Karnak Conflict

This sounds like a potentially interesting story:

"As Tahrir Square erupted, protests swept through Luxor, a city of nearly 500,000 best known for its spectacular ancient ruins. One demonstrator was reportedly killed. At a cafe I find Omar, a former tomb restorer who now runs a restaurant and wouldn't give the rest of his name, taking long, slow drags on his shisha and sipping tea, whiling away the hours. People raided the police station, he said, 'and we took away their guns and they ran away.' The police, he said, looted Karnak Temple, but 'all the people stood on the highway and set up road blocks and checked each car; for 20 days we guarded the tombs. Tourism is our business, so we protected it.'"

Today's Iraq Protests

Today saw protests throughout Iraq, and six protestors were killed by government security forces. As with other recent protests in Iraq, these are connected to the broader wave of protests in the Arab world these past two months, but Reidar Visser usefully highlights their specific Iraqi context:

"Indeed, the striking aspect of today’s demonstrations was their national character. For one thing, we have seen Kurds rise up against the dominant Kurdish parties, Shiites challenging the hegemony of Maliki’s own 'all-Shiite' alliance, and Sunnis complaining against their Sunni local politicians. The cries for better services and employment conform to a universal pattern that has been in emergence over the past few weeks. But more importantly, in terms of slogans and demands, there are signs of a true synthesis of genuine nationwide opposition to the supposed 'government of national partnership' that was formed, tentatively at least, in December 2010...

"In Dhi Qar, demonstrators demanded better services, an end to corruption, and, importantly, criticised the system of ethno-sectarian quota-sharing that forms the basis for all of Iraq’s post-2003 government and that is supported by the United States and Iran alike. In Baghdad, protestors are trying to destroy the concrete blast walls put up by the United States since 2007 in its own attempt to engineer 'sectarian' reconciliation, American-style, and are calling for a unified Sunni–Shiite political project, with echoes from the uprising against the British in 1920. Again, this seems to indicate a desire for more profound reforms and system change. Some of the activists are highlighting the absence of properly elected local councils at the sub-governorate level across Iraq as one very immediate grievance."

One again, it needs to be emphasized that Iraq's sectarian divisions are not timeless enmities, which of course never actually exist, nor are they that comparable to the ethnic nationalism of post-communist eastern Europe. Alongside them there is an ideal of Iraqi nationalism among Arabs, which is why we see factions competing for the apparatus of the central state with regional autonomy as simply an occasional fallback position. Grassroots counter-sectarian activism is plausible, quite possibly sustainable, and welcome, and if the Kurds want to join in, then so much the better.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Italy's Fourth Shore

As a quick orientation to modern Libya, I've started reading Dirk Vandewalle's A History of Modern Libya, and have been surprised to learn that Italy attempted a settler-colonial society there similar to French Algeria. From the text:

"From the beginning, therefore, Italy put high faith in agricultural cultivation and regeneration in its Fourth Shore. Until the fascist policy of of "demographic colonization" was implemented, however, settlement colonization in Libya proceeded slowly, mainly financed by north Italian capital that favored large estates. Between 1914 and 1929 roughly 180,000 acres of agricultural land were brought into production for Italian settlement. Although much of Italy's initial investment in its colony included utilities and public works, the focus of investments changed rapidly as the Fascists adopted a set of more intense state-sponsored and subsidized programs that were meant to settle individual Italian peasant families on their own, small individual farms. In line with this fascist vision of self-sufficiency, each family property became the unit of settlement, self-contained and providing its own labor. This policy had already become accentuated during the 1930's, but it was not until 1938, under Marshal Italo Bablo, that Italy embarked upon a number of grand-scale settlement experiments that brought 20,000 Italians...in one fell swoop to prepared family farms in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. This was followed by another 12,000 in 1939 when 'Libia' as the two northern provinces were now known, became an integral part of metropolitan Italy...

"Except for the large estates in Tripolitania, the overwhelming majority of the Italian settlers consisted of poor, landless peasants and of an urban proletariat that was attracted by the chance of becoming property owners, within twenty years, of the initially state-owned and state-subsidized farms. By 1940, 225,000 hectares were in production and 110,000 Italian settlers had arrived."

This colonization was short-lived, however, as all the Italian settlers were evacuated during World War II. As a result of that war, Italy was forced to renounce its claims, and western powers pushed for immediate full independence so as to have military bases in the south central Mediterranean in the rapidly developing Cold War strategic environment.

Tribal Segmentation

I don't have knowledge on Libya in particular, but Jonathan Wright is being far too rigid in his use of what anthropologists call the principle of segmentation to discuss tribal politics in Libya.

This model of tribal behavior was produced by E.E. Evans-Pritchard in the 1930's during his study of the Nuer in what is now Sudan. As seen in the common saying, "It involves a series of genealogically identified nested groups, and is explained reasonably well by Wright:

"But the unusual feature of tribalism, as anthropologists have noted for at least the last century or so, is that loyalties and customary obligations are 'segmentised' - in other words, tribes can easily split at a large number of different levels, based on perceptions, often mythical, of a person's genealogical origin. In theory, the more recent the common ancestor between X and Y (in the male line in the Arab context), the tighter the bonds of solidarity between them should be. That means that, even in a theoretically 'perfect' model, tribes need not always act as a coherent unit, unless they are in direct conflict with another tribe of equal size and coherence."

Evans-Pritchard did not elaborate this system strictly off observation, however, but was influenced by W. Robertson Smith's 1885 work Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia. Robertson Smith was not an anthropologist, but an orientalist, and here I do not use that term pejoratively, who was working with written Arabic sources from the 8th century which had been heavily influenced by the administrative organization of tribal identity in the early caliphate. Since the 1980's, Evans-Pritchard's segmentation theory has been steadily questioned by anthropologists working on modern Bedouins societies for many reasons: It ignores links forged through women, it assumes wrongly that parallel segments will have similar sizes, it has little to say about the development and influence of tribal leadership, it does not account for genealogical changes, and tribal alliances seldom seen to actually follow it despite the fact they they accept it as a theory of their actions. At the very least, it probably has much more to do with very small, immediately related groups than it does broader tribal confederations.

Here I wish I did have detailed knowledge of Libyan tribal politics, but I can raise some points to consider. First, even independent of settlement and the like, tribespeople are not socially programmed automatons. A team of anthropologists whose work I admire, William and Fidelity Lancaster, have emphasized the way tribespeople perceive their tribal identities as assets, options, and obligations, and make a series of rational calculations about whether and how to activate or follow them. Second, the role of leaders must be considered in a case like Libya. What relationship might they have to the state? What is their source of influence? Do they control agricultural resources, or channels of patronage? The Libyan state has to be the main economic power in most people's lives, and the intersection of this with tribal networks (my own preferred term to just "tribes") colors how people see their assets and obligations. In fact, states often use tribal leaders to incorporate tribespeople into their web, as happened with Jordan during the British Mandate, and given that I'm more interested in the actions of "tribal leaders" as a group than I am individual tribes.

To conclude, though, I want to emphasize that Libya is very definitely not one of my strong points, though I hope to know a bit more by Saturday than I do now.

The Libyan Atrocities

Libya's unbalanced dictator Moammar Qadhafi is hoping to avoid the fate of Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak by lashing out forcefully. Reports today show an escalating massacre of anti-government protestors, a massacre carried out by aerial bombardment and heavy artillery, killing hundreds. There have been defections, not only among the diplomatic corps, but in the military, but unconfirmed reports from inside Libya allege soldiers who refuse orders are being burned alive inside their barracks.

By these actions, Qadhafi and his entire family have secured a place alongside Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad as the great monsters of the late 20th century Middle East. Not since the former's response to the 1991 Shi'ite uprising and chemical weapons assault on Halabja has the Arab world witnessed such brutality, and there is little doubt that Qadhafi would create another Hama if the situation called for it.

In addition to the humanitarian implications, the rest of the Arab world has a stake in what happens, for if Qadhafi is successful, he will have crafted a path to regime survival for those facing their own protests, while if he fails, they will be more likely to give in with less struggle. For this reason, I wholeheartedly agree with Marc Lynch that the international community must intervene:

"By acting, I mean a response sufficiently forceful and direct to deter or prevent the Libyan regime from using its military resources to butcher its opponents. I have already seen reports that NATO has sternly warned Libya against further violence against its people. Making that credible could mean the declaration and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, presumably by NATO, to prevent the use of military aircraft against the protestors. It could also mean a clear declaration that members of the regime and military will be held individually responsible for any future deaths. The U.S. should call for an urgent, immediate Security Council meeting and push for a strong resolution condeming Libya's use of violence and authorizing targeted sanctions against the regime. Such steps could stand a chance of reversing the course of a rapidly deteriorating situation. An effective international response could not only save many Libyan lives, it might also send a powerful warning to other Arab leaders who might contemplate following suit against their own protest movements."

A no-fly zone has already been called for diplomatically by none other than Libya's own deputy UN ambassador, one of those diplomats who, along with his colleagues in New York, has sided with the people against his government. Qadhafi's lack of friends in the Arab world has also led to a call for Arab League action by Qatar, which echoed the call for action by the UN Security Council.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Qaradawi in Egypt

As I've commented before, Yusuf al-Qaradawi matters, as a conservative Sunni Islamist who appeals to massive youth audiences through television even as the older generations remember his connection to Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna. On Friday, he gave a sermon in Midan Tahrir. I can't find a complete English text, but here is some of what he said:

"On Friday, he struck themes of democracy and pluralism, long hallmarks of his writing and preaching. He began his sermon by saying that he was discarding the customary opening 'Oh Muslims,' in favor of 'Oh Muslims and Copts,' referring to Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. He praised Muslims and Christians for standing together in Egypt’s revolution and even lauded the Coptic Christian 'martyrs' who once fought the Romans and Byzantines. 'I invite you to bow down in prayer together,' he said.

"He urged the military officers governing Egypt to deliver on their promises of turning over power to 'a civil government' founded on principles of pluralism, democracy and freedom. And he called on the army to immediately release all political prisoners and rid the cabinet of its dominance by officials of the old Mubarak government.

"'We demand from the Egyptian Army to free us from the government that was appointed by Mubarak,' Sheik Qaradawi declared. 'We want a new government without any of these faces whom people can no longer stand.' And he urged the young people who led the uprising to continue their revolution. 'Protect it,' he said. 'Don’t you dare let anyone steal it from you.'"

Another source mentioned this:

"Qaradawi, a spiritual leader to the Muslim Brotherhood here, sought to reassure Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority saying 'in this square sectarianism died' and praised Copts for linking hands to symbolically protect Muslims while they prayed during the uprising.

"'The regime planted sectarianism here … in Tahrir Muslims and Christians joined hands for a better Egypt,' said the theologian, who has lived in semi-exile in Qatar for decades."

In my post from a week ago, I commented that the illiberal opinions of many Egyptians was a greater problem for developing a pluralistic society than the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, and that there is no reason to suspect the latter of secretly planning a theocratic dictatorship. While I still expect to see an increase in, for example, blasphemy trials, there is an optimistic scenario in which strong comments by respected leaders such as Qaradawi mute popular attitudes towards, say, conversion much like American popular Islamophobia remained somewhat muted when President Bush repeatedly worked against it.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Syrian Food Aid

Probably hoping to stave off opposition protests linked to the economy, Syria is increasing direct aid to citizens:

"Thousands of impoverished Syrians began receiving cash payments from a multimillion-dollar aid fund this week, as part of a government effort to tackle persistent high levels of poverty.

"The step comes less than a month after heating fuel subsidies for two million public sector employees were unexpectedly raised by 72 per cent. The government had previously been in the process of cutting back subsidies, which it can ill afford to pay because of dwindling oil reserves.

"Import duties on various staple foods, including rice, tea, coffee and powdered milk, were also cut this week in a move designed to lessen the impact of rising food prices that have hit ordinary Syrians hard.

"Although the social aid fund has been in the pipeline for years, and the cabinet approved an outline of the programme in December, analysts in Syria say its implementation was accelerated after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, when entrenched rulers were toppled in protests fired, at least in part, by widespread public outrage at growing economic hardship."

Libya's Insurrection

The Los Angeles Times provides useful background on Libya:

"The eastern region has long been marginalized by Kadafi, and anger has been growing over failed economic reforms, especially for the jobless young. There is also lingering hostility over the 1996 deaths of hundreds of inmates from the east killed in a massacre at Abu Salim prison in Tripoli.

"'Libya is more like a black hole. It's very hard to see inside at all,' said Joe Stork, deputy director for North Africa and the Middle East for Human Rights Watch. 'Libya's police have in the past shown zero tolerance for any dissent. Especially public dissent. People have been locked up for years for organizing even small protests. What's new here is that large numbers of people are still coming out...'

"But U.S. diplomatic cables released recently by WikiLeaks reveal growing internal discontent with Kadafi.

"'Static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples, have hit ordinary Libyans hard in the last two years,' states a 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable. 'Conspicuous consumption by regime elites, has not sat well with the silent majority.... The fact that many young men are forced by lack of means to delay marriage is another pressing economic issue in a conservative society in which marriage is a key social anchor.'"

It's hard to say what is happening in Libya right now, but the eastern city of Benghazi in particular continues to be the scene of violence, which is also starting to spread in the west. There are also reports that Qadhafi is bringing in mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa to augment his perhaps unreliable security forces.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Pearl Roundabout Retaken

Bahrain's protestors have reoccupied Manama's Pearl Roundabout:

"Thousands of protesters have reoccupied the Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama, after troops and riot police retreated from the symbolic centre of their anti-government uprising.

"The cheering protesters carrying Bahraini flags, flowers and signs that said 'Peaceful, peaceful" marched to the traffic circle on Saturday. They chanted, "We are victorious".

"Protesters kissed the ground in joy and took pictures of about 60 police vehicles leaving the area.

"Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, the crown prince, had earlier in the day ordered the military to withdraw, saying that the police would now be responsible for enforcing order, the Bahrain News Agency reported.

"Soon after the crown prince's directive, protesters attempted to stream back to the roundabout, but were beaten back by the police. According to the Reuters news agency, about 80 protesters were taken to a hospital after being hit by rubber bullets or teargas.

"The protesters, however, were successful in the next attempt, after riot police withdrew as well from the traffic circle."

In a sign of a potential rift in the royal family, King Hamad asked the crown prince to take charge of resolving the situation. The crown prince's offer to meet the major opposition groups was rejected, but he may make it again now that the security services have been redeployed.

The Case of Libya

Issandr thinks that Libya's protests are currently the most important:

"Libya shares something important with Egypt and Tunisia: an aging leader (41 years in power) faces a looming succession crisis in which the leading candidates are his own sons. I simply don't think that's an acceptable outcome for any republic in the 21st century, and was a key aspect to the revolt against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia (with the rumored heir apparent being his nephew). Of course there are also differences: the Libyan regime is much more brutal, more tribalized, more totalitarian than Egypt or Tunisia. The country is split along an east-west axis, with the east kept systematically poorer and discriminated against, along with older historical grievances. That's why it's not surprise Benghazi saw the first and biggest protests, particularly since core organizers were relatives of the victims of the Abu Salim prison massacre of 1996.

"The second reason that Libya's regime appears in some respects more fragile (at least in parts of the country) is that it is the worst in the Middle East — basically the region's North Korea. Except that it's not protected by China, and is situated in a region of the world that is historically globalized. Libyans may have been cut off from the rest of the world by the sanctions, but they share an Arab and Mediterranean culture with over 300 million people and know that there is better than Qaddafi out there."

Here's what's happening:

"Libyans have taken to the streets and buried their dead, accusing government forces of perpetrating massacres in Benghazi and other towns said to have been taken over by anti-regime protesters.

"Opposition sources claimed that at least 61 protesters had been killed in three days of unprecedented unrest largely in Libya's impoverished eastern region, though it was not possible to confirm that figure.

"Human Rights Watch reported that 24 people had been killed by Thursday.

"Diplomats reported the use of heavy weapons in Benghazi, Libya's second city, and 'a rapidly deteriorating situation' in the latest Arab country to be hit by serious unrest.

"Amid a near-total official news blackout, fragmentary information and a ban on journalists entering Libya, there was a blizzard of rumours and claims about killings by mercenaries and defections by members of the security forces...

"Supporters of a Libyan 'day of rage' on Facebook reported that Derna and other eastern towns had been "liberated" from government forces.

"Crowds in Tobruk were shown destroying a statue of Muammar Gaddafi's Green Book, and chanting: 'We want the regime to fall,' echoing the uprising in neighbouring Egypt. The city's airport was closed.

"Troops were reported to have landed at Benghazi airport, suggesting a significant move into the city."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Bahrain Oppression Continues

Bahrain's regime continues its war on demonstrators:

"Shots were fired by soldiers around Pearl roundabout in Manama, the Bahraini capital, a day after police forcibly cleared a protest encampment from the traffic circle.

"The circumstances of the shooting after nightfall on Friday were not clear. Officials at the main Salmaniya hospital said at least 66 people were injured, some with gunshot wounds to the head and chest.

"Some doctors and medics on emergency medical teams were in tears as they tended to the wounded. X-rays showed bullets still lodged inside victims.

"'This is a war,' said Dr. Bassem Deif, an orthopedic surgeon examining people with bullet-shattered bones.

"Protesters described a chaotic scene of tear gas clouds, bullets coming from many directions and people slipping in pools of blood as they sought cover...

"Protesters claimed live ammunition was used against the demonstrators."

I don't have the sources I need to make this point authoritatively, but in Bahrain, the police and even the military are made of mainly of non-Bahrainis, with Pakistanis as the group I heard about most when I was there for a few days several years ago. This means there is little relationship between them and the citizenry. They are mercenaries.

Al Khalifa Family Politics

Jean-Francois Seznec calls attention to divisions within Bahrain's ruling family:

"For the past few years, quasi-Salafist and arch-conservative elements of the Khalifa family have been gaining power over more liberal members of the family, who advocate widening the economic and political involvement to all spheres of Bahraini society.

"Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the oldest and richest member of main ruling clan, has emerged as the leader of these conservatives, who seek to ensure the Khalifa family's continued stranglehold over the politics and economy of the country. His resignation has become one of the protesters' primary demands...

"The growing influence of the more extreme Khalifas was on full display during the Feb. 17 police crackdown. The police force that raided the camp is legally under the control of the prime minister. The brutality with which the raid was conducted may have been a bid to create a state of emergency on the island, forcing the more liberal members of the family to side with them against the protesters."

When I was in Bahrain in 2007, I heard the prime minister called "Fifty-Fifty" in reference to his corruption. Local rumor has him as the richest royal in in the GCC.

Crackdown in Bahrain

Over the past few days, Bahrain has emerged as a country whose anti-government protests are fairly serious, as demonstrators camped out at the Pearl Roundabout in what was probably a conscious imitation of the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt. Last night, the regime cracked down:

"Troops and tanks have locked down the Bahraini capital of Manama on Thursday after riot police swinging clubs and firing tear gas smashed into demonstrators in a pre-dawn assault, killing at least four people.

"Hours after the attack on Manama's main Pearl Roundabout, the military announced a ban on gatherings, saying on state TV that it had "key parts" of the capital under its control.

"Khalid Al Khalifa, Bahrain's foreign minister, justified the crackdown as necessary because the demonstrators were 'polarising the country' and pushing it to the 'brink of the sectarian abyss'...

"The pre-dawn raid was a sign of how deeply the Sunni monarchy fears the repercussions of a prolonged wave of protests, led by members of the country's Shia majority but also joined by growing numbers of discontented Sunnis."

The sectarian split between a Shi'ite majority and Sunni monarchy and minority matters, but not in a straightforward way. The country's rulers have played a game of divide and rule, one which seems to have accelerated over the past few years which have seen an increase in anti-Shi'ite discrimination. Presumably hoping to keep smaller the popular base to which they must dispense patronage while tying that base to them ideologically, the Al Khalifa dynasty has portrayed Shi'ites as potential Iranian catspaws and pointed to Iraq as an example of the negative consequences of Shi'ite democratic empowerment. What you see in the government's rhetoric is an attempt to cast the Shi'ites themselves as the sectarian ones primarily on the grounds of their Shi'ism, much like the Mubarak and Ben Ali regime claimed to suppress Islamic extremism.

Bahrain has also seen major protests before, with a 1990's "intifada" almost exclusively Shi'ite demographically. During that period, the key to the uprisings' longevity was a social base in the winding narrow streets of the Shi'ite neighborhoods in and around Manama that the mostly South Asian police had trouble penetrating.

I'm going to try to follow this more closely in the coming days, but for now here's Mahmood al-Yousif:

"I have never witnessed protests such as these in my life in Bahrain. I’ve most certainly did not witness the level of determination to wrest those demands either. And from what I can personally see, people no longer care if they’re killed while trying, so much so that they are more than happy to get their wives, sisters, mothers and children accompanying them while protesting. I’ve personally seen disabled people at the Pearl Roundabout, some on crutches, in wheelchairs or pushing their Zimmer frames. All of whom didn’t come out to have a picnic, they, instead firmly believe in the sanctity and genuineness of their rightful demands.

"Yes, the demands of the protestors are understandably more resolute. They’re no longer calling for the reform of the government, but its removal. Such is the effects of brutatlity against unarmed civilians. Although the situation is very serious and tense, heightened no doubt by the army taking to the streets with their armoured personnel carriers, we are not yet beyond the abyss. Or at least I fervently hope not. This “conflict” cannot and will not be solved with military or police force. It will only be resolved with genuine dialogue and the offering of concessions, which, ironically, is going to ensure that longevity of the ruling family in Bahrain.

"Al-Wefaq, the largest political bloc in parliament with 18 of 40 seats have announced the suspension of their parliamentary membership and strongly denounced the violence and killings, but people see that this is not enough and they demand a stronger stance, nothing less than their immediate resignation from parliament will satisfy them. That and the resignation of the full government as it is fully their responsibility for the deterioration of the situation. That is, if the country is genuinely to be saved."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Yemen Protests Continue

Anti-government protests are continuing in Yemen, though they still don't seem on the same scale as those in Tunisia and Egypt:

"At least three anti-government protesters were wounded yesterday when they clashed with pro-government demonstrators during the fifth consecutive day of street protests over the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

"The pro-democracy protesters, inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, marched from Sana'a University towards Mr Saleh's palace demanding he step down after 32 years in power.

"Mr Saleh said on February 2 that he would not seek to extend his term when it expires in 2013 and that his son would not succeed him as president...

"In Taiz city, 250 kilometres south of Sana'a, thousands continued protests yesterday for a fifth day, demanding an end to Mr Saleh's rule. His goverment is battling criplling poverty and unemployment as well as a secessionist movement in the south, a rebellion in the north, and al Qa'eda militants.

"With the protests showing no signs of ending, Mr Saleh announced yesterday that his office was open 'to listen to the views' of 'various segments of society from all the republic's provinces'."

Egyptian Revolution and Islamic Revival

With the fall of long-time Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, many fear that Egypt will evolve into a theocracy under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. In that light, this statement is significant:

"Preserving the people's freedom is more important than setting up a system of Sharia (Islamic law), even though freedom remains part and parcel of Sharia, said Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on Friday evening in an interview with Al Jazeera television network. Al-Qaradawi, who is an influential Islamic thinker and president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, is closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group.

"Recently, some members of the Brotherhood have tried to alleviate concerns that they want to establish an Islamic state by asserting that the Brotherhood does not seek to the rule the country or establish an Islamist government in Egypt."

I don't know on what show this interview was conducted, but prior to his retirement he was central to the highly rated al-Jazeera show Shari'a and Life. He was also an early follower of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, though he has resisted involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership. Although despised by al-Qaeda types, he is one of the undisputed leaders of conservative Islam in the world today, and his views are significant.

The Muslim Brotherhood's support for democracy is not a momentary tactic, but has roots in its theological foundations. The group draws on the traditional of Islamic reformism associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 19th century, which taught that instead of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims should rely on contemporary interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith. These modern interpretations can be harsh and puritanical, as well as liberal, and the Muslim Brotherhood has interpreted criminal law, for example, fairly literally. Politically, however, a key principle is "shura," or consultation, which at least since the Young Ottomans opposed to the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-1800's has for many carried connotations of democracy. Richard Mitchell, whose 1969 book on the Muslim Brotherhood remains a standard, explained it thus:

"'The nation,' 'the people,' in fact, are the source of all the ruler's authority: 'The nation alone is the source of power; bowing to its will is a religious obligation.' The ruler has no legal existence and deserves no loyalty except as 'he reflects the spirit of the society and is in harmony with its goals.' Banna described the relationship of ruler and ruled as a 'social contract' in which the ruler is defined as a 'trustee' and 'agent'...Since the ruler is the 'agent contracted for' by the nation, he is 'elected' by it."

Not all or even most of the specific systems of government proposed under this framework could be called "democratic," as many involve religious tests for office, limited electorates, and clerical councils with important powers, but the point I make is that for the Brotherhood, there is no break between advocating democracy and core political theory.

In the present context, I'm not even convinced that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to exercise power. It has pledged not to run a candidate for president, which is probably about reassuring those fearful of its influence, but may also cover uncertainty about the effects of actually having responsibility for things on its image and overall message. A further point is that there are several strains of thought within the MB, and I am not certain they will hold together in a common organization without the unifying concern for strength and unity in the face of military government.

If there is a related concern going forward in Egypt, it does not involve the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, but rather the generally illiberal impulses of Egyptian society. The specific form of Islamic Revivalism involving puritanical intolerant religious ideas has been growing steadily in Egypt for many years. I know its broader context from anthropological studies by Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, and there is a decent journalistic account by Geneive Abdo. One factor seems to be returning guest workers from Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. Migration from conservative rural areas to the cities is also spreading that conservatism through urban society. Physical manifestations of the movement are seen widely attended unlicensed, often open-air mosques led by independent preachers and the circulation of salafi cassette sermons. Legally, there is a steady drumbeat of court cases involving alleged blasphemy. I expect all these trends to make themselves felt more publicly in a freer political environment.

At the same time, however, it may be that the salafi wave has crested. I suspect it is too soon to proclaim a post-Islamist Middle East, but several factors may gradually reduce its attractions. For one thing, a less corrupt government that spent more on economic and human development could reduce the incentive to become a guest worker in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the moderate clerics favored by Mubarak may no longer suffer from government associations in the court of public opinion.

Most important, however, is the sudden upsurge of new, competing ideologies and paths to dignity and meaning in life. I don't have the materials at hand to provide concrete examples, but I was struck by the way in which the reasons many protesters gave for wanting to participate in the uprising paralleled those of people attending conservative shari'a classes at their local mosque. This passage by Mohammed Bamyeh is kind of what I mean:

"Third, remarkable was the virtual replacement of religious references by civic ethics that were presumed to be universal and self-evident. This development appears more surprising than in the case of Tunisia, since in Egypt the religious opposition had always been strong and reached virtually all sectors of life. The Muslim Brotherhood itself joined after the beginning of the protests, and like all other organized political forces in the country seemed taken aback by the developments and unable to direct them, as much as the government (along with its regional allies) sought to magnify its role.

"This, I think, is substantially connected to the two elements mentioned previously, spontaneity and marginality. Both of those processes entailed the politicization of otherwise unengaged segments, and also corresponded to broad demands that required no religious language in particular. In fact, religion appeared as an obstacle, especially in light of the recent sectarian tensions in Egypt, and it contradicted the emergent character of the Revolution as being above all dividing lines in society, including one’s religion or religiosity. Many people prayed in public, of course, but I never saw anyone being pressured or even asked to join them, in spite of the high spiritual overtones of an atmosphere saturated with high emotions and constantly supplied by stories of martyrdom, injustice, and violence.

"Like in the Tunisian Revolution, in Egypt the rebellion erupted as a sort of a collective moral earthquake—where the central demands were very basic, and clustered around the respect for the citizen, dignity, and the natural right to participate in the making of the system that ruled over the person. If those same principles had been expressed in religious language before, now they were expressed as is and without any mystification or need for divine authority to justify them. I saw the significance of this transformation when even Muslim Brotherhood participants chanted at some point with everyone else for a 'civic' (madaniyya) state—explicitly distinguished from two other possible alternatives: religious (diniyya) or military (askariyya) state."

I remember G'Kar from Babylon 5:

"There is a greater darkness than the one we fight. It is the darkness of the soul that has lost it's way. The war we fight is not against powers and principalities. It is against chaos and despair. Greater than the death of flesh is the death of hopes, the death of dreams. Against this peril we can never surrender. The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain."

President Obama also spoke of the power of human dignity in his speech yesterday afternoon. If that is right, then the future is on the right track.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Fall of Husni Mubarak

What happened today in Egypt is a landmark, not only in Egyptian history, but that of the entire Arab world. Its relative wealth and high level of human development mean that Tunisia could be dismissed as an outlier. Its lesson, however, that the power of determined activists can undermine repressive regimes and even oust their top authorities, has now been confirmed in the Arab world's most populous nation and frequent cultural leader. The people of Egypt, long derided for political apathy and easy co-option, sent a signal that sends chills down the spine of autocrats the world over.

The story of this uprising is still gradually coming to light, and that process could easily take years. In the Wall Street Journal, Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker chronicle the origins of the January 25 protest that worked and got the ball rolling, a story of cooperation, skilled planning, and undoubtedly a little luck that is worth reading. Mohammed Bamyeh suggests that January 28 is the day the regime really fell:

"Though the regime struggled for two more weeks, practically little government existed during that period. All ministries and government offices have been closed, and almost all police headquarters were burned down on January 28. Except for the army, all security personnel disappeared, and a week after the uprising, only few police officers ventured out again. Popular committees have since taken over security in the neighborhoods. I saw patriotism expressed everywhere as collective pride in the realization that people who did not know each other could act together, intentionally and with a purpose. During the ensuing week and a half, millions converged on the streets almost everywhere in Egypt, and one could empirically see how noble ethics—community and solidarity, care for others, respect for the dignity of all, feeling of personal responsibility for everyone--emerge precisely out of the disappearance of government."

Perhaps, but I still remember watching on February 2 and 3 as youth protesters held Midan Tahrir against the brutal onslaught of Mubarak's thuggish mercenaries. I won't made definitive statements questioning those on the scene, but I suspect that will go down as the critical moment which secured the ground on which, last weekend, protesters held both Muslim Friday prayers and Christian Sunday prayer service that no one could touch. Also critical, however, are the neighborhood committees, which thus far are mentioned for security and local organization, but could easily evolve into something like the anjumans which were an ongoing source of public participation and pressure during Iran's Constitutional Revolution over 100 years ago.

Bamyeh eloquently continues:

"Undoubtedly this revolution, which is continuing to unfold, will be the formative event in the lives of the millions of youth who spearheaded it in Egypt, and perhaps also the many more millions of youth who followed it throughout the Arab world. It is clear that it is providing a new generation with a grand spectacle of the type that had shaped the political consciousness of every generation before them in modern Arab history. All those common formative experiences of past generations were also grand national moments: whether catastrophic defeats or triumphs against colonial powers or allies.

"This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

"Everyone I talked to echoed similar transformative themes: they highlighted a sense of wonder at how they discovered their neighbor again, how they never knew that they lived in 'society' or the meaning of the word, until this event, and how everyone who yesterday had appeared so distant is now so close. I saw peasant women giving protestors onions to help them recover from teargas attacks; young men dissuading others from acts of vandalism; the National Museum being protected by protestors’ human shield from looting and fire; protestors protecting captured baltagiyya who had been attacking them from being harmed by other protestors; and countless other incidents of generous civility amidst the prevailing destruction and chaos."

The future is unknown, and I'm still not convinced true democracy is the most likely outcome. The bargain among those with influence will now be renegotiated, a process that sometimes takes years after this kind of earthquake. With continued popular pressure, however, and probably with ongoing American back-channel pressure and cooperation with the Egyptian military, I see at least a reasonable chance for a system that is democratic aside from military-enforced red lines, much like Turkey was for decades. Compared to Egypt's recent past, that would be no small victory.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Repercussions in Azerbaijan

It hadn't occurred to me that events in Tunisia and Egypt would much impact the Caucasus, but apparently they've made waves in Azerbaijan:

"Opposition groups in Azerbaijan are calling for the release of a 20-year-old political activist who was arrested last week after posting a message on his Facebook page calling for Egypt-style protests in Baku's central square...

"Two days after the Egyptian protests began on Jan. 25, the government appeared to launch a preemptive strike against an similar uprising in Azerbaijan.

"The government's anti-corruption commission, which is overseen by presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehiyev, convened Jan. 27 for the first time since 2009. In the following weeks, several government officials have made announcements promising far-reaching anti-corruption measures within government ministries. According to the newspaper Yeni Musavat. 18-year president Ilham Aliyev is also considering reshuffling his Cabinet and calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Artur Rasizade...

"A week earlier, a group of about 100 opposition leaders and human rights activists gathered in a central square in Baku calling for new parliamentary elections, threatening popular protests if the government did not comply."

These are, however, really small protests. Buoyed by energy revenue, Azerbaijan's government is reputedly popular on the street, and it certainly seemed that way when I spent a few days there in 2006. Azeris might like less corruption and greater political freedom, but don't seem that interested in upsetting the status quo to get them.

Why Speak?

Why did Mubarak even bother to give that speech? My best guess is that it was aimed at elements within the ruling class, both military and economic. David Kurtz wonders if a key was handing unspecified powers to Suleiman, which in context may indicate that Mubarak is actively moving himself out of power while trying to maintain the system from which various people are benefiting. If that's the case, however, it was a bone-headed maneuver that may guarantee angry and violent retribution.

UPDATE: Marc Lynch wonders if Mubarak was planning to resign but changed his mind, and has this to say:

"It's hard to exaggerate how bad Hosni Mubarak's speech today was for Egypt. In the extended runup to his remarks, every sign indicated that he planned to announce his resignation: the military's announcement that it had taken control, the shift in state television coverage, a steady stream of leaks about the speech. With the whole world watching, Mubarak instead offered a meandering, confused speech promising vague Constitutional changes and defiance of foreign pressure. He offered a vaguely worded delegation of power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, long after everyone in Egypt had stopped listening. It is virtually impossible to conceive of a more poorly conceived or executed speech.

"Omar Suleiman's televised address which followed made things even worse, if that's possible, telling the people to go home and blaming al-Jazeera for the problems. It solidified the already deep distrust of his role among most of the opposition and of the protestors, and tied his fate to that of Mubarak. Even potentially positive ideas in their speeches, such as Constitutional amendments, were completely drowned out by their contemptuous treatment of popular demands. Things could get ugly tonight --- and if things don't explode now, then the crowds tomorrow will be absolutely massive. Whatever happens, for better or for worse, the prospects of an orderly, negotiated transition led by Omar Suleiman have just plummeted sharply."

UPDATE: Egypt's U.S. ambassador claims that Mubarak transferred all power to Suleiman.

The Coptic Angle

Egyptian State TV has aired Pope Shenouda III still calling for an end to protests:

"The Egyptian Radio and Television website posted an interview produced by the Nile News channel with Shenouda in which, in an implicit expression of support for the regime, he called on protesters 'to end protests and listen to the voice of the mind regarding developments on the current situation and what has been broadcast on media channels concerning dialogue as a way to reach the desired solutions...'

"Shenouda emphasized the necessity of returning to a stable security situation and warned that the popular committees lacks the proper means of ensuring security.

"The pope also highlighted some incidents that resulted during the protests, referring to dialogue among all political groups. He also spoke about the importance of the Muslim Brotherhood joining in such dialogue, as well as the Committee of the Wise."

Assuming this interview is current, it shows Shenouda continuing to follow the regime line, which itself has advanced to including the Muslim Brotherhood in national dialogue. Meanwhile, protests tomorrow may be called "Day of the Martyrs" and feature a Coptic mass on Midan Tahrir. Martyrs are a critical part of the Coptic heritage, which follows a calendar measuring "years of the martyrs" from the reign of Diocletian.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

A Worried Regime

As the Battle of Midan Tahrir continues, there are signs the regime is still worried:

"The developments come as the New York Times reports, quoting US officials and Arab diplomats, that the US administration is discussing with Egyptian officials a proposal for Mubarak to resign immediately, turning over power to a transitional government headed by Omar Suleiman, the newly appointed vice-president, with the support of the Egyptian military.

"The Egyptian president, for his part, says he has had enough and is ready to go but fears chaos if he resigns now...

"Ahmed Shafiq, Egypt's new prime minister, said the interior minister should not obstruct Friday's peaceful marches. The interior ministry has denied it ordered its agents or officers to attack pro-democracy demonstrators...

"In a move to try to calm the situation, Suleiman, the vice-president, said on Thursday the Muslim Brotherhood had been invited to meet the new government as part of a national dialogue with all parties.

"An offer to talk to the banned but tolerated group would have been unthinkable before protests erupted on January 25, indicating the gains made by the pro-democracy movement since then."

Shafiq's comments, Mubarak's comments, the possibility of U.S. brokerage, and the attempt to peel the Muslim Brotherhood out of the opposition all show that the regime does not feel it has the situation under control. This is entirely due to the heroism of those in Midan Tahrir:

"Protesters in Tahrir Square, dominated now by a youthful hard core including secular middle-class graduates and mostly poorer Muslim Brotherhood activists, barely listened, saying the concessions were too little and too late...

"Doctors in makeshift hospitals at the scene said at least 10 people were dead and 800 wounded after armed men and stick-wielding Mubarak supporters attacked protesters on the streets. The UN estimates that number to be much higher.

"Close to the Egyptian Museum, home to 7,000 years of civilisation, men fought with rocks, clubs and makeshift shields, as US-built tanks from the Egyptian army made intermittent efforts to intervene.

"There were sporadic clashes throughout Thursday as the army fanned out to separate the two sides and allowed thousands more protesters to enter their camp in the square.

"An Al Jazeera online producer in Cairo said: 'The battle for downtown Cairo took on an almost medieval quality, with protesters erecting makeshift barricades and building homemade catapults to launch rocks at each other.'

"He described the contrast between both sides' tactics as striking. 'The pro-democracy protesters organised themselves, building walls and seizing strategic locations; the pro-Mubarak crowd mostly advanced in a mob, hurling rocks and then retreating under return fire,' he said."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Bouteflika to Lift Emergency

Algeria has a very strong protest culture which may even have served as a point of reference for those who began the wave in neighboring Tunisia. Because of this, it is a strong candidate for revolution. Attempting to stave off that possibility, President Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika announced the country's state of emergency would be lifted:

"Algeria's 19-year state of emergency will be lifted in the "very near future", state media has quoted Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president, as saying.

"During a meeting with ministers on Thursday, the president also said Algerian television and radio, which are controlled by the state, should give airtime to all political parties.

"He added that protest marches, banned under the state of emergency, would be permitted across the country of 35 million except in the capital...

"Opposition groups in Algeria had recently made the repeal of emergency powers one of their main demands, ahead of a protest planned for February 12.

"Last month several hundred pro-democracy protesters took to the streets in Algiers, the capital, demanding the government overturn a law banning public gatherings."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Egypt's Security Forces

In addition to these background links, we now have an excellent overview of the social, economic, and political background of Egypt's different security forces by Paul Amar.

Battle of Midan Tahrir

Today, Egypt's peaceful pro-democracy protestors were set upon by a mob wielding knives, bricks, and Molotov cocktails:

"Witnesses said the military allowed thousands of pro-Mubarak supporters, armed with sticks and knives, to enter the square. Opposition groups said Mubarak had sent in thugs to suppress anti-government protests.

"One of our correspondents said the army seemed to be standing by and facilitating the clashes.

"Though initially put on the backfoot by the sudden attack, determined anti-government protesters looked to be winning the battle against Mubarak supporters.

"Witnesses also said that pro-Mubarak supporters were dragging away protesters they had managed to grab and handing them over to security forces...

"Aisha Hussein, a nurse, said dozens of people were being treated at a makeshift clinic in a mosque near the square...

"Meanwhile, another Al Jazeera correspondent said men on horseback and camels ploughed into the crowds as army personnel stood by.

"At least six riders were dragged from their beasts, beaten with sticks by the protesters and taken away with blood streaming down their faces."

The battle began mid-afternoon and raged into the evening. The Associated Press put the numbers involved at about 10,000 anti-Mubarak demonstrators and 3000 regime supporters. Evidence suggests that the pro-Mubarak faction was conjured up from the police and hired thugs, as is common in Egypt.

The regime restored internet and cell phone service shortly before the attack, probably hoping word would spread and intimidate potential activists. At the same time, the international seem to have been targets of regime violence, presumably in an attempt to keep the affair off television screens. The army ceased guarding the square entrances and let the protesters get attacked, suggesting it has no intention of acting decisively against the Mubarak government, which is probably at this point more like Umar Suleiman's government anyway. It looks to all appearances that my theory the military was seizing the chance to install Suleiman was annoyingly correct.

As I write, while today the demonstrators survived and cleared the square of regime forces, those pro-Mubarak thugs have barricaded them inside and any potential reinforcements outside, leading to fears of what tomorrow will bring. According to substantial Twitter traffic, in at least one nearby square, someone is firing rubber bullets at anti-Mubarak demonstrators.

I don't see this as over today any more than I did a few days ago, though it looks bad for the protestors, who were able to remain united and organized even on this terrible day. They could still hold out for a little while, but I'm not sure they'll get much help in the coming days without a massive organizational call for such help which I'm not seeing anywhere. Mubarak's hand-off to Suleiman seems to have resolved the internal tensions within the security apparatus.

UPDATE: AJE is now (9:56 p.m.) reporting that anti-Mubarak demonstrators may have taken control of the Sixth of October Bridge over the Nile.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)