Ras al-Khaimah Succession

For some reason I thought David Roberts's Gulf Blog was defunct, but Issandr El Amrani highlights an article there about jockeying for position in a battle to become the next Emir of Ras al-Khaimah:

"The quickly declining health of Ras Al Khaimah’s ruler is precipitating a round of intrigue and succession stories in the northernmost Emirate of the UAE. Sheikh Saqr Al Qasimi, 92, one of the longest ruling leaders in the world having ascended to the throne in 1948, has been in hospital for at least the past month.

"His son and Crown Prince, Sheikh Saud, has been in charge of the Emirate for some time but his official assumption of the throne faces a serious challenge from the former Crown Prince Sheikh Khalid who was deposed in 2003. The reasons for his removal from power are not wholly clear. It is believed that Khalid was forced into exile by his half-brother Saud for his staunch anti-Iranian rhetoric in addition to leading anti-Iraq war protests during which an American flag was apparently burned. It is even alleged that his ‘pro-woman’ attitude in the conservative emirate contributed to his downfall. Either which way, when he was deposed the UAE central government needed to send tanks to RAK to restore order after protests erupted. Saud has lived in exile since in Oman and London...

"What is different in this case is the 21st century manner in which Khalid has gone about resuming his place in line to the throne. Much like the Emirates’ economy is described as a ‘rentier’ in nature with their income (or rent) largely derived from oil and gas with an exceedingly heavy reliance of foreign workers, this appears to be a rentier coup. Specifically, Khalid hired Californian Strategies, an American public relations firm to devise a plan to return him to power. Some members of the PR staff even reportedly get a $250,000 bonus if they succeed.

"Cognisant of exactly what will grab the attention of America and the world at large, the PR agency — paid some $3.7 million to date according to The Guardian — began to formulate an image of Khalid as a Western-orientated, modern, pragmatic, facebook and twitter-friendly leader...

"The success of this quasi-coup depends on Abu Dhabi. The most powerful of the Emirates, their ruler and Emirati President, Khalifah bin Zayad Al Nayhan, will have a significant say in the decision. He has a vested interest in assuring stability in RAK; any security concerns could quickly end up 80km down the road in Dubai or 120km further on in Abu Dhabi. Installing the (now) clearly pro-American Khalid in power would not only please the Americans but fit in more with Abu Dhabi’s harsher anti-Iranian stance as compared to, for example, Dubai. Nevertheless, interfering in succession issues is always a dangerous business, even more so if there is the suggestion that it was done under foreign (American) pressure."

A bit more could perhaps be said here. Khalid was Crown Prince for a long time, and developed a great deal of influence in the emirate. It wouldn't surprise me if his ouster was partly because Emir Saqr feared being deposed himself. As Roberts notes, a how of military force was needed to suppress the protests over his ouster. It also wouldn't surprise me if his anti-Iranian stance was linked to the Tunb Islands dispute, in which case he'd have a lot of sympathy, not only in Ras al-Khaimah, but the rest of the UAE.

Khalifah b. Zayed Al Nahyan will not casually interfere in another emirate's succession dispute. Any rewards simply wouldn't be worth it when Abu Dhabi can dominate UAE as things stand. However, given the above, it's possible we could see a pro-Khalid movement within Ras al-Khaimah itself. I also wonder what the rest of the royal family thinks. The point about stability is key, and if there's an open dispute, a diplomatic campaign of the sort Khalid is waging could help him.

King Abdullah's Agenda

Toby Jones looks at one aspect of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia's policies:

"Yet, despite the new levels of openness enjoyed by Saudi citizens, Abdullah is not leading the kingdom on the path to political liberalism. Just the opposite: While making small social and economic concessions, the king is in fact turning the clock back in Arabia, using his popularity to confront clergy and restore the kind of unchecked authority his family enjoyed in the 1970s. Although the royal family has been the preeminent political force in the Arabian Peninsula since the early 20th century, its supremacy was challenged in 1979 by the spectacular siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, which marked the rise of a generation of Islamist rebels. The kingdom's leaders responded by co-opting its radical critics. In doing so, they greatly expanded the power of the religious establishment.

"Thirty years on, it is this bargain that Abdullah has begun to dismantle. And he is succeeding. Indeed, Abdullah's most important domestic accomplishment so far has been the strengthening of his and his family's grip on power."

I never thought King Abdullah would usher in much political reform. However, one component of his battle with the Wahhabi establishment has been the mild liberalization of social regulations, which is important to note. I also think a key part of the context here is not just the royal family's desire for power, but the wave of religious militancy several years ago which some in the Wahhabi establishment were seen as fostering.

Azad University Battle

RFE-RL reports on a battle over efforts to bring Iran's Azad University under principlist control:

"On one side are hard-liners within the Iranian establishment, most prominently President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who appears ready to punish Azad University for its alleged support for opposition candidates in the 2009 presidential election. Supporting Ahmadinejad is the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR), whose resolution to alter the Azad University's charter, replace its current head of Azad University, and change its governing board was recently approved by the president.

"On the other side are the conservatives within the same establishment, mainly former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who co-founded the university in 1982 and now the heads its board of trustees. Also supporting the conservatives are parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, and Abdollah Jasbi, the university head who is up for replacement and is a close Rafsanjani ally.

"Matters came to a head on June 19 when the university's board secured a temporary injunction that prevented the SCCR from enforcing its revision of the university's charter.

"The next day, a bill was rushed through the 270-member parliament that effectively circumvented the government takeover of Azad, by allowing universities to endow their properties to the public.Azad University's board had previously decided to endow the properties of the university, which has 357 branches and satellite campuses throughout the country.

"The legislative move was quickly met with demonstrations outside parliament by Ahmadinejad loyalists.

"In the wake of the heated protests, 100 legislators made a counter move by voting for emergency discussion of legislation that would support the SCCR's authority in the matter. This, in turn, could result in a bill that would effectively overturn the endowment bill passed on June 20. The counter move led to an uproar in parliament, with legislators exchanging insults."

This is cast as a dispute showing fissures within Iran's governing establishment, but again it rather shows how it is wrong to cast Iran as under the control of a unitary establishment. None of the figures named as opposed to Ahmadinejad's move were ever his allies. Rafsanjani was a strong supporter of Mousavi in the 2009 presidential election, which may mean that Jasbi was, as well, lendence credence to assertions that the institution favored reformist candidates.

Larijani, meanwhile, is a much more traditional conservative than Ahmadinejad, who has taken steps to ameliorate the violence with which the latter's allies suppressed demonstrations last summer. His stance here may be ideological or faction-based, but he definitely has no interest in seeing the Iranian military establishment linked to Ahmadinejad gain control of one of the world's largest universities.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Near Sumela

The Pontic Mountains of northeastern Turkey, near Sumela

Egypt's Opposition

Prompted by the beating death of Khaled Said in Alexandria, several thousand protesters rallied around Muhammad el-Baradei Friday demanding an end to Egypt's police state. The press coverage is there, but the current round of protests seems a bit like the Kefaya movement of 2005, which accomplished absolutely nothing, and I can't see el-Baradei's presence alone changing that.

Of perhaps greater long-term interest to me is the ongoing labor activism:

"Since 1998 over 2 million workers have participated in more than 3,300 factory occupations, strikes, demonstrations, or other collective actions protesting low wages, non-payment of bonuses, wage supplements, and social benefits, and private investors' failure to uphold their contractual obligations to their workers. The protests spiked sharply since the Nazif government accelerated the pace of privatization of public-sector enterprises in 2004. According to a recent report published by the Solidarity Center, The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt, privatization has usually meant less job security, longer hours, and a lower standard of social services for workers, while ETUF rarely defends their interests.

"The character of worker protests has been changing since late March. Supported by NGOs like the Center for Trade Union and Workers Services and the recently established Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, a growing number of workers, are coalescing around the demand for a national monthly minimum wage of 1,200 Egyptian pounds(about $215). That proposal was first advanced in 2008 by workers at the giant Misr Spinning and Weaving Co., in the Nile Delta. Security forces prevented Misr workers from striking in support of this demand on April 8, 2008."

If push comes to shove, the regime can easily give in to these demands and diffuse the movement. What would be striking is some sort of merger between the labor activism and those calling for political reform, but that doesn't seem to be happening.

Change in Wahiba Sands

The National looks at the changing life of Wahiba Sands Bedouin:

"Over the past 10 years, authorities have built major roadways leading to and between hitherto isolated towns and villages in an effort to develop local economies through investment and tourism.

"Apart from the increased appearance of other Omanis and foreign tourists in the sprawling 15,000-sq-km region, the greatest change, many locals say, has been to their lifestyles, which were traditionally in herding, farming and fishing.

"'I had hundreds of goats, sheep and camels grazing in this farm until the road came along four years ago,' said Mansoor al Hikmani, 76, a resident of the growing village of Al Sakaa in the southern Wahiba Sands.

"'Now my land is a quarter of what it was and I had to sell most of the animals because there is not much grazing land left,' he said, pointing to his few remaining camels and some rows of date palms that make up the border of his farm, which is hemmed in by a new road...

"Both men said the government had 'generously compensated' them for the farmland they lost, with Mr al Wahiba saying that the money he received for his land was triple the market value.

"Like many other farmers in the region, they have renovated parts of the remnants of their farms to cater to the increasing number of tourists to the area, building small restaurants and setting up areas for camel rides."

Karabakh Fighting

The front lines around Nagorno-Karabakh are suddenly hot:

"Intense skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces around the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh continued on June 21, RFE/RL's Armenian Service reports.

"News reports said an Azerbaijani soldier was shot dead early today in what the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry said was an Armenian attack on Azerbaijani Army positions in the Fizuli district southeast of Nagorno-Karabakh...

"Karabakh Armenian military officials insisted their forces suffered no fresh casualties on June 21, in the worst Armenian-Azerbaijani cease-fire violations in over two years...

"Four Armenian soldiers and one Azerbaijani soldier were killed in what authorities in Stepanakert and Yerevan described as an overnight Azerbaijani assault on a Karabakh Armenian army outpost in the northeastern part of the breakaway Azerbaijani region on the night of June 18-19.

"Exchanges of automatic and sniper gunfire along the main Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of Contact -- east and north of the disputed region -- appear to have intensified since then."

I don't see Armenia starting this, but perhaps Azerbaijan, which conventional wisdom holds is the ascendant power in the area due to its wealth in fossil fuels, is trying to apply pressure.

Gaza Watch

Geoffrey Aronson's argues for stepping back from a focus on Israel's Gaza blockade to focus instead on creating a means for Gaza to simply function as an economic territory:

"Instead of playing the game according to rules set by Israel, the international community must focus on creating an entirely new border regime on Gaza's land borders and sea and air corridors; a regime that removes Israel from its commanding role as gatekeeper, encourages Egypt to establish economic links with its Palestinian neighbor, that establishes land and sea corridors that operate according to internationally accepted standards, and that restores to Palestinians a system to import and export goods and services according to their abilities and preferences--not those of their enemies.

"The failure of the international community to confront Israel's decision to isolate Gaza from Israel and the West Bank is at the root of the web of crises centered on Gaza today. However understandable the international focus on Gaza's humanitarian emergency, what is at issue is the fact that Gaza's current nightmare is the consequence of Israel's continuing effort to separate the political, economic, and security destiny of the West Bank from that of the Gaza Strip--an objective that the international community has tacitly supported because of opposition to Hamas' rule in Gaza."

I can deal with Israel treating Hamas as an enemy group. After all, it is an enemy group, and Israel's conflict with Hamas is part of the broader phenomenon of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the isolation of Hamas has, as far as I can tell, done nothing but strengthen the most radical elements of Palestinian society - Hamas and the Salafi groups to its right - while the peace process which was supposed to make Palestinians love Fatah simply does not exist with the Netanyahu government in power. Under these conditions, it makes sense for the international community to find a way to deal with Hamas and the territory it controls.

Kuwaiti Intermarriage

Kuwait is trying to limit intermarriage:

"Kuwait has set up a committee to look into ways to limit marriages between Kuwaiti men and foreign women.

"The committee has been assigned the task of studying marriage applications with a view to reducing the number of marriages between Kuwaiti men and foreigners, the Al Qabas daily said yesterday.

"While most Kuwaiti men preferred to marry their countrywomen, hundreds do take foreign wives.

"Their inability to pay thousands of dinars in dowry and exorbitant marriage and living costs has often been cited as the main reason Kuwaiti men marry foreigners."

This is an issue for the regime because it broadens the number of people who can tap into the country's welfare system. Women also marry foreigners, but I suspect the legal system makes it harder for them to draw husbands into the privileges of citizenship, meaning it's not as large of an issue.

UPDATE: This story confirms that Kuwaiti woman can't pass on citizenship to their children.

Tiberias Mosque

This is an old mosque in the Israeli city of Tiberias, by the shores of the Sea of Galilee.

Resettling Madaba

The Jordanian city of Madaba touts an old heritage, but the modern city only dates back to 1881 when it was settled by Christians from Karak. During this period, lots of new land was being brought under cultivation throughout the Middle East and settlement was increasing. The story of Madaba, however, is a bit wilder than most, as found in Eugene Rogan's Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921.

In November 1879, a young Roman Catholic woman was kidnapped by a Muslim male of the Sarayra family, and her relatives demanded her return. The Majalis, the leading Muslim notable family in the region, sided with the Catholics, and the woman was released to the Majalis, who in turn handed her over to local Catholic clergy.

Unfortunately for the Catholic clergy, simply returning her to her family proved not to be an option, as the people of Karak insisted she be killed to redeem the family's honor, in what is now known as an "honor killing." The priests, therefore, Fr. Alexandro Macagno and Fr. Paolo Bandoli, smuggled her to Jerusalem and on to Nablus. Her brother, frustrated in his determination to murder her, turned instead on the Sarayra, and killed a number of them at Wadi Hasa near the city.

This, in turn, led to tribal tensions between the Sarayra and the Roman Catholic tribe of 'Uzayzat, and the Catholic clergy decided the best thing to do would be to simply have their flock leave the area. Accompanied by three 'Uzayzat shaykhs, Fr. Bandoli surveyed central Jordan, and together they decided Madaba was the best place to settle.

The determination to let the Christians have Madaba was made by none other than Midhat Pasha, a reformist statesman who turns up all over the mid-19th century Ottoman Empire, and at this time was governor of Damascus. The settlement was opposed by Sattam Fayiz of the Bani Sakhr tribe, which claimed Madaba as part of their domain and didn't want to lose it, while potentially forming an alliance with the Majalis of Karak. Midhat Pasha, however, ruled against the Bani Sakhr as part of his overarching program to get the tribal authorities to submit to the Ottoman administration, in this case by registering land and paying taxes on it. They hadn't done that, so in the eyes of the state the land was vacant and the 'Uzayzat could claim it.

One other side note is that Fr. Bandoli, who led the migration from Karak to resettle Madaba, was himself and interesting figure who tried to take on the role of Bedouin shaykh in Madaba and ultimately ended his life as a book peddler for the Protestant Bible Society in Alexandria, Egypt.

Israel's Blockade Easing

Israel is now allowing some new categories of goods into Gaza:

"Israel removed cookies, soda, canned fruit, and other snack foods from the list of goods barred from entry into the impoverished territory, though it maintained its ban on imports of cement and other building materials that Gazans and international aid groups say the territory needs to recover from the pounding it took in Israel's 2008-2009 offensive, which left much of the infrastructure in ruins and destroyed hundreds of homes.

"Israeli officials said the easing had nothing to do with the controversial raid on the flotilla, which prompted dozens of governments to call for an end to an economic blockade that has pushed Gazan unemployment above 40 percent. But it follows a similar symbolic easing by Egypt, Israel's partner in the blockade of Gaza and its Islamist Hamas government."

This seems like public relations more than anything else, removing some of the most easily mocked categories while leaving the heavy hitting building and medical categories.

Iskenderun Attack

Some Turks suspect Israel of complicity in an attack near Iskenderun Naval Base:

"Hours before the deadly Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara and other ships carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, an assault on Turkey’s Iskenderun Naval Base left seven servicemen killed and six injured (Firat, May 31; Today’s Zaman, June 6). Though earlier reports indicated the attack was on the naval installation, Hatay Governor Mehmet Celalettin Lekesiz said later that PKK members fired on a military vehicle carrying troops to sentry posts with RPG-7 grenade launchers and 'long-range weapons' (TurkishPress.com, May 31)...

"Inevitably, news of the fatal attack on Iskenderun looked to many Turks like two sides of the same coin. The feeling was reflected at top levels across the political board; AKP Deputy Chairman Huseyin Celik remarked, 'We do not think that it is a coincidence that these two attacks took place at the same time' (Today’s Zaman, June 2). After expressing regret over the losses at Iskenderun, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu stated, 'At a time when the Israeli army continues military operations, it is meaningful that such an incident took place in Turkey' (Today’s Zaman, June 2). Turkish intelligence agencies are reported to be investigating any links between the raid on the flotilla and the attack on the naval base (Today’s Zaman, June 6)."

This strikes me as really improbable. Why would Israel set about attacking the Turkish military directly? It makes no sense.

Khersones

These are the ruins of the Greek port of Khersones just outside Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. The cathedral in the background commemorates the baptism of Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev.

Iran, One Year Later

I feel like I should mark the first anniversary of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election as President of Iran, but I don't have that much to say. On the one hand, last summer's events made it evident that power in Iran now rests with the principlist faction and its military and paramilitary supporters. They've maintained it over the past year by simply threatening to crush the opposition with brutal force, and conditions haven't been desperate enough that a critical mass of people have risked going out to protest anyway. All this leaves us in a situation where the regime is unpopular, but too powerful to safely oppose, the same situation one usually sees in the Arab world.

Sic Transit Zion

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is becoming openly pessimistic about the two-state solution:

"Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas said on Thursday he feared the concept of a two-state solution to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 'is beginning to erode.'

"'I would like to express concern that the situation is very difficult,' he said in remarks at a Washington think tank.

"'The concept of a Palestinian state ... with an Israeli state, I fear, is beginning to erode,' he said."

What makes me pessimistic is not just the current situation on the ground, but the direction the current Israeli government is pursuing. Matt Duss addressed some problems here.
(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Karimov Youth

Uzbekistan is creating youth groups to augment its border security:

"The Uzbek authorities are recruiting a volunteer police force to help patrol the country’s borders.

"The force is being set up under the aegis of Kamolot, an official youth movement. Kamolot issued a statement on May 25 saying volunteer squads were being created in 'mahallas', neighbourhoods which come under the lowest tier of local government

"The Kamolot Posbonlari ('sentinels') will be deployed along the borders with Kazakstan and Tajikistan, and help the law-enforcement agencies tackle smuggling.

"An insider source in Uzbekistan says the country’s military has a significant presence in frontier areas, and is surely better placed to deal with smugglers than volunteer youth groups."

What this is really about, I suspect, is the government's interest in developing ways to socialize youth into its own ideology and loyalty to the regime.

Easing a Blockade

With the glare of the world upon it, the Israeli government is allowing some new goods into Gaza:

"Israel is easing its Gaza embargo to allow snack food and beverages into the Palestinian enclave, Palestinian officials said on Wednesday, following an international outcry over Israel's raid on an aid flotilla...

"The Palestinian officials, based in the West Bank, said that as of next week, Israel will allow a wider variety of food, such as potato crisps, biscuits, canned fruit and packaged humous, as well as soft drinks and juice, into the Gaza Strip...

"Israel says its blockade of Gaza is necessary to choke off weapons supplies to Hamas Islamists who run the enclave and are opposed to Abbas's peace efforts with the Jewish state...

"Raed Fattouh, head of a West Bank-based Palestinian government committee that coordinates entry of goods into the Gaza Strip from Israel, said it was unclear whether Hamas would let the Israeli-made drinks and snack food in.

"A Palestinian merchant, who spoke to Reuters in the Gaza Strip on condition of anonymity, said Hamas officials ordered businessmen in the enclave not to import most of the items from Israel. A variety of goods come into the Gaza Strip from
neighbouring Egypt via smuggling tunnels."

I'm glad Israel has found a way to defend itself against potato crisps, fruit, and soft drinks. Hamas, meanwhile, shows it would prefer to keep a monopoly on distribution of goods into Gaza through its smuggling tunnels.

Bahrain Elections Preview

Abdellah al-Derazi previews Bahrain's upcoming parliamentary elections:

"As Bahrain heads toward elections for the lower house of parliament in September or October, a climate of public unhappiness with the incumbents prevails. The parliament elected four years ago was dominated by Islamists, including the Shi’i opposition al-Wefaq Islamic Society on one side and the two Sunni groups al-Minbar Islamic Society (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) and al-Asala Political Society (Salafi), which allied with the government, on the other. Most secular and leftist candidates, who probably would have allied with al-Wefaq to form a majority bloc, did not win seats due to government interference.

"This year’s elections will see a similar cast of characters, as all these blocs will run again and others, such as the opposition Haqq movement, will stay out as it did last time. But a large number of independent candidates, including women and businesspeople, are expected to run. In 2006 the government discouraged businesspeople from running, but this time they seem determined to get into the game and put up their own candidates rather than lobbying for the support of others. Kadhem al-Sa’eed, a member of the board of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry, recently announced that he would run. Given the public’s sense that those elected last time accomplished little, new candidates running either on lists or as independents stand a good chance, making the outcome of the elections unpredictable."

Sawt al-Arab in Manama

Back in this article, I expressed an interest in the reception of the Nasser-era radio station Voice of the Arabs. Here's an excellent bit from Nelida Fuccaro's Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800:

"After the Egyptian revolution of 1952, radio became another form of egalitarian political acculturation. The broadcasts of Sawt al-'Arab from Cairo propagated the anti-imperialist message of Nasser, the iconic Pan-Arab leader who also started to target Belgrave and British imperialism in Bahrain directly. Regardless of status and education, Nasserist propaganda entered the heart and minds of Arab residents. Manama's coffee shops gathered large crowds of listeners, and in poor Sunni neighbourhoods with no public facilities radio broadcasts increasingly shaped the activities of the majlises of influential members of the community. In al-Hurah, one of the new popular quarters of Manama, personal consultation and collective gatherings in affluent houses started to be defined by the times of broadcasts as radio sets made their appearance in both outdoor and indoor reception areas."

The idea of people getting together in discussion groups to discuss broadcasts brings out something I missed in my article, and this is that unidirectional mass media can and does spark discussion, much like the cassette tapes I suggested as an analogy for web-based social media.

Hamas Refusal

What is Hamas hoping to accomplish here?

"Hamas will not allow goods from an aid flotilla raided by Israel to enter the blockaded Gaza Strip, a spokesman for the Islamist organization said Thursday.

"Ahmed al-Kurd, Social Welfare Minister in the Hamas government which rules Gaza, said Hamas would block the aid cargo until Israel met all of the group's conditions.

"Israel must release all of the activists detained after Israel's interception of the Gaza-bound convoy and transfer all, not just part, of the seized cargo, Kurd said...

"An Israeli spokesman said eight trucks packed with goods taken from the flotilla are stuck at the Kerem Shalom crossing point, waiting to enter the Strip.

"He denied Kurd's claim that Israel has confiscated goods, saying Israel had not yet finished unloading containers from the flotilla."

The Blockade is the Thing

Issandr El Amrani shares my perspective that the flotilla assault is part and parcel of the larger blockade issue:

"Gaza is the crux of the matter. An international effort towards lifting the blockade must be inventive and propose a solution to a complicated problem quickly. They should be focused on lifting the restrictions Israel imposes on goods coming into Gaza and ensure that reconstruction materials are allowed in. They must also tackle the security demands that Israel will make to prevent weapons going into Gaza. International institutions like the UN will almost certainly have to play a role, and perhaps also the European Union as monitors (as has been suggested before.) This is costly both politically and financially, support needs to be rallied around the idea. But an immediate aim must be allowing aid and reconstruction material, and secondly relinking the Gazan economy to that of the West Bank, i.e. restoring Palestine's economic integrity."

The Devil's Not the Details

In the wake of yesterday's assault on the Gaza aid flotilla, the most important tactic of Israel's defenders, including the American government, has been to focus on the details of the events which transpired aboard the Mavi Marmara in the early stages of the confrontation. The Israelis argue that their military was pursuing something like peaceful crowd control until they were attacked by activists aboard the ship, and pointing to the two seriously and eight lightly injured soldiers, insist they fired in self-defense.

The Israeli preference, in other words, is to have a discussion about rules of engagement. In attempting to focus the international discussion there, they are also implicitly asking their critics to somewhat carelessly accept the premise that the flotilla represented a force which required a military assault in international waters. If the Mavi Marmara was something like a transport vessel carrying an enemy guerrilla force, then what took place aboard her decks loses its power.

No one, however, really contends that the activists attacked the soldiers first. That bears emphasizing, because the Israeli position also requires acceptance of the fact that scrambling the communications of and forcibly boarding a ship in international waters is not a form of attack against which the activists with their makeshift weapons sought in vain to defend themselves, only to be smashed by the superior Israeli firepower. I'm sure Israeli commanders did hope to achieve their objectives without bloodshed, but the logic and arc of the events they set in motion carried that possibility from their conception.

Despite half-baked claims to the contrary, this was not, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed today, "a violent force", and the Israelis have apparently found no weapons to trumpet before the cameras. Instead, they have found a bunch of humanitarian aid which they are allegedly transferring to Gaza themselves. I would love for someone to examine that situation, and determine how much of it was in violation of Israel's draconian blockade of the territory, and consequently how dangerous it can really be if Israel's now just passing it on.

For the real story here is not about a military confrontation at sea, but about an ongoing siege the consequences of which for the Gaza Strip have been well documented elsewhere. If Israel were just checking ships and convoys for weapons and then waving them on, this flotilla would not have existed. The violence yesterday was but an extension of the ongoing violence of siege which does not protect Israel, but makes Gaza into a giant internment camp in which conditions are becoming increasingly desperate. In this context, who did what to whom once the Israeli assault was in progress simply doesn't matter.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)