Dnieper at Zaporizhzhya

The Dnieper River at Zaporizhzhya in Ukraine, with part of the Dniproges Dam on the left

Azerbaijan's Religiosity

Politicians in Azerbaijan are displaying more religion:

"Although Azerbaijan prides itself on being a secular country where religion and politics are separate, candidates increasingly use religious rhetoric to gain voters’ sympathy and support. In a live TV debate, candidates from one constituency have started arguing over whom the local religious wise man had supported, pointing out to the various pictures taken and telephone conversations held with him. It was obvious that the support of this local clergyman could be a deciding factor in that particular district (Azerbaijan Public TV, October 18). Candidates from another district, located in the center of Baku, have also appealed to religious rhetoric, with one candidate pointing out that he has translated the Koran and another candidate calling her voters 'religious people' thus promising them justice and honesty. A candidate from Barda district has even openly accused his opponent, the current Member of Parliament (MP), Zahid Oruc, of being an 'infidel,' thus trying to discredit him in the eyes of voters (Azertaj News Agency, October 15)...

"Islam’s role in the political life of the country today differs significantly from that of 1990’s, when Islamic parties were established and attempted to openly compete in elections. At that time, the government took decisive measures to break them up and arrest those politicians, who attempted to use religion for political purposes. Today, religion seems to be coming more from the grassroots level, thus pushing the secular politicians to speak with voters in 'their language'."

I'm pretty sure this has nothing to do with political Islam as understood in the Middle East and South Asia, and everything to do with the revival of religion in general in the former Soviet Union as the post-communist generation discovers its pre-communist roots. I also suspect the "wise man" in the first paragraph refers to a leader connected with Sufism, broadly defined, which is something almost invariably opposed by Middle Eastern and South Asian Islamists.

Iraq's Nakba

Matthew Duss compares the conflict which engulfed Iraq after the U.S. invasion to the creation of the Palestinian refugee crisis:

"But the point is this: between 2003 and 2009, in addition to the more than 100,000 Iraqis killed and many more wounded and maimed, more than 4.5 million Iraqis were expelled and displaced amid Iraq’s sectarian civil war — new, grim details of which are contained in the WikiLeaks trove. Around 2.6 million remain internally displaced in Iraq, unable to return to their homes. Another 1.9 million remain refugees, mostly in neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. It has utterly changed the face not only of Iraq, but of the region. If Americans are going to learn the right lessons from Iraq, and satisfy the huge moral debt we’ve incurred, we’ve simply got to regain our sense of shock about the enormity of what we have done there: Through a combination of hubris, idealism, incompetence, and plain ignorance, the United States facilitated, sponsored, and oversaw Iraq’s Nakba."

Over the summer, I read Deborah Amos's Eclipse of the Sunnis, which focused on the Iraqi refugee crisis. Before reading it, I had not realized the extent to which it was specifically a Sunni phenomenon. Although I do not believe Amos made her case that the Iraq War is the root of a rising wave of tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Middle East, she did portray very clearly a situation in which large numbers of Iraqi Sunnis are living as refugees, often as an underclass in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and that despite rhetoric, the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government has shown little interest in creating the conditions necessary for their return. The situation has the makings of significant tension within Iraq's Arab neighbors and between those neighbors and the Iraqi government for years to come.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Ras al-Khaimah's New Ruler

Sheikh Saud b. Saqr al-Qasimi has become the new ruler of Ras al-Khaimah:

"Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi was yesterday appointed as Ruler of Ras al Khaimah and a member of the UAE's Supreme Council, the nation's highest federal authority.

"Born on February 10, 1956, he is the fourth son of Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qasimi.

"He was appointed the Crown Prince and deputy ruler of Ras al Khaimah in 2003, and in recent years has taken on an expanded role in running the emirate's affairs. Sheikh Saud holds a bachelor's degree in economics and political science from Michigan State University."

Saud's accession comes despite intensive lobbying by deposed crown prince Khalid b. Saqr on his own behalf.

Dissident Meritocracies

Lara Setrakian considers Husni Mubarak's holding onto power in the Egyptian government to the decision last year of Muhammad Mehdi Akef to step down as leader of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood to ask whether Islamist organizations are better able to recruit talent:

"In 2009 the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef voluntarily stepped aside -- the first time a top leader in the movement had voluntarily resigned before reaching death's door. His message, as Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment describes it, was that ‘we old guys need to step aside -- I'm going to set an example.' This month Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Akef's counterpart in the ruling establishment, hinted he would run for a third term in office next year, extending his three decade rule.

"Akef's resignation was the high note in a pitch that Islamist groups have repeatedly made: that they are more internally democratic and dynamic than their secular counterparts. It's a cultivated image that glosses over a deeply flawed system, one that can be just as autocratic and hostile to new ideas. But it is giving Islamist groups a competitive edge, especially in attracting and retaining a new generation of talented members...

"In terms of real meritocracy, Islamists political movements have many of the same deficiencies as the secular establishment: they are largely autocratic, manipulated through patronage and often intolerant of dissent. 'There's still a complaint that the younger generation don't feel they have a chance,' said Carnegie's Michele Dunne. '‘[It can be] the leader for life phenomenon, undemocratic internal procedures, gerentocracies with old men holding onto their seats forever.'

"Yet Islamists maintain a perceived meritocracy, along with a real opportunity to participate at the low- and mid-level. That gives them a strategic advantage in attracting and retaining many of the region's brightest and most dedicated minds. Having that human capital makes them better equipped and more resilient as the political forces of the Arab world collide."

The only evidence in favor of this idea is Setrakian's conversation with a young Egyptian professional. Without more, I'm dubious this is actually true. In particular, I can see lots of young people questioning whether rising in that organization is ultimately worth it. At most, I can see it being more attractive for aspiring political activists than established opposition parties such as the Waqf which are just as prone to cronyism as the ruling NDP. On the flip side, however, I'm not sure the NDP even wants to recruit that kind of new activist, as opposed to continuing to run and profit on a developmentalist economic and social agenda.

Tel Aviv Cats

Cats looking for food in Tel Aviv.

From the Iraq Documents

The New York Times highlights several key points from the Wikileaks Iraq dump:

"The war in Iraq spawned a reliance on private contractors on a scale not well recognized at the time and previously unknown in American wars. The documents describe an outsourcing of combat and other duties once performed by soldiers that grew and spread to Afghanistan to the point that there are more contractors there than soldiers.

"The documents suggest that the so-called surge worked not only because the American military committed to more troops and a new strategy but because Iraqis themselves, exhausted by years of bloody war, were ready for it. The conditions, the documents suggest, may not be repeatable in the still intensifying war in Afghanistan.

"The deaths of Iraqi civilians — at the hands mainly of other Iraqis, but also of the American military — appear to be greater than the numbers made public by the United States during the Bush administration.

"While the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by Americans, particularly at the Abu Ghraib prison, shocked the American public and much of the world, the documents paint an even more lurid picture of abuse by America’s Iraqi allies — a brutality from which the Americans at times averted their eyes.

"Iran’s military, more than has been generally understood, intervened aggressively in support of Shiite combatants, offering weapons, training and sanctuary and in a few instances directly engaging American troops."

All these conclusions are based on American military field reports.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Khamene'i in Qom

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i has always been vulnerable for his weak religious credentials, which is a key reason the fact so many high-profile religious leaders turned against the regime's handling of the 2009 election could have presented a serious problem. Reuters reports, however, that he is boosting his standing on his trip to Qom:

"Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appears to have scored a political success by gathering leading clerics in the holy city of Qom around him in a show of unity after months of in-fighting.

"Iranian media highlighted pictures on Thursday of a smiling Khamenei sitting with several top Shi'ite Muslim dignitaries, including some who have been critical since the disputed re-election of hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last year...

"Their turnout belied rumors that senior religious figures would boycott Khamenei's annual visit to the center of Shi'ite learning in protest at a fierce crackdown on reformists and moves to isolate and intimidate dissident clerics.

"However, while conservative clerics who have voiced concern about the economy or the prerogatives of the clergy came to meet Khamenei, more liberal figures who backed opposition candidate Mirhossein Mousavi last year have so far stayed away."

What this will do is help his standing among conservatives in the population and bolster his ties among the clerical establishment that remains critical to legitimacy within the regime.

Kuwait Sponsorship Confusion

Remember the praise for Kuwait's plan to make the government the sponsor for most guest workers? Now there's confusion over whether it will actually happen:

"Last month Mohammad Al Afasi, Kuwait's Labour Minister, announced that Kuwait would cancel the ‘kafeel' sponsorship system by February 2011 as a "gift" to expatriates to mark the anniversary of the country's liberation from the 1991 Iraqi occupation.

"A day later, however, an under-secretary for the same ministry performed an about-turn. The government, the official told Al Jazeera, the satellite channel, was not about to cancel the system but only to amend it to make it easier for foreign workers to transfer sponsors.

"The result is confusion about the government's real intentions, fuelling opposition and scepticism and pitting officials against recruitment agency owners...

"Employers are also against change. They argue that sponsorship protects them, especially when recruiting skilled labour from overseas...

"If Kuwait does act it will be only the second GCC country to discard the kafeel laws after Bahrain, which set up an agency last year to issue work permits to foreigners. But workers in Bahrain are still tied to individual employers and the system has been criticised for failing to make a significant difference."

Kuwaiti Royals' Past

Kuwait's Ambassador to Jordan led a mob against a TV station:

"Kuwait's public prosecution on Monday issued arrest warrants for members of the ruling family after they reportedly attacked a privately-owned television station, whose owner went on air and accused their grandfather of an early 20th century bloody attempt to depose his cousin, the emirate's ruler at that time...

"Eyewitnesses told Gulf News some '150 people' attacked the station, which has since stopped broadcasting. Police said the alleged attack was led by Shaikh Faisal Al Homoud Al Malek Al Sabah, Kuwait's ambassador to Jordan.

"The attack followed a live talk show in which the owner of the station, former MP Talal Al Saeed accused the Malek family, a smaller branch of the ruling Al Sabah family, of an attempt to depose Shaikh Mubarak Al Sabah, the founder of modern Kuwait in the early 1900s.

"A senior member of the Al Malek family, Shaikh Faisal Malek Al Malek Al Sabah, is Undersecretary in the Ministry of Information."

The main thing I wonder after reading this is how the Al Malek relate to the rest of the Al Sabah royal family, and if that may explain why their arrest is permitted. Mubarak Al Sabah is often called Mubarak the Great, and the Jaber and Salim branches of the Al Salim family are descended from his sons by those names. Since Mubarak's 1915 death, they have alternated the throne between them. However, the last Salimi emir reigned for only nine days due to health reasons, meaning that the Jabiris have effectively held uninterrupted office since 1977, and the current ruler, Sabah IV, has named a Jabiri as crown prince.

I hadn't realized that people descended from cousins of Mubarak were still considered members of the royal family, and I also have access to one of the biographies of Mubarak where presumably I could see if there's much behind the TV station's claims. This, however, is the political context in which the assertion was made.

Seaside Mansion

Some rich person's seaside mansion near the Qala'at al-Bahrayn fortress outside Manama.

Silwan Protest Tent

In the spirit of Wednesday's post, here's another example of Israel cracking down on non-violent resistance:

"Jerusalem city council is threatening to expel a Palestinian and raze his home if he does not remove a protest tent from a strife-torn district on the city’s eastern side, locals said on Friday.

"Residents in Silwan told AFP that city officials had delivered a 'demolition order' late on Thursday, ordering the removal of a tent set up to protest against municipal plans to level 22 homes to make way for a new tourism park.

"'They told Naim al-Ruweidi, who owns the land, that he must take the tent down by 8:00 am on Sunday,' Fakhri Abu Diab, one of the protest leaders, told AFP.

"'They said that if he didn’t do it, they would expel him and his family from Jerusalem and demolish his house.'"

Al-Ruweidi is protesting plans to build a tourist park on the site, which is associated with the "City of David" archaeological site, the Jerusalem which served as the capital of ancient Judah. The archaeology is not neutral, however, in that archaeologists not driven by Biblical considerations almost unanimously consider it unlikely that the site hosted a capital of a "United Monarchy" as implied by the name, and in any case claiming it for the Israeli heritage is an example, more defensible than most, of still an example, of emphasizing the city's Jewish heritage so as to buttress Israel's claims to it. I've been to the City of David, and before the tour, which is actually interesting and well-done, you watch a video on the history of Jerusalem which simply omits everything that happened between the Bar Kokhba Revolt and the Zionist movement even though the city's most recognizable monument, the Dome of the Rock, looms over this very neighborhood.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Abdallah Abu Rahme

Matthew Yglesias correctly notes that non-violent resistance requires an audience, so I'll call attention to Israel's conviction of Abdallah Abu Rahme:

"One of the leading figures behind a recent wave of non-violent protests against occupation has been sentenced by an Israeli military court to one year in prison.

"The court also ordered Abdallah Abu Rahme this week to pay a fine of 5,000 shekels (Dh5,140) after he was found guilty in August of incitement and organising and participating in illegal demonstrations...

"Permits are required for demonstrations of 10 or more people, according to the Israeli military law that governs much of the West Bank. That law was cited as justification to arrest Mr Rahme and some of the dozens of people who have protested against the separation barrier, which stretches hundreds of kilometres and reaches beyond Israel's internationally recognised boundaries and deep inside the West Bank."

This sort of thing is hardly new among Palestinians, though I suspect many will perceive it as such. Long before intifada there was sumud, or "clinging," which was primarily nonviolent.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Sheikha Lubna

Forbes magazine has named the United Arab Emirates's minister of foreign trade, Sheikha Lubna, as the most powerful Arab woman:

"Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi, the minister of foreign trade, has been voted the most powerful Arab woman by Forbes magazine.

"She was also ranked the 70th most powerful woman in the world in this year's annual list of the most influential females in politics, business, media and 'lifestyle'.

"The US first lady Michelle Obama topped the list. Three other Arab women made the top 100: Sheikha Mozah, the first lady of Qatar, was ranked 74th, followed by Queen Rania of Jordan in 76th place. Maha al Ghunaim, a Kuwaiti businesswoman who co-founded the bank Global Investment House, was number 94...

"Sheikha Lubna is the UAE's first female cabinet minister, appointed in 2004 as the Minister of Economy, and later as the Minister of Foreign Trade. She is a member of Sharjah's ruling family and studied computer science at California State University, Chico."

Egypt Election Primer

Issandr recommends Mona El-Ghobashy's primer on Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections:

"As in its day-to-day politics, Egypt’s elections bring together two wildly mismatched players, one holding all of the state’s resources and force and the other possessing nothing more than the sympathy the public may have for the underdog. There is no uncertainty about the overall winner, but winning is not what is at stake. Since the playing field is unlevel, anything but a government victory is ruled out, so the parties use elections as means of achieving extra-electoral ends. For the regime, elections are one among several implements of rule used periodically to reestablish its domination. Campaigns are seasons for the renewal of political alliances and redistribution of economic resources to the regime’s vast pyramid of partners, agents and minions, and their respective lower-level clients.

"Opposition groups enter elections not to win a majority, and certainly not to govern, but rather to build political standing. They cultivate new and old constituencies, lambaste the government and advertise their own integrity, and seek places in Parliament to counteract their exclusion from other national power structures. Given the default exclusion, to boycott Parliament would be tantamount to accepting political invisibility. Official status as MPs gives opposition members access to the state bureaucracy overseeing services to their districts and the standing to meet with foreign delegations. Most Egyptians avoid elections altogether because they can be physically dangerous or because there is nothing in it for them. But citizens’ stance toward elections is not fixed and depends on the nature of their ties to the political contestants in a given cycle: Some voters seek basic goods and services that they do not get otherwise, while others support particular candidates for ideological or kinship reasons."

Despite this beginning, El-Ghobashy doesn't have that much to say about the patronage, except perhaps under the theme of corruption. This, however, hardly matters, the the essay is a comprehensive yet digestible overview of Egypt's current politics, laying out the issues for which the government and its NDP party need to consolidate the influence the patronage ties give them.

Krasnaya Sloboda

This is Krasnaya Sloboda, a Jewish village in northern Azerbaijan.