Muscat Wastewater

Oman is moving ahead with a plan to upgrade Muscat's wastewater treatment facilities:

"Development of one of the biggest wastewater schemes in the Middle East is now well under way in Muscat.

"Affirming its determination to implement the giant project despite the global economic downturn, Oman’s government signed contracts worth in excess of half a billion dollars over the past week...

"In addition to the construction of several modern treatment plants, the contracts also cover the laying of hundreds of kilometres of sewer lines and several pumping stations, as well as the decommissioning of ageing treatment plants...

"Importantly, the Haya Water project will make available massive volumes of treated water for landscaping, farming and irrigation. It will provide the farm sector with an alternative resource to depleting groundwater aquifers."

Iranian Women and Activism

Melody Moezzi goes a bit into the ways in which women's role in the ongoing political turmoil in Iran didn't just spring from nowhere:

"Back in the ’70s Iranian women were fighting for the right to wear hijab after the shah outlawed it; today they are fighting for the right to take it off. Regardless, they have always been fighting for the same thing: the right to freely dress and, more importantly, speak their minds. Iranian women today are not embarking on some fresh path to freedom. They are simply picking up where their mothers and grandmothers left off...

"While it may appear that young Iranian women are at the head of this struggle, their grandmothers are at its roots. And it is these roots that allow them to stand strong and continue to fight even in the face of the harshest conditions, and even when it seems like no one is watching. While these roots may appear modest at first glance, they are, in fact, legion.

"Though maybe not to the rest of the world, in her corner of Tehran, Mamaan Kuchooloo was a kind of local celebrity. Everyone called her that, too: Mamaan Kuchooloo — a play on the Persian word for grandmother, mamaan bozorg, meaning big mother. Mamaan Kuchooloo, however, means little mother. At her tallest, she stood no more than 5 feet, but her presence was immeasurable."

She could also have mentioned that women were also critical during the Constitutional Revolution a century ago. A good source for this is Janet Afary's The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism.

Palin's Symbolism

Hugo Schwyzer has an important take on the Palin phenomemon:

"I found her politics crudely reactionary, and still do. But I was and am troubled by the way in which some of my fellow progressives have failed to recognize that, in many ways, Palin’s popularity with the 'base' reflects a radical cultural shift among our conservative brothers and sisters: with some notable and defiantly troglodytic exceptions, most on the right were and are quite comfortable with the idea of this woman, a mother of five, serving as president. This reflects nothing less than the happy truth that, for the most part, we on the left have won and are continuing to win the culture war. A generation ago, far more pastors and conservative pundits would have railed against a mother of young children pursuing a very public career outside the home. Her ambition would have been decried; her husband Todd’s primary role as caregiver to the younger daughters (Willow and Piper) would have been blasted as a tragic refusal to submit to God’s plan for the human household. And though some on the very fringes of the far right did indeed make noises to that effect, I was pleased that a clear majority of conservative voters repudiated those traditionalist sentiments.

Supreme Leadership

My trip back to the Midwest late last month broke my momentum in following Iran closely, and I'm only now starting to feel caught up enough so that my thoughts might be useful. Chief among those thoughts is the simple fact that the nature of the Supreme Leader's office has changed, and perhaps with it, the range of potential futures for the Islamic Republic.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's concept of velayat-e faqih never had wide and deep theological support, but during the past 30 years, it has won acceptance, even if only passive, as a cornerstone of Iran's political landscape. During the past month, however, that implicit authority has been weakened beyond repair. How many people, and I'm speaking specifically of Iranians, knew previously that the Assembly of Experts didn't just elect the Supreme Leader, but also had the power to supervise and if necessary remove him? How many people, both within the government and outside it, have become his enemies now that he has openly become theirs?

The authority of his office weakened, Khamene'i now relies almost entirely on open displays of physical power, a development which grows out of the increasing Ahmadinejad-era militarization of Iranian politics that may have played a role in last month's electoral coup to begin with. Two days ago, the Los Angeles Times's Borzou Daraghi reported this:

"The top leaders of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard publicly acknowledged they had taken over the nation's security during the post-election unrest and warned late Sunday, in a threat against a reformist wave led by Mir-Hossein Mousavi, that there was no middle ground in the ongoing dispute over the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

"Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the elite military branch, said the guard's takeover of the nation's security had led to 'a revival of the revolution.'

"'These events put us in a new stage of the revolution and political struggles, and all of us must fully comprehend its dimensions,' he said at a Sunday press conference, according to reports that surfaced today.

"'Because the Revolutionary Guard was assigned the task of controlling the situation, [it] took the initiative to quell a spiraling unrest. This event pushed us into a new phase of the revolution and political struggles and we have to understand all its dimensions.'"

Digest that statement, and you start to see the difference between the principlists' "Islamic Government" and the "Islamic Republic" of traditional conservatives and most reformists.

What, then, of the popular revolution which has coalesced around Mousavi? If, over the course of several months, they succeed in forcing some sort of change the nature of which becomes more difficult to see as time passes, the Supreme Leadership is further weakened, having gone all in on suppressing it. If they fail, then the present regime continues, but it is difficult to see much future for the evolutionary potential many saw within the republican framework. It was always plausible for a successful reformist run to, in alliance with pragmatic conservatives, make the Supreme Leader a mostly ceremonial figure who gave sermons, talked about values, and presumably had a plush lifestyle if he wanted it, but interfered in government no more than Europe's constitutional monarchs. The office has no future, however, as the dictator-for-life of a government maintained only by the military, especially if it eventually winds up in Mojtaba's hands as a family fiefdom.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Mojtaba Khamene'i

RFE-RL looks at the important political role of Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i's son Mojtaba:

"Mojtaba Khamenei has a powerful unofficial position as the gatekeeper for all who want to contact his father. His role is reported to include acting as an interface between his father and the Office of the Supreme Leader.

"The office has an extended staff of thousands to arrange the supreme leader's meetings and keep him up to date on all political developments in the country. It does that by close contact with the supreme leader's own appointed representatives to the executive branch, the military, the provincial governments, and virtually all major revolutionary, religious, and cultural organizations.

"Mojtaba is widely credited with winning his father's endorsement for Ahmadinejad to run for president in 2005, when Ahmadinejad emerged from the shadows as a former mayor of Tehran but not a major national figure...

"Mojtaba, a reclusive figure in his 40s or early 50s, is said to be more hard-line than his father.

"Like Ahmadinejad, he represents a second generation of leaders determined to protect the Shi'a-led revolution from the moderating effects of time. Again like Ahmadinejad, he is said to share a taste for messianic rhetoric and Islamic fervor.

"There have always been allegations that Mojtaba -- given his father's total reliance upon him as a gatekeeper -- might be being groomed to succeed the supreme leader."

Crown Prince Hussein

In a non-shocking development, Jordan's King Abdullah II named his oldest son as crown prince:

"Hussein's appointment came in a royal decree released by the palace. It said the crown prince will hold the title and enjoy the rights and privileges of his post effective immediately...

"Thursday's move was widely expected once the position became vacant in November 2004, when Abdullah removed the title from his half brother, Prince Hamzah, in a sudden palace shake-up.

"Hamzah, 29, had held the post when Abdullah first ascended to the throne in
February 1999 following the death of their father."

We'll see if King Abdullah decides to skip trying to name another son as Hussein's successor.

Zahra Mansouri

This got buried under the Iran story, but is significant. A woman named Zahra Mansouri was chosen as mayor of the Moroccan city of Marrakesh.

BBC Persian

Given its importance as a media outlet in the current Iran crisis, readers might be interested in Paul Cochrane's profile of BBC Persian in the last Arab Media & Society. You should read the whole thing to see the channel's situation on the eve of the elections, but here's an interesting historical note:

"While VOA has been broadcasting Persian news and discussion programming into Iran by satellite since 1999, such forays by foreign powers into the Iranian television market are rare. The launch of BBC Persian TV comes some 69 years after the BBC Persian Radio Service went on air during World War II, when the news was firmly controlled by the propaganda department of Iran’s Ministry of Information. Ever since, the BBC has had a complex relationship with its Iranian audience, being viewed as a credible alternative to state propaganda at times and an agent of British meddling at others.

"BBC radio broadcasts were considered instrumental in turning the people against Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was forced to abdicate following the British and Russian occupation of Iran in August 1941, while the service carried out a similar function during the CIA-backed overthrow of Premier Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953. Conversely, in the lead up to the overthrow of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in February 1979, the Persian Service was accused of backing Ayatollah Khomeini when it ran interviews with the revolutionary leader and aired segments of his speeches.

"Nearly 30 years after the Islamic Revolution and just months before PTV was to launch, the BBC was again under fire."

Cohen on Larijani

Marsha Cohen tries to understand Ali Larijani:

"Speaking live on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) Channel 2 on Saturday (20 June), Larijani stated that 'a majority of people are of the opinion that the actual election results are different from what was officially announced.' He criticized members of the country’s Guardian Council, which must certify the election results, for openly favoring Ahmadinejad and campaigning for him. 'Although the Guardian Council is made up of religious individuals I wish certain members would not side with a certain presidential candidate.'

“'The Guardian Council should use every possible means to build trust and convince the protesters that their complaints will be thoroughly looked into,' Larijani declared. Expressing his concern that the Iranian people had lost their trust in the country’s legal system, Larijani said it was up to the authorities to provide an atmosphere in which people feel free to express their opinions.

"Press TV has just released a report quoting an interview with Larijani, in which he 'urges ‘politicians and candidates’ to separate themselves from rioters and seek legal channels to prove their claims.' Larijani accused some of the rioters of not having voted, and 'taking advantage of the current mood by creating unrest and disrupting public security. They must be stopped.'

"Larijani 'is the quintessential opportunist' cautions Iranian-born security expert Shahram Chubin, the Director of Research at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies in Switzerland. 'Be prepared to see him on every side of a question, utterly without any scruple or principle, except self-advancement.'"

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Stolen Election

Juan Cole commentary on a Chatham House report brings together lots of threads that have led professional Iran watchers to almost unanimously reject the Iranian election results.

Back on the Grid

I'm back on the grid, but have a lot of catching up to do. In the meantime...

1.) Someone commented on yesterday's post that Larijani has said most consider the elections fraudulent. This represents a break between him and Khamene'i, in contrast to what I said below. A break between Larijani and Khamene'i is huge.

2.) The use of the British Embassy here has historical resonance. On the one hand, the British are widely viewed with suspicion in Iran. However, in the Constitutional Revolution, the British did grant sanctuary to protesters, and this is remembered fondly.

Lines

If Larijani and Tavakkoli aren't just working for their own advantage, it seems likely that they were acting in support of Khamene'i's efforts to reposition himself above the fray, move Ahmadinejad off center stage, and make the battle about the system of government rather than the election.

That sets the stage for this.

Khamene'i's Sermon

In his Friday sermon, a translation of which you can read here, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i had one major theme, and that was the importance of preserving the system of the Islamic Republic, one to which all four candidates are committed and which millions of voters legitimized by voting. This part leaped out at me:

"This was a response to many of your enemies' remarks expressed in their biased propaganda. If the people have no hope for the future they would not take part in elections. If they do not trust their own system they would not take part in elections. If they do not feel free, they would not welcome the elections. Trust in the Islamic Republic became evident in these elections. I will tell you later that the enemies have targeted this very trust. The enemies of the Iranian nation intend to undermine this trust. This trust is the biggest asset of the Islamic Republic and they want to take it away. They want to create doubt about elections. They want to cast doubt on the trust of the people.

"The enemies of the Iranian nation know that when trust is gone, participation will weaken. When participation and presence on the scene is weakened, the legitimacy of the system will be questioned. This is what they want. They want to undermine trust to weaken participation to deprive the Islamic Republic of legitimacy. The harm inflicted by this is far worse than setting fire to buses and banks. This cannot be compared with any other loss. The enemy wants to see the people come forward in such a move and participate so enthusiastically in elections and then get told that they have made a mistake in trusting the system, the system is not trustworthy. This is what the enemy wants."

Later in the sermon, he chided all the candidates, trying to appear above them as a wise spiritual leader, while extending a welcome to Rafsanjani and Nateq-Nouri (at least the former of whom was absent) as part of the family of the Islamic Republic. You could almost say he was trying to be Barack Obama, calling for unity even while sticking firmly to his own agenda.

On the immediate demands of the protesters, he gave nothing, standing by his earlier insistence that Ahmadinejad won the race fair and square. He also, however, made a point to the leading figures on the other side: Do they want to bring down the republic, and perhaps cause the chaos of another revolution? If and when a crackdown comes, it will be framed thusly - as a defense of the system against outsiders.

Finally, what was with the Branch Davidian reference? Is that the best he can do in criticizing "Democrat" governance?

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

On the Road

I'm on the road this weekend, so if something happens during the day, don't come here to read about it. I will check in during the evenings.

Ahmadinejad's Conservative Critics

Another name I've been keeping an eye out for has surfaced. This time it's Ahmad Tavakkoli, who ran for the presidency against Rafsanjani and 1993 and Khatami in 2001 and is close to (in fact, related by marriage, if I remember correctly) Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani. He is unhappy with the crackdown:

"Many prominent conservative politicians, including Ahmad Tavakkoli, a conservative critic of Mr Ahmadinejad and head of the parliament research centre, and Maryam Behrouzi, secretary general of the Zeynab Association – a politically conservative women’s group – have also protested over Mr Ahmadinejad’s attitude towards his opponents.

"In a live programme on the state-run television on Wednesday, Mr Tavakkoli said Mr Ahmadinejad’s tone was one of the main reasons for the present unrest in the country.

"'The 14 million who didn’t vote for Ahmadinejad and now have questions and feel insulted, rightly or wrongly, are not ‘motes and dust’ and ‘hooligans’. Motes and dust and hooligans are those who attacked university dormitories and students and committed those murders,' Mr Tavakkoli said."

Yesterday, I wondered what Larijani was up to with his criticism of Ahmadinejad's Interior Ministry. Now I wonder if Tavakkoli is up to the same thing. Meanwhile, however, other Ahmadinejad backers are also speaking up:

"But the strongest criticism came from unexpected quarters – from a member of one the parties that had officially backed Mr Ahmadinejad’s candidacy in the elections.

"'A person who thinks of only himself and his associates as being right and all others as wrong, and looks at others as ‘motes and dust’, whatever his position, has ceased to be a servant of God,' Habibollah Asgaroladi, a prominent conservative politician, was quoted as saying by Farda News on Wednesday.

"The Islamic Coalition Party (Motalefeh), of which Mr Asgaroladi is a central council member, still considers Mr Ahmadinejad to be the winner of the elections."

The conservatives who dominate the government definitely aren't all on the same page.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)