Bazaar Strike Redux

Gold traders in Iran's bazaars are on strike again:

"Gold merchants throughout Iran are joining a strike to protest a new tax on gold that they say severely hurts their business, RFE/RL's Radio Farda reports.

"The gold bazaar in Tehran went on strike shortly after the government announced on September 26 that it was adding a 3 percent VAT (value-added tax) on gold products.

"The strike has since stretched to other cities such as Mashhad, Shiraz, Ghazvin, Qom, and Sabzevar."

The widespread bazaar strike over the summer began in the gold and textile sectors. However, so far, I haven't seen anything suggesting this one is spreading across economic sectors. See here for a little about how the Iranian bazaar today is different from that of the 1970's

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Internet in Turkmenistan

RFE-RL reports on the growth of the internet in Turkmenistan:

"During Niyazov's decades-long rule, the Internet was available only for a select few, mostly government officials and well-connected families in the capital, Ashgabat.

"Berdymukhamedov, in his first months of office, freed things up a bit, providing greater access to the Internet that led to the opening of dozens of Internet cafes in the capital and other regions.

"Now, the economy, corruption, and domestic finances are among popular topics on blogs and forums, and while the Turkmen president might be responsible for the newfound openness compared to his predecessor's rule, it does not spare him from criticism...

"Despite the small changes, Turkmenistan still has a long way to go in its on-line liberalization...

"For instance, Facebook and other social-networking sites such as the Russian Odnoclassniki (Classmates) are blocked, along with many foreign news sites and YouTube.

"Access to the net also comes at a high cost, placing the Internet beyond the reach of ordinary Turkmen citizens. An hour of surfing the net at an Internet cafe costs about $2.10, while surfing at home costs $0.42 per hour in addition to a monthly subscription fee of $4.20. Such prices are prohibitive in a country where, despite vast energy wealth, some 30 percent of the population lives in poverty, and the average monthly salary is about $200."

Despite those caveats, it would be difficult to overstate how remarkable this is. The background to the regime's decision to permit more internet access is probably an interest in economic development, but it does provide at least a small counter-public for the economic elites who can afford it and a chance for the regime to keep an eye on their concerns.

End of Kuwaiti Kafeel

In February, Kuwait will finally end its sponsorship-based labor regime:

"A government decision to scrap by February its system for sponsoring foreign labourers was welcomed yesterday by Kuwait’s non-government organisations...

"Faisal al Masoud, the deputy chairman of the Social Work Society of Kuwait, said a planned public authority for labour would take care of foreign workers 'from the airport to the airport'.

"He said when the institution is created, an unhappy worker will not have to undergo the arduous process of transferring his residency. 'He will be able to go immediately without any headaches...'

"Mohammed al Afasi, the minister of social affairs and labour, said the sponsorship system, known as kafeel, would be abolished when the new authority is established next year, local press reported.

"Kafeel allows companies and family heads to sponsor foreign labourers’ residency visas. The employee cannot leave the country or change jobs without the sponsor’s permission. A recent amendment permitted some exceptions after three years of employment.

"All other GCC states except Bahrain have a similar system."

Muta' in Iraq

IWPR reports on the rise of muta', or temporary marriage, in Iraq:

"Despite a lack of hard figures, anecdotal evidence indicates that the popularity of mutta marriages has grown dramatically in recent years.

"According to Mazin al-Shehani, the former head of a Baghdad provincial government committee in charge of displaced people and immigrants, a succession of recent wars – from the Iran-Iraq conflict to the United States-led invasion – is responsible for the rising popularity of mutta...

"'The high number of widows has made Iraq a market for mutta,' he told IWPR. 'There was no other answer to the problem of widows... it was the spontaneous solution.'

Shehani, who is allied to a popular anti-American Shia cleric, Muktada al-Sadr, said mutta had historically served to 'satisfy the needs of a woman who could not get married for whatever reason'.

"Dr Saeed al-Essadi, a professor of psychology at Basra university, said the rise of mutta was linked to unemployment and a weak economy, which had made it prohibitively expensive for many people to get married and raise a family.

"Strict sexual mores that prohibited unmarried men and women from mixing had, he said, also contributed to mutta's popularity.

"Several observers argued that the internet and mobile phones had also played a part in the mutta boom by fostering virtual courtships that could only eventually be consummated through temporary marriages."

The rise in temporary marriage is almost certainly due to the combination of modern technology and post-war economic factors. A critical aspect to this, however, is that the practice is permitted only among Twelver Shi'ites. If it becomes prominent, then it will be perhaps the most visible, emotionally charged everyday difference between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq. What might the consequences of this be? Greater sectarian tension at a social level? Sunnis drifting into Shi'ism so as to be able to practice it?

Anti-Mubarak Protests

Issandr comments on recent anti-Mubarak protests in Egypt and their suppression:

"I would venture that these protests are taking a slightly different significance for both participants and the security services in the current political context. For activists, they are the first major protests since the launch of the poster campaign for Gamal Mubarak last month, and may represent a revival of the trend of frequent large protests that we saw in 2005 in the run-up to the presidential elections. In this charged political atmosphere, it makes sense that activists will redouble their efforts and that more people might be drawn into participating in these protests: there is something more tangible to protest against today, since a Gamal Mubarak campaign now exists in public.

"For the police, this might indicate new instructions to send a strong message to participants that such protests (not long ago largely tolerated and kept under control) will be handled more firmly from now on. The dumping of people on the desert highway is quite unnecessarily petty, for instance, and the rough handling of MPs unusual (although it also happened last May.)"

He also muses that the succession period will see greater restrictions on Egypt's public sphere. Given that this will be a delicate time, I think that likely, though it might be obscured by what seem efforts to create a pro-reform persona for Gamal Mubarak. A wild card is what we might get out of Muhammad El Baradei and Amr Moussa.

Violence in Tajikstan

A wave of recent violence in Tajikistan has risen to the level of an attack on a military convoy:

"Details of the assault on the convoy, which occurred around midday on Sunday, have emerged slowly. Faridun Makhmadaliyev, a spokesman for the Tajik Defense Ministry, said by telephone on Monday that a column of military vehicles carrying about 80 soldiers was passing through the mountainous Rasht Valley, about 150 miles east of the capital, Dushanbe, when it was ambushed by gunmen in the heights above.

"The column sustained heavy fire from machine guns and grenade launchers, he said. At least 23 servicemen were killed and several others were critically wounded, he said. Other reports said that as many as 40 soldiers may have been killed...

"The assault came just weeks after a car packed with explosives rammed a police headquarters in northern Tajikistan, killing at least one person and wounding more than two dozen, in what apparently was a suicide attack. A few days later, a bomb exploded at a nightclub in Dushanbe, injuring seven people."

This rash of violence follows a militant prison break:

"Tajikistan faces a deteriorating security situation following the escape of 25 high-profile prisoners from a detention center in Dushanbe run by the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on August 23. The convicts escaped less than one week after they had been sentenced to lengthy terms in prison on charges related to terrorism and drug trafficking. Some of the escapees reportedly have ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), designated by the US State Department as a terrorist group, and rebel militants in Russia’s North Caucasus republics (www.asiaplus.tj, www.khovar.tj, August 23)...

"On September 8, a previously unknown Islamic group, Jamaat Ansarullah in Tajikistan, claimed responsibility for the bombing in Khujand. The group’s statement on an Islamist website frequently used by rebels in Chechnya said the attack was carried out 'in response to the killing and humiliation of our brothers and ordinary Muslims, which took place behind the walls of this building accursed by Allah' (www.kavkazcenter.com). Although many experts, including the deputy head of Tajikistan’s Islamic Revival Party, Umarali Hisaynov, doubt whether Jamaat Ansarullah exists, the statement reflects a growing frustration with the Tajik government’s increasingly harsh policies towards non-conventional Islamic movements. In the first eight months of this year alone, Tajik security agencies jailed more than 100 members of banned Islamic organizations (www.asiaplus.tj, September 11)."

Central Asian leaders, including Tajikistan's President Emamoli Rahmon, have used the threat of Islamic militancy to track down on dissent, but this violence is real.

Branch Mouth

This is Branch Mouth near San Ignacio, where the Mopan and Macal join to form the Belize River.

Bahrain's Campaign Begins

Fred Lawson reports on recent developments in Bahraini politics:

"Campaigning for elections in Bahrain is typically combative, but this year the circumstances leading up to the combined parliamentary and municipal elections scheduled for October 23 are nothing short of explosive. Amidst a major crackdown on opposition figures and organizations, most of which champion the interests of the disadvantaged Shi'i community, various political societies (Bahrain has no political parties) are scrambling to define their platforms.

"Just one week after King Hamad bin'Isa Al Khalifa announced the date of the balloting on August 8, the campaign against liberals and leftists commenced with the arrest of Dr. 'Abd al-Jalil Singace, a key figure in Haqq (the Movement for Liberties and Democracy). Three other prominent human rights activists were rounded up the next day. The four were charged with setting up 'an organized network aiming to undermine the security and stability of the country,' as well as with inciting violence and terrorist acts against private and public property...

"The primary targeted organization, Haqq, has consistently criticized Bahrain's pre-eminent Shi’i political association, al-Wefaq (the Islamic National Accord Society), for its decision to contest the 2006 elections and start playing by the rules of the political game. The crackdown on Haqq in the run-up to next month's balloting confronts the leadership of al-Wefaq with a dilemma: it can close ranks with fellow Shi'a and pull out of the electoral process, opening itself to government accusations of complicity with hostile outside forces, or it can participate in the elections and abandon a large part of its potential constituency in the hope of effecting change from inside."

Comedy Central Rally

Jon Stewart may officially be a comedian, but his grasp of politics is way above that of many "serious" talk show hosts:

"Last night, Stewart announced he will host the 'Rally To Restore Sanity' on the Washington Mall on October 30. The central message of the event, which Stewart also characterized as the 'Million Moderate March,' will be 'Take It Down A Notch -- For America.' Featured signs will include reasonable maxims, such as, 'I Disagree With You, But I'm Pretty Sure You're Not Hitler.'"

Shi'ites and Iraqi al-Qaeda

The National reports on an increasing number of Shi'ite-al-Qaeda alliances in Iraq:

"Shiite gangs are joining the Sunni extremists of al Qa’eda to form new and dangerous alliances that threaten stability in southern Iraq, government officials and community leaders have warned.

"A series of deadly attacks last month in once secure areas, including the southern cities of Kut and Basra, caught the Iraqi authorities by surprise and, they say, indicate that al Qa’eda has made contacts with Shiite groups willing to carry out strikes in the region.

"The cooperation, driven by a mixture of money, fear and a mutual hatred of Iran, represents a stark reversal. Since the formation of al Qa’eda in the late 1990s, the radical Sunni Muslim group and its affiliates have regularly targeted Shiites, whom they consider heretics. That hostility continued following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the factional fighting that broke out soon thereafter.

"There are signs, however, that this longstanding acrimony has given way to the desire of al Qa’eda sympathisers to penetrate Iraq’s Shiite-dominated southern provinces. To that end, they have found willing Shiite allies, according to regional officials."

Insofar as the al-Qaeda label has been a banner flown by local militants seeking to convey a unity with transnational militant Sunni Salafism, and that movement has largely been opposed to Shi'ism as a heresy within Islam, this is an uncommon development. It is, however, not an impossible one. For starters, the obsessive targeting of Shi'ites in the days of Abu Musab az-Zarqawi was controversial even within al-Qaeda circles. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of the al-Qaeda movement leads to significant variation at local levels, and some groups will easily decide to prioritize attacking the U.S. or a related power even if it means you might also have issues with your allies.

Turkey's Constitutional Referendum

Yesterday, 58% of Turkish voters approved 26 constitutional amendments supported by the ruling AKP and billed as enhancing Turkish democracy. A list is here, but the most controversial allows elected officials to nominate judges on the nation's Constitutional Court, who would then serve 12-year terms. Another amendment would place military crimes against the constitution under civilian courts. Because the military and high court system have historically been autonomous bastions of Kemalist secularism, many allege that the Islamist AKP is seeking to undermine Turkey's secularist traditions.

Goats

These goats live at Abdaly Farms in northern Kuwait.

Ahmadinejad's Power

During the past five years, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has built up an unprecedented amount of real power for an Iranian president. Much of this is related to his military ties, and the Republican Guard has seen an economic bonanza under the current administration. As Golnaz Esfendiari reports, he has also used the appointment of special envoys to develop independent foreign policy clout:

"Decisions on foreign policy issues -- including the contentious issue of Iran's nuclear program -- are traditionally subject to the supreme leader's approval. However, four appointments made by the president in recent weeks suggest that he intends to exert greater influence on Iranian diplomacy, and could be trying to wrest outright control from Khamenei in the sphere of foreign policy.

"Special presidential envoys for foreign policy are not without precedent -- President Mohammad Khatami, for example had two such envoys. The difference is that under Khatami, the appointment of envoys was decided by consensus and subject to approval by the president's cabinet, while Ahmadinejad appears to be making appointments unilaterally.

"On August 22, Ahmadinejad appointed his highly controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, as his special envoy to the Middle East. Hamid Baghei, the head of Iran's Cultural Heritage Foundation, was appointed as special envoy for Asia affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhundzadeh has been named Iran's envoy on Caspian Affairs. And Abolfazl Zohrevand, deputy head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, is now the president's envoy to Afghanistan."

This is happening amidst a shocking amount of conflict between Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i described by Muhammad Sahimi:

"The behind-the-scenes confrontation continued after the nuclear deal. In a previous article, I described the June 4 ceremony at the shrine of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to commemorate the 21st anniversary of his death. The aftermath of the event demonstrated the friction between the two camps. In a completely unprecedented web article, an anonymous hardliner rebuked Khamenei by name and referred to Khomeini only as the 'former leader of the Revolution.' The piece accused Khamenei of preventing the uprooting of nepotism among the clerics and mocked the Bayt-e Emam (the Khomeini family). Anyone who can post such a scathing piece with impunity must have ties with the highest levels of the military-security establishment.

"Two recent developments represent the most telling evidence of the deepening rift between the two men. One emerged when Ahmadinejad and his cabinet met with Khamenei last week. Ahmadinejad presented a list of his government's 'achievements,' but the ayatollah rebuked him, directly or indirectly, over each item, which is without precedent. The ayatollah had previously gone out of his way to exaggerate Ahmadinejad's 'successes,' but not this time.

"When Ahmadinejad claimed that his government had spread 'economic fairness,' the ayatollah responded, 'In order to assess whether fairness has been achieved, certain criteria must be set to see whether it has really happened in the various aspects of the society -- economical, social, cultural, and educational.'

"After Ahmadinejad stated that his government is 'rapidly' achieving the goals set out in the Expediency Council's 20-Year Vision Plan, the ayatollah retorted, 'The government must appoint some people to study whether the pace of progress has been good' during the period Ahmadinejad has been in office.

"Ahmadinejad then told the ayatollah that the main focus of his government is 'culture.' Khamenei pointedly responded, 'Showmanship in cultural affairs is not only not useful, but also damaging,' a reference to Ahmadinejad's constant boasting of his accomplishments."

Sahimi speculates that Ahmadinejad may have an ambitious goal more commonly associated with the most radical reformists, the end of the clerical regime:

"There are other signs that Ahmadinejad wants to do away with Khamenei and the clerics. He and his team have repeatedly visited and talked about Jamkaran, the site near Qom where people can supposedly make contact with Mahdi, the Shiites' 12th Imam who is supposed to return from hiding one day. Many people interpret this as an example of Ahmadinejad's demagogic exploitation of superstitions. I believe it his subtle way of saying, 'If we can directly contact with Imam Mahdi, we do not need the clerics to do that for us.'"

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Shippensburg's 9/11 Commemoration

Shippensburg University has issued a press release about its 9/11 commemoration:

"With more than 6,500 American flags flying at Shippensburg University today (Sept. 11), hundreds of people honored the men and women who gave their lives in defense of the U.S. and freedom during the war on terror.

"Under a bright blue sky that belied the solemnness of the event, veterans, current service personnel, members of the campus and the Shippensburg community — everyday Americans all — joined to remember and thank those whose sacrifice keeps us safe and free...

"Guest speakers talked of honor, of service, of duty, but most of all they talked about the men and women who serve and our nation’s need to support — and remember — all our veterans."

Right now, the United States is engaged in a war in Afghanistan that is a direct response to the 9/11 attacks. One could also argue that, despite the deceptions involved, Iraq is related because 9/11 was an important milestone in the chain of events which led us there. For both these reasons, as well as the fact that American veterans and active service members deserve all the support they get, this means of marking the anniversary of 9/11 makes sense.

In the long run, however, and given the existing Memorial Day and Veterans Day commemorations, I'd advocate a decisive move toward focusing on those who actually died that day: The police, fire fighters, and other "first responders" who risk their lives all the time with little public recognition of the fact. I also think this most resonates with understanding the type of organization that struck the U.S. nine years ago, which Juan Cole has, in a model I am increasingly in agreement with, characterized as a vigilante cult.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Saddam's Diplomatic Legacy

Iraq today is not only dealing with Saddam Hussein's legacy internally, it's being held responsible for his international crimes, as well:

"Iraq has quietly agreed to pay $400 million in claims to American citizens who say they were tortured or traumatized by Saddam Hussein’s regime after his 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

"The controversial settlement ends years of legal battles and could help Iraq emerge from United Nations sanctions put in place two decades ago – a step Iraqi leaders see as a prerequisite to becoming fully sovereign...

"Settling the claims, which were brought by American citizens, has been seen as a key requirement for Washington to be willing to push for an end to the UN sanctions...

"Known as 'Chapter 7' sanctions after the part of the UN charter that deals with international threats to peace, they were imposed against Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and never fully lifted.

"As part of the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States, which provides the legal basis for the presence of American troops here, the US committed itself to helping Iraq emerge from Chapter 7."

Iraq is also continuing to pay compensation to Kuwait, which the latter has refused to forgive.

The Laws of Hammurabi

In 1902, in what is now southwestern Iran, archaeologists found a diorite stele which had been looted by the King of Elam and which contained a number of legal stipulations enacted by the Babylonian ruler Hammurabi. At that early stage of Mesopotamian archaeology, it was mistakenly dated far earlier than its correct date in the 18th century BCE, and proclaimed the world's oldest law code, an assertion still found today in textbooks and cultural references even though, as mentioned by Amanda Podany in her recent book Brotherhood of Kings, specialists in the field have known of earlier examples as far back as 1915. At present, the earliest known law code is the Code of Ur-Nammu.

Beyond that, however, most scholars today doubt that such monuments, including that of Hammurabi, were even actual law codes as opposed to monuments of royal justice. Bruce Wells's article on "Law and Practice" in Blackwell's Companion to the Ancient Near East elaborates, noting most significantly that despite a reasonably large number of cuneiform texts recording judicial decisions, we have no examples of the law being applied. The stipulations are seen as somewhat random, and occasionally presuppose knowledge of an existing body of law. The purpose of this monument was not to establish law, but to serve as a visual reminder the peace and justice in the land derived from Hammurabi's rule, the same sort of propaganda purpose which ancient monumental building usually served.

Elementary Sanskrit

Penn Live offers a story in the "strange college courses" genre:

"Imagine going to college and taking classes in monsters, zombies, UFOs and Sanskrit...

"Like diners at an expansive smorgasbord, students are selecting quirky, intriguing, somewhat weird but usually cool courses. Why not?

"Who wouldn’t like to take 'Monsters' at Messiah College, 'Elementary Sanskrit' or 'They’re Coming to Get You: Zombies, Mass Culture and Art' at Lebanon Valley College? How about 'Unidentified Flying Objects and Near-Death Experiences,' also known as Sociology 282, a study of UFOs and NDEs, at Harrisburg Area Community College?"

Some of these are just creatively titled typical offerings, but how did "Elementary Sanskrit" make this list? Isn't it just a typical beginning foreign language course?

Iftar in Uzbekistan

Uzbek authorities are apparently afraid of the communal meals which break the Ramadan fast:

"The official body in charge of Islam in Uzbekistan has ordered Muslims not to end their daily Ramadan fasts by eating out together in public.

"As in other Muslim countries, people in Uzbekistan end each day’s fasting after sunset with a meal called 'iftar'.

"Some welcome the ban as it will curb the lavish feasts thrown by the rich and powerful using the iftar as an excuse. That was the explanation offered by the Muslim directorate, the state-backed clerical establishment, which said it had agreed the measure with police and other government agencies as the month Ramadan got under way on August 11...

"But others point out that it will also prevent ordinary people from enjoying the iftar as a communal event. In that sense, the ban appears to reflect the Uzbek government’s fear of any form of Islamic practice that it cannot control.

"According to a resident of the western city of Samarkand, many people did not have the facilities for cooking for many guests at home. In addition, he said the local authorities banned people from inviting significant numbers of guests to the iftar."

Myths of Tripartite Iraq

Reidar Visser has something critical to say:

"There has been much talk about conspiracies by hostile powers to divide Iraq into separate statelets, and most of it is probably unfounded. This partition conspiracy, however, is real and since it mostly goes undiagnosed it represents arguably far most dangerous aspect of the Iraq War: Brilliant Western academics who may have the best possible intentions towards Iraq and its people but who in an attempt at sounding sophisticated perpetuate the toxic paradigm of a tripartite Iraq – be it territorially or sociologically – simply because they have failed to study the country’s history properly through primary sources. The suggestion is not that sectarian and ethnic issues are non-existent in Iraqi history. But if Western academics had stopped reproducing what are outright lies about the origins of the modern Iraqi state, the whole climate of the discourse on Iraq would have looked vastly different. Rewrite that Feldman op-ed, delete everything that is empirically incorrect about Iraq’s history, and check to see how much is left of the original argument.

"Operation Iraqi Freedom may be over, but Operation Iraqi Partition lives on, regardless of Security Council resolutions or status of forces agreements. Unfortunately, there is no anti-war movement against it in the Western world because most of the academics there are in fact its loyal soldiers."

I suspect a lot of reason for the "tripartite Iraq" model of thinking stems from the superficial similarities between Yugoslavia after communism and Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Tellingly, however, only the Kurds have a heritage of seeking independence. Among Arabs, the idea has always been that a single Arab nation was deliberately divided by foreign powers to keep them weak, and what we've seen in Iraqi politics the last seven years hasn't involved anyone's quest for independence, but rather control of the resources of the united state.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)