. The main opposition group, the Republican People’s Party, won nearly 26 percent, and another opposition party, the Nationalist Action Party, had 13 percent, the agency said.

"The returns give the pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party, known as the A.K.P., its third term in office since it first won a parliamentary majority in 2002. The results, however, failed to provide the absolute majority that the party wanted to push for major changes, including a shift to a presidential system and the drafting of a new constitution. The party will now have to work to forge consensus with its opposition."

The "absolute majority" needed for a constitutional referendum is 60%, so the AKP is actually only four votes short. If they get them and push ahead with revisions to Turkey's military-written constitution of 1982, it will probably further Erdogan's standing as a new Ataturk for Turks opposed to the militant secularist legacy of Turkey's founder. One of the AKP's ostensible goals is to move toward a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, which I'm sure Erdogan thinks would fit him well.

The other winners in yesterday's elections were the Kurds:

"But the other story of the election was the strong gains made by Kurdish rights candidates, who needed to run as independents to get around rules requiring a party to get at least 10 percent of the vote to get into Parliament.

"A total of 36 candidates backed by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) won seats, a gain of 16 from the previous election...

"Independent candidates running for the BDP attracted around 60 percent of the votes in at least three mainly Kurdish provinces in the southeast and won large protest votes in some Turkish cities, such as İstanbul."

Sheep as Groundskeepers

My local public school district is using sheep as summer groundstenders:

"Sheep are taking over some of Carlisle Area School District groundskeeping chores.

"They are saving the district up to $15,000 a year and cutting local air pollution...

"Instead of workers spending six hours a week mowing and trimming near solar panels, sheep have moved in for the summer. They nibble grass and weeds each morning and laze under panels during hot afternoons."

Abdullah's Promised Reforms

Jordan's King Abdullah II is making promises:

"King Abdullah II yesterday promised reforms leading to parliamentary government and a tougher fight against anti-corruption, at the same time warning against 'chaos' and the media creating a climate of 'hatred'.

"In his first televised address since pro-reform protests began in Jordan in January, the king pledged a new electoral law that would result in 'a parliament with active political party representation' that 'allows the formation of governments based on parliamentary majority … in the future'. He said: 'The practical approach to this meets the constitutional review now being undertaken by the royal committee I recently tasked to explore possible amendments appropriate for Jordan's present and future...'

"The king's speech comes in the wake of political reform recommendations made June 4 by the 47-member national dialogue committee, comprised of a cross-section of society, created in March.

"The proposed reforms would increase the number of parliamentary seats to 130 from 120 and cut the number of people needed to form a political party to 250 from 500, with women making up at least 10 per cent."

I wonder what's in that ellipsis between "parliamentary majority" and "in the future." Whatever the case, it's one thing to make a speech, and quite another to deliver meaningful change. The king is maintaining a paternalistic attitude that does not bode well, and I don't see where the specific reforms get the problem of gerrymandering that is one of the pillars of royal domination.

Oil and the Libya War

Glenn Greenwald argues that these considerations are the key to the American involvement in Libya:

"By November 2007, a State Department cable noted 'growing evidence of Libyan resource nationalism.' It noted that in his 2006 speech marking the founding of his regime, Gaddafi said: 'Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them. Now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money.' His son made similar remarks in 2007.

"Oil companies had been forced to give their local subsidiaries Libyan names, the cable said. Eni, for example, became Mellita, and the Spanish firm Repsol became Akakoss. Labor laws were amended to 'Libyanize' the economy, and oil firms were pressed to hire Libyan managers, finance people and human resources directors...

"But doing business in Libya remained difficult. 'Everything in Libya — everything — had to be approved by Gaddafi or one of his sons,' said Nansen Saleri, the founder of Houston-based Quantum Reservoir Impact and former head of reservoir management at Saudi Aramco. '. . . That’s one reason we elected not to be involved.'

"Saleri said that he would like to do business enhancing the percentage of oil recovered from known reservoirs but that he would wait for the political situation to settle down...

"But Libya’s oil production has foundered, sagging to about 1.5 million barrels a day by early this year before unrest broke out. The big oil companies, several of which had drilled dry holes, felt that Libya was not making the best exploration prospects available. One major company privately said that it was on the verge of a discovery but that unrest cut short the project."

The quotes above are from a Washington Post story which does shake my certainty that oil was largely irrelevant to the American, British, and French decision to become involved in Libya's civil war. However, the very last sentence also matters. Qaddafi may have been difficult to deal with, but civil conflict and uncertainty are worse, and no one knows what Libya's future holds. At most, I think his oil policy simply represented a key reason that NATO powers saw Qaddafi as expendable in a way that they don't Bahrain's royal family, for example.

It's worth mentioning that the British and French were actually the drivers of this intervention, and in that light, the refugee issue bears mentioning:

"The European responses to the predicted influx of migrants from Tunisia and Libya have been ones of panic; Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has claimed that Italy will be 'flooded' with half-a-million migrants, while the British Prime Minister David Cameron has repeatedly conflated trans-Mediterranean migration with security and Britain’s national/capitalist interest, couching it all in liberal interventionist terms. Speaking before Parliament on 14 March 2011, Cameron stated: 'Do we want a situation where a failed pariah state festers in Europe’s southern border, potentially threatening our security, pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the people of Libya?' Meanwhile the neoliberal interest behind British attitudes to the North African revolutions was plain to see: 'Europe needs to follow through on its declaration with a real and credible offer to these countries based on three of the key freedoms – movement of goods, services, and investment.'

"Noticeably while Cameron talks about the 'movement of goods, services, and investment,' another key freedom and one that underpins Schengen, the free movement of people, is absent. The contradiction between the free flow of capital and the free flow of people was starkly illuminated by Cameron who in the same speech advocated for the free movement of capital and at the same time warned against the movement of people in terms that paint migrants as an almost existential threat and seek to conflate migration with terrorism. For the idea of any movement of people from Europe’s southern neighbors creates a sense of panic, as Cameron so ably demonstrated in a speech to Parliament on the eve of the US and European enforcement of the No-Fly Zone on 18 March 2011: 'Libya will become... a state from which literally hundreds of thousands of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure on us in Europe. We must also remember that Gaddafi is a dictator who has a track record of violence and support for terrorism against our country.'"

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Million Pardoned

Jordan's King Abdullah II is pardoning criminals:

"Jordan's King Abdullah II has pardoned more than one million criminal offenders to mark the 12th anniversary of his accession.

The pardon covers traffic violators and those who committed petty crimes, but also some detainees who took part in street protests demanding reforms...

"Those convicted of thefts, traffic violations, slander, criminal offences, among others were included in the pardon.

"But it excluded those convicted of espionage, treason, drugs dealers, bribery, misuse of public office and crimes related to the internal security of the state well as premeditated murder and rape.

"In total, the prime minister said 1,184,000 Jordanians stand to benefit from the amnesty."

What's up with this? There are only six million people in Jordan. That's a lot of outstanding traffic violations.

Gulf International Relations

Gregory Gause's The International Relations of the Persian Gulf provides an excellent overview of its subject over the past 40 years since the British withdrawal, while providing both interesting unifying themes and well-supported arguments about several controversial issues. Gause views the states bordering the Gulf as forming a "regional security complex," meaning that the bulk of their foreign policy energy is dedicated to their relations with each other. Between 1971 and at least 2003, the Persian Gulf saw a tripolar system based around Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Politics among them was often characterized by concern with transnational identities, such as Arab ethnicity or Shi'ism, and a critical factor shaping interstate relations, including the major wars, was states' fears that these identities could be manipulated so as to undermine their own internal security. This is especially true when discussing Iraq.

An early case of a Gulf regime entering a conflict was Saddam Hussein's decision to attack Iran in 1980. While acknowledging that the Iraqi government saw an opportunity to advance territorial claims at the head of the Gulf, Gause argues based on the timing of events that the actual decision to go to war was motivated by a fear of revolutionary Shi'ism spreading to Iraq, a fear which also motivated support for Iraq by Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Gause adduces a similar motivation behind Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, producing a great deal of evidence that Saddam Hussein, with a certain amount of paranoia, believed Israel, the United States, and the smaller Gulf monarchies were conspiring with internal dissidents to undermine his regime in the wake of the unsuccessful Iran-Iraq War. A belief that danger was imminent led him to attack Kuwait in August 1990, instead of trying to wait until he had nuclear weapons. In this context, Saddam saw Kuwait's over-pumping of oil as in part an attempt to undermine his own economy and patronage capacity by driving down prices.

Gause devotes an entire chapter to the American decision to attack Iraq in 2003, which he argues undid the tripolar system leading to a current situation in which it is unclear how power and influence will ultimately be distributed. His argument here is that while some within the Bush administration were in favor of an attack on Iraq from the get-go, Bush himself only came to support the idea after September 11, and this support was based primarily on the belief that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons programs and could provide such weapons to terrorists. Once this decision was made, confirmation bias and internal administration politics led to exaggerations of the intelligence in areas such as nuclear weapons and al-Qaeda links that served to make the case for war to the American public.

As someone who follows these issues closely, I felt like I'd heard almost everything in this book before at some point or another, but it was still invaluable to have it all in one place as part of a common narrative and analysis. Looking at the region today, one can see the continued foreign policy salience of regimes' concerns for their international security in Saudi Arabia's decision to help suppress demonstrations in Bahrain. At the same time, I'm not as convinced as Gause is that Iraq is now primarily a playing field for outsiders as opposed to a power in its own right. While there are definite internal tensions to be resolved, Iraq currently has a stable government with a steadily increasing capacity, and I'm dubious that any of its neighbors want to see it collapse back into civil war. The key issue to watch there is what kind of path it charts amidst the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

In summary, Gause's book is a highly effective introduction to key regional issues, as well as a useful resource for those with some background in the area, which will continue as a flashpoint in world affairs for the foreseeable future.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Assad's Support

An anonymous Damascus correspondent for Babylon & Beyond explains Assad's base of support:

"'Syria has a similar demographic to Egypt, with a young population,' said one diplomat. 'But they have a relatively young president in whom they had a lot of hope for reform, though his reputation is greatly tarnished now. Many people, even without high expectations of reform, still value the secular nature of society, and in recent years, if you were a middle-class person, you have seen life improve.'

"The middle classes are the bedrock of Assad's support now, and as turmoil roils in Dara and in rural and suburban areas, the biggest cities of Damascus and Aleppo, which have gotten richer under the economic policies of the last decade, have remained relatively quiet.

"Living under heavy surveillance, people do not easily share criticism of the authorities in public. 'We in the cities don't have a problem [with the regime] because we understand that democracy and freedom mean chaos,' one shop owner in Aleppo said...

"The threat of sectarian violence is seen as another reason for standing with a regime that is nominally secular, despite resentment over corruption and violence among the elites and security forces belonging to the president's minority Alawite Muslim sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam."

The point about surveillance might undermine the reporting a bit, but the general thrust still works. Dictatorships don't need to be popular, they just need for a critical mass of people to see living under it as better than the personal risks of actively opposing it. The pattern of protests in Syria shows that the Assad regime has thus far maintained that balance with the urban middle and upper classes.

Politics of Turkish-Israeli Relations

Turkish politicians clearly feel that accusing opponents of being pro-Israel is a winning tactic:

"Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, used a campaign speech in Istanbul on Sunday to slam opponents for failing to stand up to what he sees as Israeli bullying. Mr Erdogan is a religiously conservative Muslim known for his outspoken criticism of Israel.

In his speech, Mr Erdogan said Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the opposition leader, had admitted that he would not have allowed last year's Gaza flotilla to sail...

"Mr Kilicdaroglu shot back, claiming that Mr Erdogan, who is expected to win the elections, had cosied up to Israel. He alleged that the prime minister proposed that an Israeli company receive a Turkish government contract to clear mines along the border with Syria. Later he called Mr Erdogan the 'co-leader of the Greater Middle East Project', a purported scheme by the US to reshape the region that is often cited by Turkish secularists as evidence that Mr Erdogan is backed by Washington. The plan supposedly props up Turkey as a model state for the concept of moderate Islam.

"In a meeting with reporters in the southern province of Mersin yesterday, Mr Kilicdaroglu accessed Mr Erdogan of secretly sending one of his ministers to Israel to secure a deal for a Turkish businessman close to the prime minister. He gave no further details.

"The public exchange shows the depth of the rift between Turkey and Israel that now extends from the halls of government to the bazaar. No party in Turkey has dared campaign on a pro-Israel platform."

Actually, it doesn't sound like being pro-American is that great in Turkish politics right now.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Mesbah-Yazdi and Ahmadinejad

Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi has launched an attack on key elements of Ahmadinejad's administration:

"'Religion is in Danger' are the words of Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, a hardline cleric who was once a staunch supporter of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Once considered President Ahmadinejad’s mentor, Mesbah-Yazdi is warning the faithful that Islam is 'in danger' by none other than President Ahmadinejad’s close colleagues and associates, now referred to as “the deviant faction.”

"For some time now, opponents of President Ahmadinejad have been referring to Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaiee, president’s Chief of Staff, and his close associates as the ‘deviant faction’ because conservatives and principalists believe that Mashaiee and his men have deviated from the principles of the conservative movement, such as a strong commitment to Velayat Faqih and clerical Islam. The so-called ‘deviant faction’ has also faced harsh criticism from the clerical establishment which accuses Mashaiee and his colleagues of having 'false and heretical beliefs.'"

This is different than the commonly reported fissures between Ahmadinejad's principlist movement and the old clerical guard such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi has long been considered the spiritual leader of Ahmadinejad and his faction, someone who was potentially using the president to lay groundwork for his own ascension to the Leadership after Khamene'i's death. The linked article also mention criticism of Ahmadinejad from the IRGC leadership. Ahmadinejad has been so close to the IRGC that some have spoken of the 2009 election in the context of the militarization of Iranian politics along lines similar to what you see in Arab regimes.

What has caused this apparent split between Ahmadinejad and the two closest institutional backers? My best guess is that Ahmadinejad, who has already become more powerful than Iranian presidents have traditionally been, is now somehow moving in a direction that threatens those institutional backers. Mesbah-Yazdi, for example, may want the Khamene'i personally weakened, but he doesn't want Ahmadinejad to go too far in undermining the prerogatives of the supreme clerical office Mesbah-Yazdi himself one day hopes to inherit. Something similar may be happening with the IRGC.

Whatever the case, these developments are significant given the constellation of forces which rule Iran, and bear watching.

Saleh Departs

Ali Abdullah Saleh has probably finally lost power, as he heads to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment:

"Yemen’s embattled president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, arrived in Saudi Arabia on Saturday for urgent medical treatment of wounds sustained in a bold attack on the presidential compound, Saudi officials said, abruptly shifting the political calculus that has allowed him to cling to power despite months of protest and violence...

"Saudi officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Saleh had agreed to leave only when his condition worsened after Friday’s attack. President Obama’s top adviser on Yemen, John O. Brennan, spoke by phone Saturday with the Yemeni vice president, Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi, who news reports said became acting president under the Yemeni Constitution.

"The Saudis are likely to make sure Mr. Saleh, who has been in power for 33 years, does not return as president, analysts said — a goal they and other regional Arab leaders have tried unsuccessfully to arrange for weeks."

In his absence, Saleh's ability to retain the loyalty of even those within his government is severely compromised. What's more, I agree with the New York Times article that Saudi Arabia is likely to use this occasion to prevent his return, as under the GCC umbrella they've been trying to ease him out of power for weeks.