Only 15 Dead

This year saw only 15 Israelis killed in violence involving Palestinians:

"The past 12 months have seen the lowest number of terror attacks this decade, and the least number of Israeli casualties of terror, according to a report from the Shin Bet security services released Wednesday.

"The Shin Bet credits the low number on the ability of Israeli security forces to thwart attacks, as well as efforts by Palestinian security organizations...

"The decrease in the number of deaths from terror attacks is also a result of the decrease in the number of rockets fired into Israel. Between the start of the year and December 24, 566 rockets were fired into Israel, compared to the 2,048 that were fired in 2008.

"The report also noted that Hamas was reigning in activities of the Islamic Jihad terrorist organization in Gaza."

So since terrorism is Israel's main justification for the occupation, does this mean they'll be pulling out of the West Bank over the next few months?

Iran's Chaos

Juan Cole lays out just how extensive Iran's protests have become:

"Another remarkable dimension of Sunday's events was the sheer number of cities where significant rallies and clashes occurred. Some of those allegedly killed are said to have fallen in Tabriz, a northwestern metropolis near Turkey. Even conservative cities such as Isfahan and Mashhad joined in. Shiraz, Ardabil, the list goes on. The attempt of some analysts to paint the disturbances as a shi-shi North Tehran thing has clearly foundered.

"The most ominous sign of all for the regime is the reports of security men refusing orders to fire into the crowd...

"Richard Spencer of the Independent reports from Dubai on the darker side of Sunday's events, as crowds went on rampages, setting fire to banks, government buildings and even a local police station in response to the use of live ammunition on them by security forces. They threw up barricades and set fire to them, as well as to basiji motorcycles, filling the streets with shooting flames and hovering smoke."

What strikes me most about these events is that the government has only thown fuel on the fire. Had they just let the Ashura protests and Montazeri funeral go on with minimal violence, things might have diminished. I commented over the summer that the biggest problem for the reformists was the lack of a hook for future protests, but now the crackdown itself has become the hook. Furthermore, as one of Andrew Sullivan's readers notes, the next couple of months lend themselves to protests:

"I think one way to explain the regime's brutality is by looking at the calendar. There are two important national holidays coming up, the first one is "Arba'ain" it is the 40 day anniversary of third Shia imam (who died in "Ashura" which was today), this will be also the 40 day anniversary of everyone killed today (I think it will be Feb. 5th). The second one is 11th Feb. the anniversary of Iranian 1979 revolution which is a national holiday accompanied by mass rallies.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Netanyahu's Kadima Offer

Benjamin Netanyahu's offer to Kadima seems more insulting than anything else:

"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday offered opposition leader Tzipi Livni two ministerial posts without portfolio should she agree to bring her Kadima party into the coalition, but said he would not divert from the foreign policy set early in his term.

"During their evening meeting, Netanyahu also told Livni that the basic lines of government would not change should the centrist Kadima join the coalition.

"He said that the premier would retain the right to make every policy decision, and that Kadima would be obligated to accept any agreements reached by the other parties in the coalition. Following their meeting, Livni summoned her aides to debate the proposal."

In other words, Netanyahu is inviting Kadima to serve as a rubber stamp for the right wing, and perhaps as insurance in case one of his right-wing partners withdraws. What Kadima is supposed to get out of this is beyond me, and it's probably aimed at giving individual Kadima MK's cover if they want to bolt.

History of the IRGC

Top-notch Iran expert Ali Ansari has a new article on how the IRGC's history set the stage for its crucial role in Ahmadinejad's electoral coup. I was struck by this part, among others:

"In fact, to cut costs, the Basij, who were themselves incorporated into the IRGC command structure, were instructed to make their money from fines on people breaking sumptuary laws. It soon became apparent that basijis were becoming dependent on this income and, by extension, on a regular supply of misguided and 'corrupted' individuals. If everyone became a 'good Muslim' overnight, who on earth would they fine? The trick was to constantly change the rules, at times relaxing them until a sufficient quota of women painted their nails, for instance, before abruptly tightening them up. This cycle became as regular as the seasons in Iran, and the butt of many jokes, more so because the authorities pretended that this annual scam was prompted by religious adherence.

"The Guards themselves became involved in similar schemes to do with satellite dishes, which were periodically outlawed because of the access they allowed to corrupting influences from the outside world. The Guards, however, took matters to another level entirely. It was widely suspected that they were involved in the illegal importation and even production of satellite dishes, which they would then sell, seize and resell. Similar suspicions abounded about the distribution of drugs, in particular opium, the traditional leisure drug of choice in Iran."

An important take-away point is that Iran's Islamic Republic has not been a stagnant polity, and that the events we're seeing today are the result of multiple developments within it.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Montazeri's Symbolism

Protests and clashes involving Iranian reformists are taking place throughout much of the country:

"Witnesses told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that police and Basij militia were out in force in Tehran and other cities, including Mashhad, Qom, Hamedan, and Najafabad and preventing protesters from congregating in large numbers. Other reports quoted witnesses as saying police fired tear gas and used batons to disperse the demonstrators.

"The incidents come as Iran marks a Shi'ite religious festival, Ashura, commemorating the death of a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century.

"Its culmination on December 27 coincides with the seventh day since the death of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of Iran’s most prominent dissidents and an outspoken critic of the government.

"An eyewitness from the western city of Najafabad, who didn’t want to give his name, told Radio Farda that a group of people chanted slogans supporting Montazeri as well as the opposition Green Movement and that there were 'a few clashes today in Najafabad with Basijis and security forces' and that the situation in Najafabad is now 'tense.'"

Much has justifiably been made of the death of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri a few days ago. Some of the coverage, however, focuses on a quest to identify a "new Montazeri" in ways that seem to me misguided. Montazeri has been a dissident cleric for years, and I see no evidence that he served as any sort of catalyst for the Green Movement as opposed to just supporting it, as do many ayatollahs of somewhat lesser stature. He was, I think, seen by reformists as more of a political martyr than someone they looked to for leadreship and guidance, though he could generate some ideas they found interesting.

If Montazeri did anything to catalyze demonstrations, it was to die during Ashura, and the latter is certainly critical for many of the protestors in this equation. I suspect Ayatollah Yusuf Ali Sane'i will become the new go-to guy for reformist clerical opinion, but he won't have Montazeri's history. The best candidate to take over Montazeri's symbolic role is actually Mousavi, if he gets arrested.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

The Date of Christmas

Via my friend Daren, I found this piece by Andrew McGowan advancing a theory about how Christians came to celebrate Christmas on December 25: Some theologians arrived at the date due to a belief that the conception of Jesus took place on March 25 in harmony with Easter, and therefore that he must have been born nine months later.

This kind of dating issue isn't something that has ever interested me either as a historian or as a Christian. However, without knowing anything about how it fits into scholarly discussion of the topic, I find this thesis interesting. The most common explanation, that December 25 was chosen to distract people from some festival around the time of the Winter Solstice, does fit practices of theological co-option common in the history of most religions. The fact it is weak at the level of finding the human agents and explaining their mindsets is probably not enough to undo it given my impression of the source material.

Evidence suggests, however, that Christians commemorated Christmas in December during the 3rd century, and perhaps even earlier. It was around 200 that Christians calculated a March 25 date for Good Friday. McGowan's earliest source for the connection between Jesus's conception and crucifixion, however, is from the 4th century, so I'm not sure it follows that calculating the date of the conception came first and led to the birth. That said, as liturgical dates seem to have come from calculation and those are the earliest calculations we have, I can definitely see it. This, in turn, let's us see a much more subtle form of religious influence, for once the date is in the calendar, it perhaps begs to become a Christian version of other late Roman winter celebrations, much like Hanukkah, though a lesser holiday within Judaism for centuries, has become a "Jewish Christmas" in majority-Christian societies.

Nativity

This picture shows the traditional site of Jesus's birth, in a small Grotto beneath the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. To all those celebrating, have a Merry Christmas!

Montazeri

Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri has died:

"Crowds of mourners are gathering in the Iranian city of Qom following the death of leading reformist cleric Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali Montazeri at 87.

"Some pro-reform websites say thousands of people are travelling to the city ahead of Monday's funeral.

"Other unverified reports say opposition supporters are also gathering in some squares in Tehran, fuelling government concern of increased political tension...

"The BBC's Jon Leyne says his death comes at a crucial time in a standoff between the government and opposition, and the leaders will fear a big turnout for Monday's funeral."

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Questioning Kuwait's PM

The main reason for the frequent dissolution of recent Kuwait parliaments has been the desire of MP's to question the prime minister, a high-ranking member of the royal family. That barrier has fallen:

"The non-cooperation motion was sparked by a request from MP Faisal Al Mislim who last month sparked a fury when he displayed a $700,000 cheque signed by the prime minister for the benefit of a former MP.

"Al Mislim demanded to know the reasons for such a generous act at a time when the premier’s court was being audited, insinuating financial mismanagement.

"However, Shaikh Nasser, a nephew of the Amir, said that the cheque was personal and that the money was from his private account.

"A vote by MPs to grill him threw Kuwait, the first Gulf country to have a parliament, into political turmoil, and the Amir was left with the option of dismissing the government or dissolving the National Assembly to avoid the quizzing.

"But Shaikh Nasser insisted that he and three other ministers also under doubts of financial and administrative irregularities face quizzing by MPs.

"On December 8, Shaikh Nasser was grilled by MPs in a marathon behind closed doors session.

"The parliament’s vote results today put an end to the turmoil and Shaikh Nasser will keep his post."

Here is a profile of the MP who brought the motion.

Dubai Bailout

Today's biggest economic news is probably Abu Dhabi's decision to bail Dubai out of its economic woes with $10 billion. This has apparently been a trend:

"Abu Dhabi, which controls the UAE's presidency, has directly and indirectly provided Dubai with $25 billion over the past year, mostly by buying Dubai bonds. In all, Dubai's known debts are roughly equal to its total economic output last year. The full extent of its liabilities is uncertain, however, with some analysts putting the total at $100 billion or more.

"The aid package is key for Dubai, which despite its international celebrity has little of the oil wealth held by Abu Dhabi. Dubai's ruler is the UAE's vice president and prime minister."

What I'm wondering about is whether this will have an impact on Emirati politics, in which Dubai has proudly tried to stake out a position as Abu Dhabi's independent near-equal. Now that it's become the Arab Iceland, however, and been saved only by its wealthier neighbor, can it keep that up? Generous financial transfers are how Abu Dhabi built the UAE during the early oil boom under Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan.

Fortress of the Raven

(Photo from Flickr user frankenschulz under a Creative Commons license)
Despite having spent a lot of time in Jordan, I've never been to Karak, the name of a town near the Dead Sea and its imposing castle which may be the kingdom's most visited Crusader site. Begun around 1142 by Pagan the Butler under the aegis of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, it may be most famous in the West as a seat of Reynald of Chatillon, whose reputation for provocation was illustrated in the 2005 film Kingdom of Heaven. Reynald's actions wrecked the truce which existed between Saladin and Baldwin IV (the Leper King), leading not only Jerusalem, but Karak to fall to Saladin and the Ayyubid dynasty he founded.

Last year saw the publication of The Fortress of the Raven, a typically expensive Brill title by Marcus Milwright, who has also written a historical account for the Virtual Karak Resources Project. The book combines evidence from both material and written sources to reconstruct the political and economic history of the Karak area in ways that highlight the relationship between them. His concluding paragraph begins, "Karak may be regarded as a market town whose history was transformed by the construction of a major castle at its southern extremity." The area did produce an agricultural surplus and benefited from traffic along the Kingshighway, but the construction of the fortress led to its becoming an administrative center with rulers and bureaucrats importing luxuries, primarily from Palestine, making it a more important trading stop than it would otherwise have been.

The castle's strategic importance is best illustrated by an account Milwright describes on pp. 38-9 of his book, in which following the capture of the Egyptian port Damietta by the Fifth Crusade, the status of Karak and the outpost of Shawbak further south were the chief sticking point in negotiations, as the Crusaders felt they could not permit Ayyubid bases so close to a reconstituted Kingdom of Jerusalem, nor were the Ayyubids willing to risk a possible division of Syria and Egypt through an undefended Jordan. A later Ayyubid ruler would advise his son to hand over both Shawbak and the coast of Syria before relinquishing Karak.

The age of Egypt's Mamluk rulers, however, which began in 1250, would make evident another reason for Karak's strategic importance. Sultan Baybars stayed in the castle regularly in order to maintain a relationship with the Bedouin of the area, who provided intelligence, livestock, and military services. Later, after the 1293 assassination of Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil, who had driven the Crusaders from their last outpost in Acre, the leaders of rival factions installed the 9-year-old an-Nasir Muhammad as a puppet, though after a shift in their schemes several months later he was sent into exile in Karak, an area he came to know well. In 1299 he was recalled again to serve as puppet, but after ten years taken up mainly with wars against the Mongols, he sought to escape the powers behind the throne and went back to Karak, where he tried to win allies among the area's magnates and Bedouin. After about a year he returned to Cairo with their support and began a 32-year reign which is usually considered the apogee of Mamluk power.

For whatever reason, the later Mamluks paid less attention to the area, and shortly after the Ottomans conquered the region in the early 1500's, they began ruling through the local Bedouin leaders while developing a new transportation route and fortresses further east, probably close to the Desert Highway of today.

Rafsanjani's Remarks

As a follow-up to yesterday's post, here's what prompted Moslehi's criticism of Rafsanjani:

"Last week in Mashhad, Rafsanjani said that the government’s existence depends upon the people’s support, and if the people in the future no longer support Iran’s leaders, they will no longer be in power. Moslehi attacked these remarks, suggesting that the rule of the supreme leader is up to the people. 'Mr. Hashemi says as long as people want the Vali Faqih (the supreme leader) he gets to rule and when they no longer want him he must abdicate.' According to Moslehi, the Vali Faqih derives his legitimacy not from the people, but directly from God."

I can't say for sure without more context, but that sounds pretty mild as reformist sentiments go.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Moslehi Attacks Rafsanjani

Although the most recent comments I've seen from Rafsanjani have not been supportive of the opposition, Iran's intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi has attacked him as part of it:

"Moslehi, quoted by the official IRNA news agency, said Rafsanjani recently had stated that his views about postelection events had not changed.

"'It is shocking to see that he repeats the same things as the leaders of the recent riots say in their statements,' he said, apparently referring to Musavi and fellow reformist Mehdi Karrubi, who have continued to voice defiance over the election.

"'Those who themselves are in crisis think the country is in crisis...but as an informed official I declare that there is no crisis in the country,' Moslehi said. 'Those who used to think they were on the safe side should know...they cannot victimize the intelligence forces for their own interests.'"

It's possible that Rafsanjani said something that I missed, but an important angle to this is that regardless of his stance on the election, Rafsanjani remains an enemy of Iran's principlists that they may be using this to push his influence downward.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

SMS Divorce

RFE-RL reports on how labor migration affects Tajikistan's divorce rate:

"With jobs at home in dismally short supply, a significant percentage of Tajikistan's male population depends on seasonal work abroad to earn money that can be sent home in the form of remittances. But as this migrant culture takes root, long-distant marriages are increasingly ending in 'SMS divorce,' contributing to a spike in the country's divorce rate and leaving countless Tajik women without recourse...

"It is estimated that nearly a million Tajiks -- accounting for one out of every seven citizens and consisting mostly of men aged 18 to 60 -- depend on seasonal jobs in Russia or elsewhere abroad to make a living. The migratory nature of the work leads to prolonged periods away from home, a scenario that women's rights activists say negatively affects the institution of marriage in Tajikistan."

I suspect that the men in migrant communities often take up with women in the country where they work, leaving women in the labor sending country effectively out of luck in traditional societies.