Shenouda Hearts Mubarak

Pope Shenouda III of the Coptic Orthodox Church has definitely chosen sides:

"Pope Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Church, expressed support for Mr. Mubarak in an interview with Egyptian state television Monday. 'We have called the president and told him we are all with you and the people are with you,' he said, according to a transcript of the interview on the state television's website."

Does he actually think Mubarak is likely to last, or is he really convinced that the Mubarak regime is good for the Copts?

Generals and Protestors

Steven Cook comes to some similar thoughts to those I posted yesterday about what is going on with Egypt's regime and the military. He attributes the military's declaration today that they would not fire on protestors in part to concerns at the elite levels that junior officers would not follow orders to do so. This is an important additional perspective to Matthew Axelrod's interpretation of the military, in which they see themselves as guardians of the nation rather than the regime, but also look out for their own interests:

"Senior military officers are believed to benefit handsomely from the revenues generated by military-owned corporations, private contracts with foreign companies, and post-retirement postings in the private and public sectors. General Ahmed Mohamed Shafik, former head of Civil Aviation and now Egypt's new Prime Minister, is the most prominent example. During my research in Cairo, foreign diplomats told me that Egyptian military officers regularly supplemented their incomes by receiving cash for routine military services, including Suez Canal passage. Some of those funds are believed to be held in Switzerland, where General Magdy Galal Sharawi, head of Egypt's Air Force from 2002-2008, currently serves as Ambassador...

"There is a tension between the military's interests -- maintaining its credibility by siding with the people on the one hand, and maintaining its vast economic apparatus on the other. Maintaining stability is a given, but that stability will shake if the military is seen by the protesters as siding with Mubarak's attempts to retain power. A middle solution is conceivable, where the military would not stand in the way of a transition government should it receive assurances that its affairs will remain untouched from reform. Mohamad El Baradei has said he will reach out to the Army, and such a discussion is not hard to imagine. For the Egyptian military it will be a huge, existential break from a symbiotic relationship with President Mubarak, but that break is looking to be inevitable."

As I commented yesterday, the military leadership can get what they want even with greater political openness.

Cook also describes what I think is the strategy:

"To contain and control the protests for as long as possible and play for time. From the perspective of Mubarak, Vice President Omar Soleiman, the chief-of-staff General Sami Annan and the others now clinging to power every day provides an opportunity to try to weaken the opposition and peel the less committed from the demonstrations. Is it any wonder that Soleiman started talking about constitutional change today? The senior command believes they can save the regime. Delusional? Perhaps, but not surprising given their deep links to the regime."

The regime, whatever that term means in this fluid situation, has clearly not given up. Al-Jazeera English just interviewed a woman who reported that police were attacking demonstrators in Luxor, away from journalistic attention. In addition, cell phone and train service will reportedly be disrupted tomorrow in an attempt to limit the size of what demonstrators hope will be a crowd of millions marching through Cairo.

If millions do march, however, it will be hard for regime elements to think they have a chance.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Military Opportunity

Just as a follow-up to what's below, the more I think about this, the more I suspect the military leadership is seizing the opportunity to install Omar Suleiman now and forestall the possibility of a Gamal Mubarak presidency. It definitely will not be that easy. Many of the protest leaders have drawn lines that won't walk away from easily, but even if Suleiman can win temporary acceptance as a transitional leader, remaining regime elements can manipulate the system as they go. The two key pillars are economic corruption and foreign aid rent, and neither is incompatible with a period of greater political openness.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Egypt Resources

Basic Egypt resources are becoming more accessible. Noor Khan's introductory primer is here. Juan Cole has also posted an analysis with more attention to economic and social cleavages. Finally, Issandr El-Amrani has charts of the regime's military and political leadership.

Egyptian Uncertainties

Today, Husni Mubarak met with the military:

"President Hosni Mubarak, clinging to power despite unprecedented demands for an end to his 30-year rule, met on Sunday with the powerful military which is widely seen as holding the key to Egypt's future.

"Mubarak held talks with Vice President Omar Suleiman, whose appointment on Saturday has possibly set the scene for a transition in power, Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami al-Anan and other senior commanders...

"In surreal scenes, soldiers from Mubarak's army stood by tanks covered in anti-Mubarak graffiti: 'Down with Mubarak. Down with the despot. Down with the traitor. Pharaoh out of Egypt.'

"Asked how they could let protesters scrawl anti-Mubarak slogans on their vehicles, one soldier said: 'These are written by the people, it's the views of the people.'

"Egypt's sprawling armed forces -- the world's 10th biggest and more than 468,000-strong -- have been at the heart of power since army officers staged the 1952 overthrow of the king. It benefits from about $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid."

Opposition leaders led by Muhammad el-Baradei have also expressed a desire to negotiate with the military. What is happening within it? Publicly they have sided with the demonstrators, using force mainly to try and bring order by rounding up looters, as just reported a few seconds ago by al-Jazeera English from Alexandria. They may be hoping that if their credibility increases, they can work a transition to the military-friendly Omar Suleiman rather than risk the unknowns of a non-NDP government following a successful revolution.

At the same time, regime moves bear scrutiny. The curfew, widely ignored, has been extended, and police are expected to return to the streets. I believe that the withdrawal of the police was part of a broader plan to defuse the protests through generalized instability, a plan which failed. It also seems like the police are still supporting the NDP, especially away from the Cairo/Alexandria/Suez trio that has dominated television coverage. Will the police crack down again, as the cameras fade away with the press crackdown?

I don't think we are out of the woods yet on possible repression. One possible scenario is an attempt by various security services to manage some sort of transition to Suleiman. The overwhelming majority of protesters will not accept this. On the other hand, maybe the military is trying to maintain its command structure by not risking a revolt of foot soldiers and the lower officer corps if they give protest suppression orders which are not followed. An assumption could also be that they could be a power in any new regime that is formed, simply by threatening a coup.

This is far from over.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Introductory Background on Egypt

Noor Khan, a colleague from Colgate University, has written an excellent primer for those new to contemporary Egyptian politics.

Coptic Hierarchy and Mubarak

The Coptic Orthodox's Church's decision to discourage people from participating in protests may surprise some, but is entirely consistent with that body's focus on the preservation of its religious mission in a nation accustomed to dictatorship. Al-Azhar, the most prestigious source of authority in Sunni Islam, has at its top levels become a branch of the Mubarak regime. The current Coptic Pope, Shenouda III, was briefly deposed by a decree of President Anwar Sadat for taking too strong a stance against his government, and only restored by Husni Mubarak a few years later. Given that churches see their mission as transcending politics, it is unsurprising that they have taken such an accommodationist line to preserve their ability to serve that mission. Fears of what might happen after Mubarak are also a factor.

Despite this, however, many Copts are on the streets protesting.

UPDATE: From Ian Lee: "A man made a point of asking me to distinguish who was from what religion in the group, I couldn't. That was his point."

Mubarak's Survival Efforts

Husni Mubarak has tried to defuse some of the protests by redoing his government:

"Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has appointed the country's head of intelligence to the post of vice-president, in a move said to be a reaction to days of anti-government protests in cities across the country.

"Omar Soliman was sworn in on Saturday, the first time Mubarak appointed a vice-president during his 30-year rule. Ahmad Shafiq, a former chief of air staff, was also appointed prime minister.

"But Al Jazeera's correspondents in Egypt have said that many of those on taking to the streets have demanded a total change of guard, as opposed to a reshuffling of figures in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

"Tens of thousands of people in the capital Cairo gathered on Saturday, demanding an end to Hosni Mubarak's presidency.

By appointing Omar Suleiman as vice president, Mubarak is giving him important advantages for an eventual succession, perhaps reassuring some whose main concern is having the presidency handed to his son Gamal Mubarak. This has not, however, had much impact on the streets, where protestors are demanding Mubarak's resignation and a complete end to his regime.

I'm watching al-Jazeera English, and military leaders are trying to clear the streets without shooting by playing the looting card. I suspect their hope is that, with the communications crackdown, it will be difficult to reconstitute the protests if they dissipate, and forces are able to crack down on what remains under the banner of combating thuggery. I'm certain those hopes are in vain.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

How Time Flies

Has it really been so long? Yasser el-Shimy says that, "Two weeks ago, no one could have predicted the overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's repressive regime in Tunisia." Actually, two weeks from tomorrow is the day Ben Ali fled, and many were predicting that.

Protests in Yemen

Today also saw anti-government protests in Yemen:

"In Sana, at least 10,000 protesters led by opposition members and youth activists gathered at Sana University, and around 6,000 more gathered elsewhere, participants, lawmakers and activists reached by telephone said. Many carried pink banners and wore pink headbands.

"The color was both a unifying symbol and an indication of the level of planning underlying the protests. Weeks ago, as the Tunisian protests were still escalating, a committee from an umbrella group of six opposition parties settled on an escalating scale of color to accompany their own plan of action, starting with purple for lawmakers to show their opposition and moving to pink for the street protests. Red, said Shawki al-Qadi, a lawmaker and opposition figure, would be the final color, though he said the opposition had not yet decided what actions would correspond with the move...

"Part of Mr. Allaw’s worries sprung from the inability of the opposition to forge a unified message. Some are calling for secession, he said, while others are looking to oust the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, through popular protests. Yet others, he said, simply wanted Mr. Saleh to undertake a series of reforms before elections in April...

"The demonstrations on Thursday followed several days of smaller protests by students and opposition groups calling for the removal of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, a strongman who has ruled this fractured country for more than 30 years and is a key ally of the United States in the fight against the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda."

As far as I can tell, this is nothing like the situation in Tunisia and Egypt. What you see instead is opposition leaders trying to incorporate Tunisia into their own narratives. It also sounds like these protests were concentrated in southern Yemen, where many people see themselves as having been "conquered" by the north in the country's 1990 unification. President Saleh was the leader of North Yemen prior to that unification, and many feel he and northern interests have been exploiting the south for the past two decades.

Tunisia's Transition Issues

Bowing to protests, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi dropped former members of the ruling RCD party from key posts:

"Ghannouchi, also a key figure in the previous administration, said he would stay in his post as the country prepares for parliamentary and presidential elections which are expected to be held in the coming months.

"The new cabinet includes 12 new ministers and keeps nine from the previous set-up. Among those replaced with independents were the ministers of interior and defence.

"Earlier on Thursday, Kamel Morjane, the foreign minister, resigned saying he was leaving 'so that the popular revolution can bear fruit'.

"Ghannouchi said the new foreign minister will be Ahmed Ounais, a 75-year-old career diplomat who studied at the Sorbonne University in Paris and served as Tunisia's ambassador to Moscow and New Delhi.

"The new lineup had been agreed after consultations with all political parties and civil society groups, the prime minister said."

The very lack of leadership that was probably a critical factor in the success of Tunisia's protests poses a challenge now, as there is no clear power center to replace Ben Ali's regime. This means that, in practice, second-tier members of that regime with little popular support are trying to manage a delicate transition.

Earlier this week, I read Christopher Alexander's Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, which at 124 pages is a good, quick introduction to Tunisian politics for those interested. Aside from whatever unknown level of strength the Islamist al-Nahda party has, I would expect the major political fissure in post-Ben Ali Tunisia to be between socialists and a strong business community, with the latter having been favored by the old regime's policies. According to the al-Jazeera story, the UGTT, Tunisia's major trade union, has been working with Ghannouchi on the interim government, but is currently upset by the lack of UGTT-friendly ministers in the new government. This is an issue to watch.

Egypt, Tunisia, and the Qualities of Revolution

I've been extremely busy this week, and so am just catching up on things, but the ongoing protests in Egypt represent the most significant challenge ever faced by President Husni Mubarak. While on a research trip to the District of Columbia Tuesday, I attended this panel on Tunisia, and the question arose as to whether Tunisia would inspire similar uprisings elsewhere. Someone, I don't remember whom, suggested that Tunisia could act to increase the appeal of anti-government activism among marginal potential participants in other countries by showing what was possible. This has clearly taken place.

Hossam el-Hamalawy says it this way:

"In Egypt we say that Tunis was more or less a catalyst, not an instigator, because the objective conditions for an uprising existed in Egypt, and revolt has been in the air over the past few years. Indeed, we already managed to have 2 mini-intifadas or 'mini Tunisias' in 2008. The first was the April 2008 uprising in Mahalla, followed by another one in Borollos, in the north of the country.

"Revolutions don't happen out of the blue. It's not because of Tunisia yesterday that we have one in Egypt mechanically the next day. You can't isolate these protests from the last four years of labour strikes in Egypt, or from international events such as the al-Aqsa intifada and the US invasion of Iraq. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada was especially important because in the 1980s-90s, street activism had been effectively shut down by the government as part of the fight against Islamist insurgents. It only continued to exist inside university campuses or party headquarters. But when the 2000 intifada erupted and Al Jazeera started airing images of it, it inspired our youth to take to the streets, in the same way we've been inspired by Tunisia today."

El-Hamalawy also calls attention to the role of independent trade unions in mobilizing the Tunisian working classes, and the gap Egypt has in that area. El-Hamalawy calls them youth protests, which it should be emphasized means a lot in a country where "youth" probably encompasses the majority of the population. Jonathan Wright also notes that in Cairo, a city of 17 million, what's happening can't really be considered a mass uprising, though the vast working class neighborhoods may be at a tipping point. The situation may be different in Suez, which looks like a war zone, though I'm having trouble finding details, as I am also with a lot of other cities around the country.

Starting tomorrow, however, the stakes will be higher, as Muhammad el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood will join in. Both matter for different reasons. El-Baradei is a leader, but not one who generated the protests. Going after him will not remove the protest leadership, but his presence as a credible transition voice should Mubarak go the way of Ben Ali. The Muslim Brotherhood brings further numbers and organization, and I noticed that a senior leader quoted by The National said that, "We are not pushing this movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be part of it." This is well calculated to hinder regime attempts to portray this as a clash between itself and Islamists.

Will Egypt become the next Tunisia? I will not hazard a prediction until this weekend. Twitter traffic suggests the government is trying to sever communications links, but if they do face a mass movement, they can't do much about the word of mouth within neighborhoods, nor are they likely to interfere with mosque and church attendance. (Many Egyptian Christians attend weekly services on Friday.)

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Libya's Reform Chill

While the Tunisian Revolution was getting under way, Libya was reining in its semi-official reform movement:

"In a surprise move, the board of trustees of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation, the NGO that Saif al-Islam Qadhafi has chaired since its creation, resolved in mid-December 2010 that it would no longer promote human rights and political reform in Libya. This abrupt change in the Foundation’s direction has significant ramifications for reform efforts in Libya. Whether Saif was forced out or withdrew voluntarily, he has had to acknowledge that his work came up against insuperable obstacles in the form of the old guard surrounding his father.

"For much of the last decade, Qadhafi’s son Saif was the public face of human rights reform in Libya and the Qadhafi Foundation was the country’s only address for complaints about torture, arbitrary detention, and disappearances. The Foundation issued its first human rights report in 2009, cataloging abuses and calling for reforms, and a second report released in December 2010 regretted 'a dangerous regression' in civil society and called for the authorities to lift their 'stranglehold' on the media. In the interim, Saif assisted Human Rights Watch in conducting a groundbreaking press conference which launched a report in Tripoli in December 2009...

"The recent decisions of the Qadhafi Foundation constitute an admission of defeat for Saif, who has been forced to retreat publicly from earlier positions and to bow out of politics for a time. Whether his banishment is permanent and affects leadership succession plans remains to be seen. Saif has withdrawn from politics before, notably in the fall of 2008, but he has never fully disengaged. Moreover, his father is a recognized expert at balancing opposing forces, and Qadhafi is unlikely to allow conservative elements – or any other faction – to dominate the political scene for long. It remains the case, however, that at least for now Libyans have lost one of their few avenues to pursue human rights improvements and political reform."

Tunisian Openings

Tunisia's government may have been based largely in the old ruling party, but it is acting quickly to open the political system:

"Tunisia's transitional cabinet has decided to recognise all banned political parties and agreed on a general amnesty for all political prisoners.

"The interim government, appointed earlier this week, held its first session on Thursday amid an outcry over its inclusion of members of the regime of the ousted president...

"Tayyib Al Bakouchi, the government spokesman, said the multiparty government pledged to make security its top priority, to prepare for new presidential elections and speed up political reforms.

"The ministers also vowed to restore goods and real estate appropriated by the ruling party under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the former president who fled into exile in Saudi Arabia last Friday after weeks of anti-government protests.

"The cabinet declared three days of national mourning starting on Friday following the country's deadly unrest. The government has said 78 people have been killed since the uprising started in December but the United Nations has put the toll at about 100."

Yesterday I spoke with a colleague who was in Tunisia around ten years ago when her husband was a Fulbright scholar there. She commented that at that time, there was democratic participation in Tunisia in the form of the parents' association of her local daycare and school. Such a grassroots democratic spirit has also been seen in the neighborhood security organizations which sprung up following Ben Ali's flight, and may be related to the critical stance taken by the country's military. As Steve Cook notes, the way they stepped in against Ben Ali heightens the expectations that they may again if an open political system does not emerge. This makes me optimistic for the future.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Tunisia Notes

Tunisia moves more clearly into revolutionary territory, as plans for a unity government dominated by the old regime fall through:

"On Tuesday, the interim prime minister and president resigned from the former ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party of the deposed president in an attempt to keep the fragile coalition together.

"Mohamed Ghannouchi and Fouad Mebazaa were forced into the move after four ministers refused to sit in a cabinet that contained eight high-ranking memebrs of Ben Ali's government, which many Tunisians see as corrupt...

"The announcement of the new government was also met with anger by some of the Tunisian public."

Juan Cole reports that protests against the new government also took place in rural areas. Kal explains a bit of the split between army and police:

"Numerous reports of armed gangs of Ben Ali loyalists, many of them former police, have circulated on the Internet in recent days which is likely related to this. The rapid decline in the prestige of the police forces as a result of their handling of the protestors and the increase in the army’s could set up for more serious competition. Ben Ali, a long time operator in the security services, had favored the the police to the military and it makes very good sense that his partisans are coming from the parts of the deep state he helped create and sustain. Through the whole crisis it is the Tunisian military and not the police that appear professional and worthy of some kind of public trust. A great many Tunisians view the military as having “saved” them from the police during the crisis, though some news reporting has translated this as some desire for military rule or guidance. One does not get that sense from talking to Tunisians or from viewing the Tunisians on Twitter or in web forums. In any case, a major task for a future Tunisian government will be restoring respect and professionalism to the police, making law and order legal — no small fix. The looting and gangsterism displayed by police and RCD party militias (this is how they have been described by Tunisians and by news reports) represents fear of a loss of privilege and position one can expect to see if a similar overthrew took place in any of the other Arab countries. One wonders what sort of social base these people command (for perspective)."

One important element of the situation, not only now but going forward, is the organization of neighborhood security forces. Such local organization could prove useful to a democratic transition, despite state's temporary loss of its monopoly over the use of force. Some sort of local committees to give the revolution a grassroots base, at any rate, could help ensure the people's voices continue to be heard.

Barak Splits Labor

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has broken from Labor to form a new Independence Party:

"Defense Minister Ehud Barak announced Monday that he is stepping down as Labor Party chairman to set up a new party, following months of turmoil within the weakened faction.

"In the wake of waning support from his own ministers, Barak is forming a new faction called Atzmaut (Independence). He will be joined by four fellow Labor lawmakers - Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai, and members of Knesset Shalom Simhon, Einat Wilf and Ori Noked...

"Barak and the four other members of his new party are expected to remain in Netanyahu's coalition. It is not clear whether Labor's eight remaining lawmakers will support the government, in particular in light of recent threats to quit the coalition over the stalled Middle East peace process.

"With peace talks in limbo for more than three months, an increasing number of Labor members had urged Barak to pull out of the government because of the impasse.Labor MK Daniel Ben-Simon quit the party last week to protest Barak's decision to remain in the government."

The other eight Labor MK's have, in fact, since bolted the coalition, leaving Netanyahu with a narrower majority. Josh Marshall wonder if this is the end of the Labor Party:

"The larger question though is what will happen to Labor in the next election. A number of members of Labor went to Kadima when it was formed back in 2006. That's the party Ariel Sharon formed after leaving Likud (the coalition party he played a key role in founding in the early 1970s -- yes, it gets complicated.) If you're an Israeli who wants to vote for a potential governing party which is at least in principle in favor of a two-state solution, Kadima seems like your obvious choice. If you want a more clearly left pro-peace process party, you'll probably want to vote for Meretz, another party with historic ties to the Labor tradition in the country."

This would be the case if the peace process were the only issue in Israeli politics, but there are other ways for Labor to distinguish itself. For one, I would expect it to move closer to its socialist roots, with even more influence from organized labor and Palestinian-Israelis who wish are willing to vote for a Zionist party. The chairmanship of Amir Peretz is a precedent for this. A lesser factor could be any voters who are leftist on the peace process but oppose Kadima's secularist tendencies. Finally, it could simply merge with Kadima, creating a new Labor party much as Mapai merged with Avoda in the 1960's.

Questions as Things Unfold

As Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi prepares to announce a new government, there is still violence in Tunis:

"A gun battle erupted on Sunday around the presidential palace in Carthage on the Mediterranean shore, while in the capital, Tunis, at least two major firefights broke out - one close to the central bank building, the other near the headquarters of the main opposition party, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP).

"In a statement, the PDP said that police and military stopped a car carrying armed men, who it described as foreigners, after which shots were fired.

"Separately, security forces killed two armed men stationed on a rooftop near the central bank, a state TV reporter said from the scene...

"Presidential guards loyal to Ben Ali were involved in the shootout in Carthage, about 15km north of Tunis, according to two residents...

"Al Jazeera's James Bays, reporting from Tunis on Sunday, said even though army roadblocks had sprung up throughout the city, people were saying they needed to arm themselves against the police, who they did not trust...

"He said the army was rounding up those loyal to Ben Ali, including members of the presidential police...

"On Saturday, looters emptied shops and torched the main train station and soldiers traded fire with unidentified armed men in front of the interior ministry.

"Some rioters appeared to be targeting businesses owned by members of Ben Ali's family."

There was also something happening at the Tunis Sheraton. Once again, I have questions more than analysis. For example, how much of the looting is directed against regime-related businesses? Is there some broader social tension involved, as often happens in revolutionary situations? Is there truth to the perception that the army is closer to the general public than the police? It was an army general whom rumor said had been dismissed by Ben Ali a few days ago, and right before Ben Ali left the police replaced the army trying to control the capital. Now scattered reports suggest people see the army as restoring order, but fear the police. Finally, what is happening outside of Tunis?

Social Media and Tunisia

I haven't kept the social science-speak out of this post, though hopefully I did explain it. My apologies.

There's been a lot of discussion of the role of social media in Tunisia's revolutionary uprising, with Jillian York posting one of the more comprehensive round-ups. I find myself thinking of a framing I used in this article I published a couple of years ago:

"Arab blogs have caught the attention of Middle East watchers. Much of the attention dedicated to them, however, has dealt with their political importance, whether as a mobilizing tool for activists or as an alternative source of news reporting. Blogging is also interesting, however, as a new and perhaps significant departure in the history of media in the Middle East. By this I do not mean 'media' in the common late 20th century usage in which it applies primarily to those who work within unidirectional mass media, but rather as a medium of communication. In particular, I am interested in the way media enables and structures relationships between and among senders and receivers of ideas and information, as well as in the mechanisms of reception of messages and the perceptions of media forms and transmitters which circumscribe their authority."

That last sentence deals with the social aspects of the transmission of ideas. What is your relation to the sources of information and ideas with whom you communicate, and in what ways do different media forms affect how you perceive information just because of the media through which it is transmitted? In my conclusion, I highlighted the ways in which blogs, a form of social media, create a new sort of space. Being a finicky academic for a moment, I'm no longer entirely happy with the coffeehouse analogy, since I suspect much of what is attributed to Ottoman coffeehouses could previously have been found in bazaars. Beyond that, however, I also wonder how, then, the spaces created by social media lie embedded within the physical world.

Marc Lynch calls attention to the totality of the media environment:

"I would suggest that analysts not think about the effects of the new media as an either/or proposition ('Twitter vs. al-Jazeera'), but instead think about new media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, SMS, etc) and satellite television as collectively transforming an complex and potent evolving media space. Without the new social media, the amazing images of Tunisian protestors might never have escaped the blanket repression of the Ben Ali regime --- but it was the airing of these videos on al-Jazeera, even after its office had been shuttered, which brought those images to the mass Arab public and even to many Tunisians who might otherwise not have realized what was happening around their country."

I would go beyond that and ask how Tunisians actually used all these media forms, and what role they played together and separately within society. I've heard a lot about Twitter, but Luke Allnut's information that 18% of Tunisians are on Facebook suggests we need a lot more information about the role that played. Does this, however, include a critical mass of trade unionists and rural workers who mobilized their own constituencies, or were they relying solely on al-Jazeera? If, as I suspect, the social media presence is primarily one of the upper middle classes, then what relationship did they have to other elements of the uprising? I suspect the key lies where Lynch puts it, in the use of social media to generate content for integrated media platforms that then spread it in other ways, but until we start to get more fine-grained knowledge of the mechanics of mobilization and information transmission, we can't say for sure.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Next Day

Juan Cole summarizes the situation in Tunisia:

"The fall of the government of dictator Zine al-Abedin Ben Ali after 23 years left behind a number of political and social vacuums. As for the security breach, it was gangs and Mafia that attempted to step into it. Friday afternoon and into the evening witnessed systematic looting in Tunis and in some other cities. Men in masks attacked civilians. Some Tunisians on the internet accused the police of going rogue. One tweeted, 'many policemen have been arrested by the army, many gunshots around presidential palace.' Some tweets are calling the rogue police 'counter-revolutionaries.'

"Aljazeera says that cars with no license plates cruised the streets looking for opportunities for larceny. Helicopters dropped paratroopers in some towns to combat the looters. One Tunisian interviewed from a quarter of Tunis said, 'There is complete disorder here. Families are afraid.' One eyewitness tweeted, '… what a night in Bourj Louzir, robbers still doing their things, and locals keep fighting them, at 3:45 am.' Some tweets report the formation of neighborhood ad hoc militias to patrol for safety. One warned that forming factious militias had been the downfall of Iraqis under US rule. (Iraq is thus a negative, not a positive, example for Tunisian oppositionists). The central train station and some supermarkets were set ablaze late Friday afternoon."

Politically, the constitutional court rejected Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi's claim to authority, which set the stage for the inauguration of Fouad Mebazza, speaker of parliament, as interim president. Constitutionally, he must call for new elections within 60 days, though it's not clear what the constitution means at this point. It provides a useful rulebook, but I'm not sure how much those involved will choose to respect it. Coverage suggests protests are now less a factor on the streets than looting, though I don't know if that's nationwide or just in Tunis. The looting does, however, probably enhance the status of the security forces. The best hope going forward is for a transitional national unity government including all major opposition parties.

Tunisia's Successful Intifada

Today Tunisia's long-time dictator Zayn al-Abideen ben Ali fled the country, while Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi assumed the presidency. Some are calling it the "Jasmine Revolution." Juan Cole, who early in his career wrote a book about Egypt's 'Urabi Revolt, provides his historian's eye overview here.

Although I like the phrase "revolutionary situation," I'm shying away from the term "revolution" here as a signaling device designed to convey caution in assuming that a complete political transformation under the guidance of new social elements, which is a key element in history's classic revolutions, will unfold in Tunisia. Ghannouchi is almost certainly an interim figurehead who holds office but probably not power as Tunisia's current elites maneuver to establish a new system. Many protesters are refusing to accept this, but perhaps enough will that the military can regain control, and with that a strong position in which to play kingmaker. Ben Ali's flight is not the end, but only the end of the beginning, and my fear now is that the next few years will resemble those of Kyrgyzstan after the Tulip Revolution, though Tunisia is better off economically and has no simmering ethnic tensions.

While being cautious about the future, however, I also want to highlight that the uprising sparked by Muhammad Bouazizi's self-immolation on December 17 is a tale of the Tunisian people's courage, conviction, and heroism that will have repercussions for Arab political culture for years. It succeeded in part because of its spontaneous and amorphous qualities, which meant that there were no opposition groups for the government to infiltrate and control and no key leaders whose arrest would lead it to dry up. As a historian, I hope someone quickly begins documenting the events through the eyes of participants, especially those in the labor movement and among the rural poor who are not well represented in social media, but whose participation was critical to success. I also wonder if the idea of protests in rural Tunisia, going back to those in 2008 in Gafsa, owes anything to the Algerian culture of protest discussed here.

One consequence of this uprising is that, whatever happens, Tunisia will almost certainly have a more open society. Another is that, from now on, the fact that Ben Ali fell will exist as a metanarrative throughout the Arab world, one which, especially if Tunisia joins Lebanon and Iraq as countries where elections matter, will render old-style repression increasingly difficult.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Modern Middle East Syllabus

For those interested in such things, here's my new "Modern Middle East" history syllabus:

HIS 344: The Modern Middle East
206 Dauphin Humanities Center, MWF 11:00 a.m.
Dr. Brian J. Ulrich
Office: 201 Dauphin Humanities Center, ex. 1736
Office Hours: 10 – 10:50 a.m. MWF, 1-3:30 p.m. W
E-mail: bjulrich@ship.edu

Required Texts:

The Middle East: A History, 7th Ed., William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fisher
Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire, Eugene Rogan
The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories, Neil Caplan

Additional Text:

The Modern Middle East: A History, James L. Gelvin: This book will serve as our main primary source reader, and is on reserve in Lehman Library. Page numbers on this syllabus refer to the first edition. Students using the second edition should add three to pages numbers higher than 268.

Course Overview:

This course will cover the history of the Middle East from the late 18th century to the present. It is divided into two sections. The first half will deal with the region during a long 19th century characterized by rapid transformations analogous to those found elsewhere in the world with the shift from an agrarian to an industrial social order. In particular, we will emphasize the rising significance of Europe for the Middle East, the forms of colonialism found in the Middle East and North Africa, developments within Middle Eastern society and culture, and the articulation of new political concepts and ideologies which have continuing importance in the region. At the end of this section of the course, students will have an appreciation for events and developments which loom large in the Middle Eastern historical memory, an understanding of key concepts, an appreciation for the ways in which aspects of the region often described as “traditional” or even “medieval” are in fact modern (whatever that means), and a sound basis for comparing Middle Eastern developments in this period with those in other regions of the world.

The second half of the course will focus on the important developments in the region during the 20th century, including but not limited to those conflicts which frequently make the headlines in the American media. Important subthemes include the role of foreign powers in the region’s politics and the continuing transformation of society and culture within the Middle East. In furtherance of Shippensburg’s integrated history curriculum, we will also highlight the ways in which different constructed historical narratives figure into the region’s conflicts, with a special focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the end of this section of the course, students will be conversant with Arab, Iranian and Turkish nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, political Islam, the impact of technology, and, if they get lucky, early takes on the significance of the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.

Three formal papers will be due on the deadlines indicated. Exam dates will not change for any reason, and students who have unavoidable conflicts must see me for alternate arrangements as soon as they become known. Late take-home exams are acceptable only with severe late penalties. Occasional quizzes and short informal writing assignments will check student comprehension of readings and other course material. Quizzes and some informal writing assignments cannot be made up. Attendance in class is mandatory, and 5% will be deducted from students’ participation grades for each class missed over three. Missing 12 classes will result in a failure in the course. Participation, however, is more than just attendance, and will reflect your asking and answering of questions and participation in discussions.

Grading:

Quizzes and Reading Thoughts: 10%
Participation: 10%
First Paper: 10%
Second Paper: 12.5%
Third Paper: 12.5%
Midterm Exam: 20%
Final Exam: 25%

Syllabus Changes:

Occasionally I find I want to make minor changes to the syllabus. These are usually substitutions of different readings or the addition of material that comes to my attention after the course starts, such as scholarly blog posts relevant to course material. These changes will not result in significant additional work or changes in the dates of exams and major assignments. These will be announced in class and, if there are absences at the time, over e-mail as well.

Plagiarism:

Plagiarism, simply put, is intellectual theft. If you use words or ideas from someone else in an academic or professional setting, and do not give them proper credit, you have stolen from them. This is true even if the work has been posted in a public forum, such as a web site. It includes:

1.) Outright plagiarism – direct copying of a source, passing off the author’s words and ideas as one’s own without crediting the source
2.) Mosaic plagiarism – lifting words or phrases from the original source, again without crediting that source
3.) Echo plagiarism – no words are stolen, but ideas are lifted, again without crediting the source

Because of all this, plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty (cheating) will not be tolerated and handled according to Shippensburg procedures. Specific guidelines for expected citation policies will be announced with each assignment. The easiest way to avoid plagiarizing is always to cite as much as possible. Citing too much is almost impossible to do. Citing too little could lead to failing an assignment, the course as a whole, or even expulsion from the university. In order to prevent plagiarism, I ask that all assignments be submitted via turnitin.com.

Frankly, you should want to cite things even if it weren’t for the consequences of plagiarism. The flip side of plagiarism is generosity, acknowledging the debt you have to the work of others. Even when professional historians have an idea of their own, they will often include a footnote mentioning that they got the idea after talking to a colleague, or even from discussion in a class they were teaching. Sometimes when they cite a book or article, they will mention that it was recommended to them by a friend, whom they name. You may not know the people who created the sources you will cite here at Shippensburg, but acknowledging things others have done to help you is a good habit to get into for life, and proper citation is a good start.

(Note: I am indebted to Professor Betty Dessants for her description of the types of plagiarism.)

Disability Accomodation:

If you feel you may need an accommodation based on the impact of a disability, you should contact me privately to discuss your specific needs at least 72 hours prior to the activity which requires the accommodation. If you have not already done so, you must contact the Office of Disability Services. This office is responsible for determining reasonable and appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities on a case-by-case basis, and more generally, for ensuring that members of the community with disabilities have access to Shippensburg’s programs and services. They also assist students in identifying and managing the factors that may interfere with learning and in developing strategies to enhance learning. I cannot approve an accommodation without you registering.

Schedule of Readings and Major Assignments

January 19 – Course Intro
January 21 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 1-8, 75-96 (Geography, Islam)

January 24 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 190-201; Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography,” The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 135-56. (Ottoman Empire)
January 26 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 215-31, 265-9 (Safavid Iran and aftermath)
January 28 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 259-65, 271-7 (Selim III – Auspicious Incident)

January 31 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 279-86; Tucker, “Decline of the Family Economy in Mid- Nineteenth Century Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly 1 (1979): 245-71 (Muhammad Ali)
February 2 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 294-308, Gelvin, 148-54 (Tanzimat)
February 4 – Rogan, 1-43 (State, society, frontier)

February 7 – Rogan, 44-69; (Administration and infrastructure)
February 9 – Rogan, 70-94 (Land)
February 11 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 311-20; Albert Hourani, “Jamal al-Din al- Afghani,” Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 103-29; Gelvin, 161-2 (Islamic Modernism)

February 14 – Rogan, 95-122 (Merchants)
February 16 – Rogan, 122-59 (Missionaries)
February 18 – Rogan, 160-83 (Social Change)

February 21 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 286-91, 336-46; Juan Cole, “The Long Revolution in Egypt,” Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 110-32 (Late 19th-century Egypt)
February 23 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 349-67; Gelvin, 164-7 (Iran through Constitutional Revolution)
February 25 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 322-33; Rogan, 184-217 (Other revolts) (First Paper Due)

February 28 – Armenian Genocide
March 2 – Exam ID Section
March 4 – Exam Essay Due

SPRING BREAK

March 14 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 369-87; Rogan, 218-41; Sykes-Picot Agreement, Balfour Declaration, Husayn-MacMahon Correspondence (World War I)
March 16 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 393-405, 462-5, 476-500 (modern Turkey)
March 18 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 407-17 (Reza Khan) (Second Paper Due)

March 21 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 419-30; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 83-120 (Egyptian nationalism)
March 23 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 433-59 (Mandates)
March 25 – Caplan, 1-55; Selection of Theodor Herzl’s Altneuland (Arab-Israeli Conflict Intro)

March 28 – Caplan, 56-100 (Mandatory Palestine)
March 30 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 465-73 (World War II)
April 1 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 536-49; Caplan, 101-30 (1948)

April 4 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 549-52, 585-98, 639-642, 650-4; Caplan, 131-43; Gelvin, 307-8 (Rise of Military Regimes)
April 6 – Algerian War documentary, background reading TBA
April 8 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 552-7; Caplan, 143-77; Gelvin, 311-2 (1967 and After)

April 11 - Ochsenwald and Fisher, 696-709, 620-6, 670-1; Gelvin, 247-56 (Oil States)
April 13 - Ochsenwald and Fisher, 502-12; 514-6 (Iran from Mossadeq to Khomeini)
April 15 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 516-26; Gelvin, 312-5; Kamran Aghaie, “The Karbala Narrative: Shi’i Political Discourse in Modern Iran in the 1960’s and 70’s,” Journal of Islamic Studies 12 (2001): 151-76 (Islamic Republic)

April 18 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 604-14; Gelvin, 290-9, 315-7; John Calvert, “The Afterlife of Sayyid Qutb” (Infitah and Islamism)
April 20 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 628-39; Caplan, 178-94 (Camp David and Lebanon)
April 22 - Caplan, 195-267 (Arab-Israeli Conflict Today)

April 25 – Ochsenwald and Fisher, 642-7, 654-67 (Ba’ath Regimes) (Third Paper Due)
April 27 – Sahar Khamis, “New Media and Social Change in Rural Egypt,” Arab Media & Society, Winter 2010 (Middle East Today)
April 29 – Middle East Today, reading TBA

The End Draws Near

It won't be long now:

"The police on Thursday all but abandoned this exclusive Mediterranean beach town — haven to the capital’s rich and powerful — as rioters calling for the ouster of Tunisia’s authoritarian president swarmed the streets, torched bank offices and ransacked a mansion belonging to one of his relatives...

"In a possible sign of divisions in the government, the Tunisian military withdrew from the capital later Thursday and interior security forces took their place in the streets. Tunisian news organizations reported that the president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, would deliver a televised address on Thursday evening...

"The riots in Hammamet, a town roughly equivalent to Tunisia’s East Hampton, were announced this morning on an Arabic Facebook page called 'The People of Tunisia are setting themselves on fire, Mr. President.' The name is a reference to the Dec. 17 event that sparked the protests, the self-immolation of an college graduate who sold vegetables on the street of a small town in the provinces. And on Thursday morning the page called on patriotic Tunisians to prepare to shed their blood in protest in the town of Hammamet."

I'm following Ben Ali's speech on Twitter, in which he is promising to step down in 2014, lead a campaign against corruption, end censorship, and stop shooting people. These acts of desperation will only serve to convince the protesters that they have the regime on the run.

Signs of a Falling Dictator

I feel like this is a sign of the end:

"The Tunisian president has sacked his interior minister after a deadly wave of violent unrest engulfed the capital, Tunis, for the first time.

"Rafik Belhaj Kacem, who was responsible for the police force which has been widely criticised for its ruthless response to the protests, was dismissed on Wednesday.

"But the dismissal did little to douse public anger immediately and hundreds of protesters emerged from a souk, or market, in the capital and hurled stones at police at a key intersection on Wednesday. Officers responded with volleys of tear gas, driving the protesters to disperse into adjoining streets. Stores in the area were shuttered...

"Mohamed Ghannouchi, the prime minister, told a press conference on Wednesday that all those arrested in the wave of demonstrations had been released, but gave no figure for how many had been originally detained.

"Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the president, had only a few days earlier accused the rioters of committing acts of terrorism."

Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi tried something similar shortly before he fell from power in Iran. What Ben Ali has done is legitimize the complaints against his regime while walking back some of the intimidation on which his power is based. It is a belated attempt to conciliate the protesters that early signs show has not worked, as demonstrations continue to grow and spread. It may be a prelude to legitimize an eventual crackdown, but if so, the strategy probably depends for its success on some demonstrators being appeased.

Further complicating the picture is the ongoing arrest of opposition leaders. Does Ben Ali really believe they matter to the protests, or is this an attempt by the regime more broadly speaking to limit competition for an eventual succession?

Tunisia on the Brink

Issandr El Amrani eloquently writes of the mood among Tunisia observers:

"As I write these lines, a 7pm curfew has been imposed in Tunis, perhaps the clearest sign thus far that the wave of protests and discontent that has taken over Tunisia since 17 December is not about to end.

"I have spent the day following the scraps of news that come out of social networks and websites, being directed to the temporary websites where Tunisian online activists are storing videos of the protests--video-sharing sites are quickly blocked by Tunisian authorities and hence must change all the time. I spoke to a well-to-do young Tunisian from a prominent family who has effectively decided to give up what would have been a life of privilege by siding with the protesters and denouncing the corruption of the ruling family.

"I read the sometimes deeply eloquent, sometimes quite hilarious responses to the speech that Tunisian President Zein al-Abideen Ben Ali delivered on Monday, in which he missed the opportunity to calm the situation by insinuating that demonstrators were foreign agents, promising the creation of 300,000 jobs in two years (that’s 17 new jobs every hour!) for unemployed graduates and thanking Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi for offering to make it easier for Tunisians to go work in Libya."

Brian Whitaker runs down today's developments here. At this point, it would seem that Ben Ali's only option for remaining in power is to bring down the full might of the Tunisian military, such as the Chinese did in Tiananmen Square. Both El Amrani and Whitaker report rumors that elements of the military are refusing suppression orders. Such rumors may represent only hope circulating through Tunisian society, but that hope is in itself significant. Someone who understand the sociology of the Tunisian military could best comment. It also occurred to me that with the only nationwide source of information being the discredited official media, there's no good way for the regime to use intimidation in selected areas as a warning to others. This could be like fighting a forest fire.

There is another option on the table, and that is the end Ben Ali's 23 years in power. This requires more knowledge of Tunisian political culture than I possess, but analysts should bear in mind that the result of social upheaval is often not democracy. How does a prospective fall play out? Do factions within the military decide the way forward is to stage a coup? Does Ben Ali's rule depend on elites outside his family who can throw their support elsewhere? Does Ben Ali just pack up and leave the place to whatever opposition exists? Tunisia has no visible Khomeini who can push a brand new system into place, and competitive electoral politics would likely emerge only if whomever succeeds Ben Ali can neither suppress nor conciliate rival centers of power.

Tunisia is on the brink of something, though I don't know what. As Marc Lynch demontrates, however, the Arab world is watching.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Domestic Terrorism

An anonymous Capitol Hill correspondent of Steve Benen makes the point that the weekend's attempted assassination of Arizona congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was not an isolated incident:

"We are family up here and I know I'm not the only who has already gotten requests from family to find another line of work. We have had this in the back of our minds for quite some time now. We had people storm our office during health care, they were filled with end-of-times rhetoric and even made mention of violence as an answer.

"One thing that isn't getting reported yet is how this isn't an 'isolated' incident. We don't know yet if right wing hate talk played a roll, but can we please not forget that a deranged anti-government man flew his plane into an IRS building in Texas killing a veteran. Can we please not forget an unhinged racist killed a security guard at the Holocaust Museum. Can we please not forget about the man arrested in northern California armed to the teeth and on his way to the Tides foundation. I'm certain there are others that I'm forgetting. This stuff comes from the right, we know that.

North African Protests

Al-Jazeera is reporting that 20 people were killed yesterday in a government crackdown on Tunisian protests. In a little sign of the greater environment, several days ago students at a Tunisian university spelled out "Free Tunisia" with their bodies. Also, in late December, protests began in Algeria, which have continued. The Moor Next Door writes a long post analyzing these developments, which you need to read in full.

One perspective, associated with Brian Whitaker and Marc Lynch, holds that these developments could form an early part of a broader wave of protests in the Arab world which could even destabilize long-secure regimes. This perspective needs to be handled carefully. Although authoritarianism and corruption play a role, a larger background issue is the weakness of the global economy. In themselves, these protests, like the wave of strikes in Egypt, have all arisen out of strictly local economic grievances. However, in the age of satellite television, it is possible that a linking narrative will form, one which unites them into a larger struggle. The formation of such a narrative and any sign of popular acceptance is the sign to watch for.

Christmas in Egypt

Juan Cole reports on Muslim solidarity with Copts in Egypt:

"Thousands of Muslims honored a promise made by their leaders and showed up at Christmas Mass or at candlelight vigils outside Egyptian churches on Friday, offering their bodies as human shields against any acts of terrorists. The observances were tense, in view of the New Year’s Day bombing of a cathedral in Alexandria, which killed 21. The Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church celebrates Christmas on January 7. Among those Muslims making this statement was beloved comedian Adil Imam. Since the 1990s Imam has been active in combating radicalism, memorably in his film 'Kebab and Terrorism' (Kebab wa Irhab).

"Father Marqus, the Bishop of Alexandria, said that in his entire life he had never seen the degree of solidarity of Muslims with Coptic Christians that he has witnessed in recent days. He said that Muslims attending the funeral of the Christian victims of the New Year’s Day bombing had treated them like Muslim martyrs, pronouncing ‘God is Great!’ in mourning, and had erupted in applause at the condemnation of the terrorists."

Expect this to have no effect whatsoever on those who complain that Muslims never speak out against terrorism.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Alexandria Church Bombing

I see three dimensions to the New Year's church bombing in Alexandria Egypt.

One is the way it has highlighted Coptic alienation from and lack of faith in Muslim society and the Mubarak regime, as seen in the sometimes violent protests. Paul Schemm provides an excellent background on that issue. Juan Cole notes that Muslim leaders, and for that matter many non-leader Muslims, have condemned and bombing and joined in some protests, but there definitely seems to have been a quiet pattern of social transformation leading to Copts feeling their minority status more acutely.

Another is its possible connection to the al-Qaeda-inspired Islamic State of Iraq's new anti-Christian campaign which they justify in part by referencing those tensions between Copts and Muslims in Egypt. The investigation is focusing on Iraq links, though Issandr El Amrani believes that the perpetrators were probably Egyptian. Juan Cole believes they may have been foreigners, though he also credits the possibility of a new group within Egypt, probably of only a single cell, as mentioned by Issandr.

The third angle that seems worth mentioning is how this might harm the legitimacy of the regime as it prepares for a transition in power. Having a violent sectarian clash can't be good, and may give the government incentive to move decisively and in a high-profile way against somebody or other to try and calm the internal situation and show it can still provide security.

Operation Tunisia

An anonymous group of international cyber-activists are going after the Tunisian government:

"Online activists have attacked and at least momentarily disabled several Tunisian government websites in the latest act of protest against the country's embattled leadership.

"As of Monday afternoon, local time, at least eight websites had been affected, including those for the president, prime minister, ministry of industry, ministry of foreign affairs, and the stock exchange.

"The attack, which began on Sunday night, coincided with a national strike, planned to take place on Monday, that organisers said would be the biggest popular event of its size since Zine El Abidine Ben Ali assumed the presidency.

"The strike comes on the day that school students return from their holiday.

"Ben Ali's administration has tightly restricted the flow of information out of Tunisia since widespread protests began on December 17, following 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi's suicide attempt. But reports of civil disobedience and police action filtered out on Twitter on Monday, with some users reporting the use of tear gas by security forces.

"The loosely organised hacker group Anonymous claimed responsibility for the cyber attack, which it called 'Operation Tunisia', an apparent arm of the group's broader effort - termed 'Operation Payback' - aimed at taking retribution against governments and businesses viewed as hostile to the similarly amorphous document-leaking group WikiLeaks...

"But on Monday, Anonymous and its followers sought to tie their cyber attack to the ongoing protests and social unrest in Tunisia, not WikiLeaks. In a manifesto reportedly posted on the prime minister's website but later removed, the group said that it was 'enraged' at the Tunisian government's behaviour, and that Ben Ali's administration had 'unilaterally declared war on free speech, democracy, and even [its] own people'."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)